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PUBLIC COMMISSION
STAFF WORKING PAPER

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
AND DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES OF THE
LOS ANGELES COUNTY GOVERNMENT

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County gov't
" " officials
Decision making

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The Public Commission on County Government is an independent body created pursuant to a grant from the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation to the Los Angeles County Bar Association. The Commission was formed in February 1975, and asked to conduct a one-year study of the structures and operations of Los Angeles County, with special reference to the adequacy and effectiveness of its central managerial and decision-making institutions.

The Commission is composed of twelve members, drawn from a wide variety of professions and affiliations. All members serve without compensation for their services. The membership is as follows:

Sigmund Arywitz	Frederick Llewellyn
David Boutte	Donn B. Miller
Willie Davis	Dorothy Nelson
Richard C. Gilman	Joseph Rensch
Evon Gotlieb	Armando Rodriquez
Seth M. Hufstedler (Co-chairman)	Harold Williams (Co-chairman)

The Commission is assisted by a staff directed by Edward K. Hamilton. The deputy staff director is Dr. Francine F. Rabinovitz. Staff members assigned to the preparation of this working paper are Judith Detchmendy, Marge Pearson Stern, and Christopher Walton.

The sole purpose of this working paper is to provide the Commission with facts and analyses which may assist it in its deliberations. Staff working papers contain no conclusions or recommendations. All findings and proposals which can properly be associated with the Commission will be contained in its Report.

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I. OBJECTIVES OF STAFF PAPER

This staff paper seeks to examine and analyze the operation of Los Angeles County government in order to describe how current central organizational structures and procedures relate to current problems or are indicative of problems likely to arise in the future. This and other Commission studies have benefited from three previous studies sponsored by the County Board of Supervisors - a 1958 Charter Commission study, a 1970 study by the County Economy and Efficiency Commission, and a 1974 Task Force Report by the same Commission. This paper, one of a number of staff reviews prepared to assist the Public Commission on County Government in its deliberations, attempts to build on the earlier work rather than repeat it. It should be carefully noted, however, that the facts and analyses contained herein are solely the responsibility of the Commission staff and not of the Commissioners themselves or of any prior study group.

The purpose of the present effort is not to find fault or apportion blame. The purpose is to indicate where the pattern of institutions, rules, and ways of carrying out the government's responsibilities help or hinder attempts to establish and sustain coherently organized, well managed, effective, equitable, and responsive County government.

This first paper focuses upon the central executive structure of the County - the Board of Supervisors, the Chief Administrative Officer, and the independently elected Sheriff, District Attorney and Assessor - and the decision-making processes through which they operate. Other staff papers will examine the way these central offices and processes affect the actual delivery of vital services in the field. All papers will be designed to provide information and analyses which will help the Public Commission to evaluate the practical effects of existing central institutions and procedures on the making of policy and on the effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness with which it is implemented. The papers are also intended to aid the Commission in assessing how well the County can be expected to cope with future developments, and how well it can relate to other governments in the region.

In this and in all our work the staff proceeds in the conviction that coherent institutions are never more than facilitating conditions for effective representation, enlightened policy and efficient administration. They are never sufficient to guarantee these results. Individual character and ability are always at least as important as the institutions within which people work. The right test of how the government is structured, therefore, is whether progress toward these goals is being helped or hindered by present institutional and procedural arrangements.

A Note on Method

This staff paper was prepared by a team of five professionals in the fields of management and public administration. Information was gathered through the collection and analysis of existing written materials and through intensive interviews with more than 100 County officials, with experts on County government, and with knowledgeable citizens. Public

hearings were also conducted by the Commission to hear the views of community groups and of the principal actors in the County government. The Commission staff also conducted a number of systematic analyses of County documents and records.

The staff would like to thank all of those who have been asked to provide information and opinion in the process of conducting the study. The cooperation we have received from busy elected and appointed officials has been outstanding. Their willingness to assist the Public Commission is deeply appreciated.

II. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

A. Summary of Formal Powers and Responsibilities

The most important starting point in understanding the government of Los Angeles County is the fact that the County Charter vests all general government powers, legislative and executive, in the Board of Supervisors. The Board also has certain quasi-judicial responsibilities. Each Supervisor, who represents approximately 1.4 million residents, serves in addition as the administrator of all local government services to constituents who reside in the unincorporated areas of his district, with duties that are similar to those of the mayor of an incorporated city. Chart I summarizes the extensive formal powers of the Board.

The mixing of legislative and executive powers means that the Board is involved in every stage of the government process, from policy formation to implementation. In some cases it is also the appellate tribunal for review of its own decisions. For example, the Board in its executive role appoints the members of the Regional Planning Commission. That Commission hears cases of requests for conditional land use permits. The rules for granting such permits are specified in the zoning ordinance passed by the Board. If the petitioner is not satisfied with the decision of the Regional Planning Commission, the Board of Supervisors hears the case in its quasi-judicial role. The Board's decisions are then final and conclusive. The practical effect of this multiplicity of Supervisorial functions is to provide a broad range of roles within which the Board as a collectivity and the Supervisors as individuals can select according to their philosophies, interests, constituency pressures, and the compelling direction of events. The sections below attempt first to provide an outline of the formal powers and organization of the Board and then to outline some of the possible themes of concentration among which each Supervisor selects in determining his role.

B. The Board as an Operating Body

1. Organization

The Board of Supervisors has two sets of organizational structures. One is the organization of the Board acting as an entity; the other is the organization of each of the individual offices of the five Supervisors.

The Board as an Entity

Acting as an entity, the organization consists of the Board itself and its Executive Office. All decisions by the Board, except where personnel, collective bargaining, and litigation decisions are concerned, are debated and made at the public meetings held each Tuesday. The Board employs no committee system to debate issues before they reach the full body. Moreover, State law (the Brown Act) prohibits the Board from meeting in private, except on

CHART I: LEGAL POWERS OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

4

EXECUTIVE

- Appoints all agency heads and department heads except 3 elected officials, after competitive examination.
- Appoints all officers, assistant deputies, clerks, attaches and employees whose appointment is not provided for in Charter. (Delegated to department heads.)
- Appoints all members of advisory committees.
- Approves an annual budget outlining the positions and expenditures of all departments, including those with elected heads.
- Supervises the activities of the Chief Administrative Officer and all appointed department heads except the Marshal of the Municipal Court. Each Supervisor serves as the chairman of a set of County departments and is responsible for keeping informed of the business of the unit assigned and reports to the Board on them. No rule as to assignment and rotations exists.
- Elects a Board Chairman to preside at all meetings. Rules of Board after 1972 mandate a pattern of succession and rotation of this position.
- Provides, publishes and enforces a code of rules prescribing in detail the administrative duties, systems of office and institutional management accounts for each of the departments and other institutions in the County.
- Serves as the governing body of special districts --- Sanitation, Flood Control, Air Pollution Control, Fire Protection.
- Sets the salaries of all non-elected County personnel.
- Determines the management position in collective bargaining.
- Determines County and special district policy.
- Serves individually on more than 20 organization Boards and Councils via appointment by action of the Board of Supervisors (SCAG, L.A. Regional Criminal Planning Board, etc.).

CHART I: LEGAL POWERS OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (Cont'd.)

- LEGISLATIVE
- Adopts ordinances and rules to control the administration of County government and regulates public conduct in the unincorporated areas of the County.
 - Adopts a salary ordinance.
 - Adopts ordinances concerning services, ranging from animal control to fire protection.
 - Creates departments other than those required by the Constitution and laws of the State.
- QUASI-JUDICIAL
- Acts as an Appeals Board on zoning exception cases of the Regional Planning Commission.
 - Sits for hearings on County Improvement Districts. Passes on improvement projects, determines methods of financing and advertises bids.
 - Hears appeals on licensing. (Delegated to the License Appeals Board of the Business License Commission which consists of a deputy from the office of the Supervisor in whose district the business is located, the County Counsel and the Probation Department.)
 - Reviews recommendations on assessment appeals. (Delegated to the Assessment Appeals Board, which sits as the Board of Equalization for L.A. County. Makes final decision on assessment appeals exceeding \$50,000 and on recommendations of hearing officers on lower appeals.)

the three confidential matters noted above. Thus, discussions by Supervisors on policy occur almost entirely in the context of responding to items on the agenda for the weekly meetings. All decisions are made in this forum by a vote of the majority of the quorum present at each meeting.

The Board also spends every other Thursday considering matters which require public hearings. These usually involve land acquisition and zoning decisions. It also meets on an as-needed basis in private sessions on personnel matters, such as hiring and evaluation of department heads and determination of management positions in collective bargaining. The Board also may hold special purpose public meetings such as hearings on the budget.

The Executive Office (EO) acts as the administrative head of the Department of the Board of Supervisors, and as a secretariat for the Board. It assembles the agenda, maintains minutes of meetings, advertises hearings, gives notice of Board actions, and files original documents. The EO maintains the budget for the Board and for the individual supervisorial offices. The funds necessary to run the five offices appear in the budget request of the Executive Office. The EO also canvasses the supervisorial offices to determine the number and kind of staff positions each Supervisor feels he needs, and performs the accounting work necessary to provide for all requests. There are no budgetary restrictions on these positions, and additional positions can be added during the year as the need arises.

The head of the EO is also the executive officer of the Assessment Appeals Board, which sits as a Board of Equalization for Los Angeles County. The Economy and Efficiency Commission and the Music and Performing Arts Commission, created by the Board to render specialized advice are attached to the Executive Office. The County Counsel is responsible for writing ordinances required by the Board and provides advisory opinions to the Board on the interpretation of County orders and codes. The Chief Administrative Officer, whose function and office will be discussed in detail in Section III, advises the Board on matters of policy and administration, prepares and submits the budget, and is the main staff advisor to the Board as a collectivity.

The convening and presiding officer at meetings of the Board is the Chairman. The Chairman has no additional powers as a consequence of this role, although he probably receives more public visibility than most of his colleagues. Although there is a tradition of rotation of the chair, until 1973 the Board had established no formal rules for the rotation of the chairmanship and irregular rotation was the rule rather than the exception. Since that time, there has been a procedure for rotating the position every two years in order of seniority.

In addition to his general responsibility, the Board Chairman designates each Supervisor the chairman of a number of operating

County departments. (There are 50 departments at present; the current division of chairmanships is indicated in Chart II.) Historically, the division of these assignments was supposed to reflect the special needs and problems of the district from which each Supervisor came. Thus, while there were some changes in departmental assignments, on the whole there was great stability in the assignments until 1972. (The pattern of assignment by district for the period 1942-1974 is summarized in Chart III.) The only exception to the rule of departmental assignment is the oversight of Health Department hospitals. For administrative purposes the hospitals in each district are assigned to the locally-elected Supervisor.

The current distribution of departmental assignments reflects no apparent attempt to cluster related activities, although it did follow an unprecedented request from the incumbent Board Chairman that each Supervisor state his preferences. There have been occasional suggestions for grouping the departments by function. For example, one Supervisor might serve as chairman of all regulatory departments (Air Pollution Control, Animal Control, Business License Commission, Civil Service Commission, County Clerk, Employee Relations Commission) while another could supervise all finance agencies (Assessor, Auditor-Controller, Treasurer Tax Collector). To date, however, this principle of assignment has not been employed. Indeed, as will become clear below, the basic rationale and description of duties for the position of chairman in the present era is in serious doubt. Should this question be satisfactorily resolved, however, the issue of logic of assignment would remain.


Individual Supervisorial Offices

Each Supervisor is free to organize his office in whatever way he believes will most effectively perform its three main functions. First, the office must be organized to serve his direct constituents and focus particular and constant attention on actions which affect his geographic area. Second, the agenda and public meetings processes place the burden for gathering information and weighing each agenda item on the shoulders of each Supervisor. It is the responsibility of each to come to the public meeting with sufficient information to vote on all of the 250 matters which are typically presented to the Board. He must also be prepared to introduce whatever special items he elects to place before the full Board. Third, the Supervisors must organize their staffs to keep themselves informed about the activities of the departments of which they serve as chairman, and those of other departments if they decide, as most do, to take a special interest in particular programs.


In most local governments, the staffs of elected officials are appointed by that official and serve at his pleasure and for the length of his term. In Los Angeles County, however, supervisorial staffs are appointed into the civil service system. (When a Supervisor leaves office, staff members either remain as staff to the new incumbent or are transferred to other County departments. The District Attorney, for example, employs a number of former

CHART II: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS OF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, DECEMBER 1974

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE - JAMES A. HAYES, CHAIRMAN



FIRST DISTRICT Peter F. Schabarum, Chairman



* Rancho Los Amigos Hospital

Legend

Appointive

■ Required by County charter

□ Required or authorized by State law


△ Established by ordinance of Board of Supervisors

Elective

◆ Required by County charter

◇ Required by State law


SECOND DISTRICT Kenneth Hahn, Chairman



* John Wesley Hospital
* Harbor General Hospital
* Martin Luther King Hospital

For general administrative purposes, other than budget making, the several institutions of the Health Services Department are assigned to individual Supervisors on a geographical basis

THIRD DISTRICT Edmund D. Edelman, Chairman





* Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center

Coliseum Commissioners:


Kenneth Hahn
Peter F. Schabarum
James A. Hayes
Edmund D. Edelman (alternate)

FOURTH DISTRICT James A. Hayes, Chairman



* Long Beach El Cerrito Hospital
* Long Beach General Hospital

FIFTH DISTRICT Baxter Ward, Chairman



* Mira Loma Hospital
* Olive View Hospital
* Antelope Valley, Rehabilitation Centers (Action, Warm Springs, Mira Loma)

CHART III: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS BY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTS, 1942-1974

Departments	12/15/42	12/07/43	01/09/45	12/10/46	12/14/48	12/12/50	12/02/52	12/14/54	08/02/52	12/11/56	06/10/58	12/09/58	12/08/59	12/13/60	01/23/62	12/19/62	12/14/65	01/24/67	12/16/67	04/01/69	District Stability	07/15/70	02/22/72	12/05/72	01/02/74	12/17/74
Agricultural Commissioner	1*	1	5	1	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	.75	5	5	5	5	5
Coroner and Medical Examiner	1	1	1	4	1	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.75	4	4	5	5	5
Farm Adv.	1	1	5	1	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	.75	5	5	5	5	5
Flood Control District	1	C*	1*	1	1	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.85	1	1	1	1	1
Livestock Inspector	1	1	5	1	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.60	1	1			
(Commissioner) County Veterinarian																										
Justice of the Peace Courts (include with other courts 1952 on)	1	1	3	1	2	2															.50					
Pound Dept.	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5		.61					
Public Administrator (include Guardian 1956 on)	1	1	1	4	1	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.75	4	4	5	5	5
Civic Center Committee	3	3	5	3	3	3	2	1	1												.56					
County Clerk	3	5	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.85	2	2	2	2	2
County Public Library	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.60	1	1	1	1	1
Health Dept. ***							1																			
Garbage Disposal Dists.	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.90	1	3	C	5	5
Los Angeles County Schools (Superin- tendent of Schools)	3	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	.75	1	1	1	2	4
Museum of History, Science & Art Dept. (Museum of National History)	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.60	2	2	2	2	2

* 1,2,3,4,5 - District

** C - Committee of the whole.

*** This does not include hospitals, which are each supervised by the Supervisor in whose district they are located.

xxx District Stability - No. of times the district with highest frequency occurred
No. of times the department appeared at all.

CHART III: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS BY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTS, 1942-1974

(Cont'd.)

Departments	12/15/42	12/07/43	01/09/45	12/10/46	12/14/48	12/12/50	12/02/52	12/14/54	08/02/52	12/11/56	06/10/58	12/09/58	12/08/59	12/13/60	01/23/62	12/19/62	12/14/65	01/24/67	12/16/67	04/01/69	District Stability	07/15/70	02/22/72	12/05/72	01/02/74	12/17/74
Probation Dept.	3	2	5	C	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	.80	3	3	3	1	4
Probation Committee	3	2	5	C	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3								.69					
Assessor	2	2	2	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.80	4	4	4	4	3
Auditor (Auditor- Controller)	2	3	4	2	2	2	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.75	2	2	2	2	2
Board of Supervisors	2	3	1	4	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	.80	C	C	C		
District Attorney	2	2	5	5	5	1	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	.60	3	3	3	3	2
Grand Jury	2	2	5	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	.75	3	3	3	3	3
Janitors	2	2	2	3	3	3	2														.57					
L.A. Memorial Coliseum	2	3	5																							
Purchasing and Stores Dept.	2	3	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.80	4	4	4	4	4
Sanitation Dists.	2	3	1	4	1	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.70	4	4	4	4	3
Treasurer	2	2	2	2	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5							.75	5	5	5	1	5
Tax Collector	2		1	4	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5						
County Counsel	5	5	2	2	2	2	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.55	2	C	C	5	C
Courts - Municipal - Superior	5	5	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	C	.80	C	C	C	4	4
Law Library	5	5	3	4	1	5	3														.43					
Marshal's Office Los Angeles Long Beach	5	5	3	2	2	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.80	2	2	2	1	1
Patriotic Hall Soldier Burials	5	2	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2									.67					
Public Defender	5	5	3	2	2	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.75	2	2	2	1	3

CHART III: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS BY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTS, 1942-1974

(Cont'd.)

Departments	12/15/42	12/07/43	01/09/45	12/10/46	12/14/48	12/12/50	12/02/52	12/14/54	08/02/52	12/11/56	06/10/58	12/09/58	12/08/59	12/13/60	01/23/62	12/19/62	12/14/65	01/24/67	12/16/67	04/01/69	District Stability	07/15/70	02/22/72	12/05/72	01/02/74	12/17/74
Public Welfare Commission	5	2	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.75	2	2	2		
Psychopathic Dept. (Mental Health after 1950 on)	5	5	3	2	2	4	5	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	.40	3	3			
Recorder (joined with Registrar 1967 on)	5	5	2	5	5	1	1	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2			.56					
Sealer of Weights & Measures	5	5	2	3	3	3	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.65	4	4	4	4	1
Building Dept. Services	4	4	4	5	5	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.65	2	2	2	2	2
County Surveyor & Engineer (Engineer)	4	4	4	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.75	1	1	1	5	5
Forester and Fire Warden	4	4	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	.60	5	5	4	4	2
Mechanical Dept. (Services)	4	4	4	5	5	5	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.65	2	2	2	2	2
Parks Dept.	4	4	2				2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.75	4	4	4	2	2
Regional Planning Commission & Dept.	4	4	4	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.70	1	1	1	5	1
Registrar of Voters (Recorder: 1967 on)	4	4	2	1	5	5	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	.35	C	1	1	1	5
Road Dept. (Commissioner)	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.70	4	4	1	2	2
Sheriff	4	4	5	C	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	.85	5	5	4	4	1
Telephone Dept.	4	1	3	3	4	5	5														.29					
Administrative Officer (CAO)	C	C	1	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	.95	C	C	C	C	C

CHART III: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS BY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTS, 1942-1974

(Cont'd.)

Departments	12/15/42	12/07/43	01/09/45	12/10/46	12/14/48	12/12/50	12/02/52	12/14/54	08/02/52	12/11/56	06/10/58	12/09/58	12/08/59	12/13/60	01/23/62	12/19/62	12/14/65	01/24/67	12/16/67	04/01/69	District Stability	07/15/70	02/22/72	12/05/72	01/02/74	12/17/74
Civilian Defense	C	C	4																		.67					
Civil Service (include in Personnel, 1974 on)	C	C	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	.75	4	4	4		
Dept. of Public Assistance (Public Charities, Social Service) *Los Angeles County Disaster Relief Authority	C	C	1	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	.95	C	C	C	1	4
Committee for Inter- racial Progress			3	3																	1.00					
County and City Affairs Committee			3	4	4	3		4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5					.54					
Youth Committee			5	5	5	5	5	2	2												.71					
Air Pollution Control District					C	C	C	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	.81	5	5	4	4	1
County Art Institute & Art Museum					3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1.00	3	3	3	3	3
Committee on Human Relations					3	3						1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	.73	2	2	2	2	2
Music Commission (and Performing Arts)					3	3	5	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	.75	5	5	3	3	3
Aviation (part of Engineering-Surveyor 1954 on)					5	5	1														.67					
Public Guardian (under Pub. Adm. 1956 on)						4	4	4	4												1.00					
County Boundary Commission								1	1												1.00					
Committee on Oppor- tunities and Needs of the Aging (Senior Citizens Affairs & County Service Office)							2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	.85	3	3	3	3	3

CHART III: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS BY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTS, 1942-1974

(Cont'd.)

Departments	12/14/48	12/12/50	12/02/52	12/14/54	08/02/52	12/11/56	06/10/58	12/09/58	12/08/59	12/13/60	01/23/62	12/19/62	12/14/65	01/24/67	12/16/67	04/01/69	District Stability	07/15/70	02/22/72	12/05/72	01/02/74	12/17/74
Arboreta & Botanical Gardens			3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.69	1	1	1	1	1
Fort Moore Pioneer Memorial Committee			3	3													1.00					
Communications Dept.			4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	1.00	4	4	5	5	1
Harbors & Marina			4	4	4	4	4										1.00					
L.A. County Watershed Commission					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1	1	1	1	5
Community Services					3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	.92	5	2	2	3	4
Historical Landmarks Committee			3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1					.88					
Fish & Game Commission					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1					1.00					
Real Estate & Property Management							C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	1.00	C	C	C	4	
Clerk of Bd. of Sup.									C	C	C	C	C	C	C		1.00					
Military & Vets Affairs									2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1.00	2	2	2	2	2
Bureau of Adoptions									3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1.00	3	3	3	3	3
Small Craft Harbors									4	4	C	C	C				.60					4
Otis Art Institute										3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1.00	3	3	3	3	3
Personnel (& Employee Relations & Civil Service Cons.-1974 on)															C	C	1.00	C	C	C	3	4
Animal Control															5	5	1.00	5	5	5	5	5
Executive Officer																C		C	C	C	C	C
Data Processing																3		3	3	3	3	3
Urban Affairs																3		3	3	5	3	1

CHART III: DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS BY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTS, 1942-1974

(Cont'd.)

<u>Departments</u>	04/01/69	District	Stability	07/15/70	02/22/72	12/05/72	01/02/74	12/17/74
Beaches	4			4	4	4	4	4
Business License Commission							1	1
County Energy Commission							4	4
Facilities								4

Supervisory staff members in his community affairs division.) Each Supervisor currently employs between 20 and 30 staff members. The budget of the five offices for personnel totals \$2.6 million in 1975, up from \$1.9 million in 1974 and \$1.2 million in 1970. There are 134 staff people serving the Supervisors, up from 116 in 1974 and an average of 77 in the period 1970 to 1973. This is in addition to the 71 members of the Executive Office staff. There is no formal organization chart for supervisory offices, nor are there any limits to the size of supervisory staffs, except as imposed by the Supervisors as a group in the budget process.

In each of the current staffs there is a general division between so-called "field" deputies assigned to affairs in the districts and deputies assigned to work "in-house" on departmental and agenda matters. Not every Supervisor has full-time field deputies, but all have deputies with some field assignments. (The current district-by-district distribution of field personnel and general descriptions of their duties are provided on pages 62-63 below.) The field personnel respond to constituent problems, monitor the condition of County facilities in the district, and maintain relations with groups and city officials in the area. They also monitor the progress of capital projects under construction. The in-house deputies are divided along lines coinciding with the major policy interests of the Supervisor. District programs and departments that fall into the functional area assigned to a deputy are normally referred to him. In addition, the departments of which the Supervisor is chairman are divided among the deputies. All offices have a procedure for reviewing the agenda in advance of public meetings, but there is no formal mechanism for communication among the deputies of the Supervisors, nor is there any common service performed by one office for all others. Each Supervisor uses his own staff to perform the representational, managerial, and policy-making functions in which he serves.

2. Management Processes

The Board of Supervisors, operating as an entity, manages the business of the County largely through three processes - the agenda process, the budget process, and the personnel process.

The Agenda Process

Since all policy decisions are taken at Tuesday meetings, the setting of the agenda for those meetings is critically important. The formal agenda-making process is described in Chart IV. Any Supervisor has the right to place items on the agenda, but most actually appear as a result of departmental requests. Such requests are routinely referred to the CAO if a financial commitment is involved (i.e., virtually always), and to the Supervisor who is chairman of the Department. These requests are accompanied by supporting "Board papers," which often run to scores or even hundreds of pages. Each

CHART IV: PROCEDURE FOR CREATING THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AGENDA

DEPARTMENTAL REQUESTS

The usual situation is that a department has a matter that needs Board approval or wishes to send formal information to the Board as a whole. If the matter requires a budget adjustment, the department informally inquires if funds are available via the CAO's Office.

If the CAO indicates funds are available, the department sends a letter to the Executive Office of the Board of Supervisors describing the project, justifying its need and supplying supporting data. These documents are called Board papers.

The letter is filed by the Clerk of the Board and a copy sent to the CAO or to the relevant Supervisor. No rules exist formally indicating to whom the letter should be referred. If the matter affects a supervisorial district it is generally sent to the Supervisor of that district; fiscal matters go to the CAO, departmental matters go to the Supervisor who serves as chairman of a given department. No one other than a Supervisor or the CAO can put items on the agenda.

The Supervisor or CAO reviews the letter and recommends whether it should be put on the agenda.

If the CAO recommends disapproval, the department head may request a Supervisor to place the matter on the agenda or permit it to be placed on the agenda with a CAO recommendation for disapproval. If a Supervisor recommends against placing a matter on the agenda it normally does not appear.

If the proposal survives these reviews, it goes to the Clerk and is put on the agenda for Board action. The agenda and supporting papers are delivered to the Board offices and to the CAO's Office on Thursday mornings preceding the Tuesday meetings.

Time: 12 days to three weeks.

INDIVIDUAL SUPERVISORS

Any Supervisor may present items at the end of the regular agenda for Board consideration. There is no requirement for advance documentation or justification. Items thus can be presented de novo at the actual public meetings for debate.

request asks that the item be considered at the "first available" time. The agenda is made up one week at a time, with the Executive Office in the position of Traffic Director, working with the CAO and interested Supervisor(s). As noted above, the average meeting considers about 250 items, so that the attendant documents often comprise a stack more than a foot high. (One Supervisor points out that he casts more votes in a single year than members of Congress or the State Legislature do in a career.) If there is special community interest in an item, a Supervisor may request that it be marked "(S)" for "set time," so that the interested parties will know when to arrive if they want to witness Board action on the item.

In addition to the flow of regular items, each Supervisor may introduce at any meeting so-called "Special Items" which bear his name and may be considered without supporting documents or previous review by the CAO. There is also no requirement that other Supervisors be notified before the meeting of an intention to introduce such an item. There are normally about ten such items at each meeting. Although the hasty procedure sometimes reflects an emergency or special time pressure, the device is often used to introduce items where there is a particular political advantage to a Supervisor's personal identification with a proposal, where a particularly strong local or Countywide constituency is involved, or where events in the days immediately preceding the meeting have thrown the spotlight on a particular problem or program. It is not irrelevant in these matters that the special items are usually treated by the media as more newsworthy than items on the printed agenda available beforehand.

Each Supervisor can also hold items off the agenda for any department if he believes further consideration or preparation is needed. A few departments (e.g., Roads, Facilities, Fire) maintain fairly close contact with the Supervisors who chair them. Some give advance warning to their chairman when an item is going to appear on the agenda in order to give more time to the individual Supervisor to consider the request, but also inform other affected Supervisors. This does not, however, appear to be a regular practice among all departments.

When the agenda and the accompanying Board papers for regular items are delivered to the Supervisors' offices on the Thursday preceding the meeting, they are distributed to the deputies for intensive review. Generally, deputies get those agenda items which fall within their departmental or functional areas. The offices review the papers in detail and prepare recommendations for each Supervisor. The Supervisors consider the agenda items and the recommendations of staff by paper review, in Friday or Monday staff meetings, or both.

The Chief Administrative Officer, whose office is discussed in detail in Section III, also serves as a filter for the agenda items. The CAO has his own internal process for reviewing each

departmental agenda request and frequently delays the appearance of an item until he is satisfied that sufficient information is assembled and the matter is presented clearly and completely. As noted in Chart IV, if the CAO recommends that an item not appear, the department head may request a Supervisor to place the matter on the agenda or may ask that it be on the agenda with a CAO recommendation for disapproval.

The CAO makes a recommendation on all items which appear on the agenda, except those introduced from the Office of the Board of Supervisors and supervisorial special items. He generally reviews the coming agenda on Friday and distributes any agenda items not previously analyzed to his budget analysts for recommendations. The CAO recommendations appear on the printed agenda distributed to the Board, and he sends an additional memo to each supervisorial office recommending action on additional items which were not completed in time to make the printed version. Even on special items introduced without warning, the CAO can be heard for or against at the public meeting. For example, the CAO has recently opposed a special item to set up a separate County Bureau of Consumer Affairs and a special item to set up a Special Investigations Unit attached to the Executive Office of the Board.

The Rules of the Board require that all department heads with items on the agenda attend the Board meetings, although an occasional appearance by a deputy department head is tolerated by the Board. It is the custom of the department heads to wait in a room near the Board Hearing Room until their items appear, whereupon they enter the Hearing Room and answer any questions the Board may have. Board members on occasion also take this opportunity to discuss matters other than agenda items with the department heads. When items are held for discussion the department head remains at the meeting until the item comes up. A management audit of the Regional Planning Department by the CAO indicates the potential consequences when items are delayed for several weeks. In one case, a zoning decision that was held led to the department's deputy spending a total of 80 hours in Board meetings before the matter was heard. Some departments have instituted a new procedure for held items on the agenda in which Board meetings are broadcast into the department offices. A deputy listens to the meeting and checks the department's agenda items as they pass. If an item is held for discussion, the deputy calls the office of the Supervisor who made the motion that the item be held. The supervisorial staff person charged with that area then informs the department why the item was held and sometimes can estimate how long the hold will remain in effect.

It has been suggested that a timed agenda would be useful for circumventing the problem of waiting to appear for department heads. However, it is argued in response that there is currently no way to anticipate what items will be held, so

that constructing the timed agenda would be difficult if not impossible. A consent agenda has also been suggested, in which all items on which there was not unanimity are scheduled for a later date. However, this would also involve an additional meeting day for the Supervisors. Neither change seems now to be under active consideration as an alternative to the current procedure.

The regular part of the agenda consists of a series of numbered items grouped under the names of the departments in alphabetical order, listed after regular items introduced by the Board. The Clerk of the Board reads the name and number of an item. If a Supervisor wishes to reserve an item for discussion the number is mentioned and the item held. The Chairman of the Board has the option of allowing members of the audience to hold items. The Clerk continues until all of the items are read. A motion is then made to pass all non-held numbers en masse. The Supervisors then present special items not on the agenda. The last items considered are those which have been held for discussion. These can be continued further or voted on after debate.

Currently the Board meets for six hours each week to deal with the agenda. If each item were debated, assuming an average of 25, only about 1-1/2 minutes could be devoted to each. Of course, most items are not discussed and, therefore, require minimal time at the Board level. What additional time is required to prepare for Board review is another matter upon which quantitative data do not exist.

In summary, the agenda process has four noteworthy characteristics. First, the agenda is made up mostly of departmental matters needing approval rather than largely of subjects introduced by Supervisors independently of the departments. Many approvals are, in fact, mandated in State statute and cannot be eliminated or combined even if the Board so preferred. (An example of one set of State requirements is shown in Chart V.) Second, departments appear before the Board widely varying numbers of times, depending on the particular approval process required by State and local law in their fields of specialization. The County Engineer, the Facilities Department, the Flood Control District, and the Roads Department normally have many items come before the Board; others do not come up at all except at budget time. The Facilities Department needs at least ten approvals from the Board to complete a construction project which proceeds normally, and it brings about 300 capital projects before the Board each year. Thus, Facilities' items appear on the agenda at least 3,000 times in the course of a year. The Arboreta, in contrast, has few matters that require Board approval and thus receives direction from the Board almost entirely through decisions on budget and personnel, and via the supervision of the Supervisor who serves as its chairman. Third, while the agenda is the forum for policy-making and discussion

CHART V : FEDERAL AND STATE-MANDATED BOARD ACTIONS IN CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION PROCESS

1. Approval of selection of land parcel to be used as construction site, and associated environmental impact report.
2. Approval of project program plan created by Facilities Department, and appointment of architect.
3. Approval of Architectural Services Agreements with architect.
4. Approval of schematic drawings.
5. Approval of preliminary plan, and architect's working drawings.
6. Approval of site purchase and advertisements for bids.
7. Awarding of construction contract.
8. Authorization of change orders and any changes in funding.
9. Acceptance of final construction.

among Supervisors, few items focus discussion on general policy issues. Even special items are often ceremonial issues or recommended positions on State legislation. While all special items requiring a financial expenditure of more than \$10,000 are held for discussion at a later meeting, relatively few are significant enough to fall in this category. Fourth, the vast majority of agenda items are passed by a unanimous positive vote. A split actually occurs on only a small percentage of the Board's agenda items.

In an effort to get some sense of these patterns, the Commission staff has analyzed the records of Board meetings since the establishment of the Commission. Since Board agenda are destroyed, and Board papers are also not retained centrally, it is difficult to document the agenda process for the period before the staff began collecting materials. The eight meetings analyzed do not represent a random sample, and therefore, can be considered only illustrative of the way the agenda process proceeds. Although they are not necessarily representative, staff conversations with long-time participants and observers suggest no reason to believe that these meetings were atypical. The results are presented in Charts VI-VIII. In the eight-meeting sample there were a total of 1,704 items. Of these 85% (1,469) were passed en masse, 14% (235) were held, and all but 12 were eventually passed by a unanimous vote. Five of the splits occurred on regular items and seven on special items. In the eight-meeting sample, an average of 29 items per meeting were held for discussion. Ceremonial acts and agenda reading normally occupied the morning portion of the session. If the time remaining is divided equally among the held items in these sessions, each item could potentially have been debated for a little over six minutes. In fact, of course, discussion time varied widely, and not necessarily in proportion to the significance of the item because some time was consumed by talk of non-agenda issues involving the same department.

In the eight-week period, 37 departments and 12 commissions presented items. The number per department ranged from one to 259. Of the total items presented 15.5% (265) were Board sponsored. However, most of the debate centered on Board-introduced items. Of all items held for discussion, half came from Board offices, and seven of the 12 split votes occurred on these items. It is also noteworthy that in this series of meetings there were no majority votes to disapprove any item. There were also no recommendations from the CAO to disapprove an item, and in no case did the Board reject a CAO recommendation.*

Neither this nor any other pattern of behavior on formal votes can provide a precise picture of how decisions are actually reached in the Board. A pattern of largely unanimous votes, rare CAO recommendations of disapproval for departmental items, and even rarer Board overruling of the CAO does not necessarily reflect the de facto power relations in the

* The staff is continuing to monitor Board meetings to create a larger base for this analysis.

CHART VI: AGENDA ANALYSIS: VOTES BY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, 4/15/75-6/3/75

Items	Passed en masse	%*	Held	%	Total	%	4-1 split # %	3-2 split # %	3-1 split # %	Unanimous # %
Agenda (Board)**	1321 (40)	77	118 (12)	7	1439 (52)	84	1 less than 1	2 less than 1	2 less than 1	1434 84
Special	139	8	91	5	230	13		2 less than 1	5 less than 1	223 13
Set time(s)	9	less than 1	26	2	35	2				35 2
Totals	1469	86	235	14	1704	99	1	4	7	1692 99

* Represents the percentage of the total number of items.

** Board items are included in agenda item figures but are also shown separately in parenthesis.

CHART VII: AGENDA ANALYSIS: DESCRIPTION OF AGENDA ITEMS
ON WHICH SPLIT VOTES OCCURRED, 4/15/75-6/3/75

April 14, 1975

Special item 182

Voted 3-1 to discontinue submission of Legislative Bulletins for agenda consideration.
Motion by Hahn.
Ayes: Hahn, Edelman, Ward
No: Schabarum
Absent: Hayes

Special item 187

Voted 3-1 to oppose an amendment of the State Health and Safety Code relating to the closing of hospital facilities and reducing service to indigents.
Motion by Schabarum
Ayes: Schabarum, Hahn, Ward
No: Edelman
Absent: Hayes

Special item 197

Voted 3-1 to put the Board on record as opposed to A.B. 78 & 250 - the creation of a Regional South Coast Air Pollution Control District for fear that Los Angeles standards would be weakened.
Motion by Schabarum
Ayes: Schabarum, Hahn, Ward
No: Edelman
Absent: Hayes

CHART VII: AGENDA ANALYSIS: DESCRIPTION OF AGENDA ITEMS

ON WHICH SPLIT VOTES OCCURRED, 4/15/75-6/3/75 (Cont'd.)

April 29, 1975

Agenda item 22

Voted 4-1 to approve the consolidation of L.A. County and City beach operations.

Aye: Hahn, Edelman, Ward, Hayes

No: Schabarum

Item S-4

Voted 3-2 to obtain background information on all nominees to County commissions.

Aye: Hahn, Edelman, Ward

No: Schabarum, Hayes

Special item 168

Voted 3-1 to upgrade railroad cars for L.A. County Commuter Train at cost of \$1,596,000.

Aye: Hahn, Edelman, Ward

No: Schabarum

Absent: Hayes

April 30, 1975

Special item 14

Voted 3-2 approving L.A. County Citizens Economy and Efficiency Commission request to review County liability insurance program.

Motion by Edelman.

Ayes: Edelman, Hahn, Ward

No: Schabarum, Hayes

Agenda item 9

Voted 3-2 to authorize representatives of five county departments to attend National Association of Counties Conference.

Aye: Schabarum, Edelman, Hayes

No: Hahn, Ward

CHART VII: AGENDA ANALYSIS: DESCRIPTION OF AGENDA ITEMS

ON WHICH SPLIT VOTES OCCURRED, 4/15/75-6/3/75 (Cont'd.)

April 30, 1975 (Cont'd.)

Agenda item 17

Voted 3-2 to adopt plans for El Cariso Regional Park at cost of \$5,614,000.

Motion by Ward

Ayes: Ward, Hahn, Edelman

No: Schabarum, Hayes

Special item 42

Voted 3-1 to endorse Gov. Brown's farm labor program (A.B. 1533 & S.B. 813)

Motion by Hahn

Aye: Hahn, Edelman, Ward

No: Hayes

Absent: Schabarum

May 13, 1975

Agenda item 77

Voted 3-1 to approve supplemental architectural services agreement with D.A.S. Inc. for Rancho Los Amigos Hospital Intensive Rehabilitation Center for a fee not to exceed \$679,539.

Aye: Schabarum, Hayes, Hahn

No: Edelman

Absent: Ward

May 27, 1975

Agenda item 25

Voted 3-1 to approve the County Commission on Obscenity and Pornography endorsement of the County Sheriff's opposition to S.B. 128 & A.B. 407, which exempts certain employees from prosecution who are acting in the scope of employment and who have no control over exhibition of obscene matter.

Aye: Schabarum, Hahn, Hayes

No: Edelman

Absent: Ward

CHART VIII: AGENDA ANALYSIS: FREQUENCY ON THE AGENDA, 4/15/75-6/3/75

	Number of Items on Agenda	S-Series	Board Items	Special Items	% of Total Items
Adoptions	2				less than 1
Agricultural Commissioner	2				less than 1
Air Pollution Control	6			4	less than 1
Animal Control	5				less than 1
Arboreta & Botanic Gardens	1		1		less than 1
Assessor	11			2	less than 1
Auditor-Controller	30			2	2
Beaches	0				
Building Services	0				
Business Licenses	0				
Chief Admin. Office	126	7		20	10
Chief Medical Examiner- Coroner	0				
Communications	9				less than 1
Community Services	0				
County Clerk	0				

CHART VIII: AGENDA ANALYSIS: FREQUENCY ON THE AGENDA, 4/15/75-6/3/75 (Cont'd.)

	Number of Items on Agenda	S-Series	Board Items	Special Items	% of Total Items
County Counsel	53	4		7	4
County Engineer	114			2	9
Data Processing	1				less than 1
District Attorney	1				less than 1
Facilities	228	2		2	17
Farm Advisor	0				
Flood Control	181				14
Forester & Fire Warden	13				1
Health Services	64			11	4
Library	3				less than 1
Marshal of Municipal Courts	7				less than 1
Mechanical	1				less than 1
Military & Veterans Affairs	1				less than 1
Museum of Art	1				less than 1
Museum of Natural History	1				less than 1
Otis Art Institute	0				
Parks & Recreation	14			1	1

	Number of Items on Agenda	S-Series	Board Items	Special Items	% of Total Items
Personnel	27	1		5	2
Probation	7			1	less than 1
Public Administrator- Public Guardian	0				
Public Defender	0				
Public Social Services	13			1	1
Purchasing and Stores	0				
Regional Planning	19				1
Registrar-Recorder	9			1	less than 1
Roads	259			4	19
Sanitation Districts	3				less than 1
Senior Citizens Affairs	2				less than 1
Sheriff	17				1
Small Craft Harbors	3				less than 1
Superintendent of Schools	5				less than 1
Superior Court	0				
Treasurer-Tax Collector	11				less than 1
Urban Affairs	38				3

	Number of Items on Agenda	S-Series	Board Items	Special Items	% of Total Items
Weights and Measures	0				
BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, & COMMITTEES ALSO APPEARING ON THE AGENDA:					
Civil Service Commission	2			1	less than 1
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography	2				
Commission To Review Public Social Services	5				
Economy and Efficiency Commission	2				
Employee Relations Commission	1				
Hisotrical Landmarks Committee	1				
Human Relations Commission	1				
Judicial Procedures Commission	1				
Music & Performing Arts Commission	2			1	
Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs Commission	1				
Public Health Commission	1				
Retirement Board	1				
Vietnam Veteran Advisory Board	1				

informal process of negotiation which leads to formal action in public meeting. Our research does seem to indicate that virtually all contacts between Supervisors occur in the public sessions, and that the negotiation in which they personally engage takes place in that forum. However, the constant staff-level interaction in each of these offices is obviously of great importance to the decision outcomes but extremely difficult to document or characterize in general terms. Thus, much of the de facto process of mediation, compromise, and consensus building apparently occurs through ad hoc systems of staff research and bargaining which vary in structure and procedure with each decision. (The de facto process of agenda setting is discussed on pages 64-65.)

The Budget Process

This is the second major vehicle through which the Board makes and implements policy. The Board is responsible for approving the budgets and appropriating funds not only for the 50 appointive departments, but for the three departments headed by independently elected officials (the Assessor, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff), for the Justice, Municipal, and Superior Courts and for the 103 commissions and committees of the County. The budget recommendations are prepared by the Chief Administrator's office and presented to the Board for approval. The process by which the CAO prepares the budget is discussed in detail in Section III and presented schematically in Appendix I. Normally, the CAO attempts to see that departmental budget requests and preliminary budget documents are not released or circulated to members of the Board of Supervisors prior to his completion and printing of the full recommended budget. Once the CAO has submitted the proposed budget, the Board holds public hearings on it. Department heads can and very often do appear before the Board at this time to present a case in opposition to the recommendation the CAO has made. Citizens groups also appear to request money from such funds as the Community Group Revenue Sharing Fund, administered by the Department of Urban Affairs, for which community organizations are eligible. There is more citizen and group involvement in these hearings than in the average regular Tuesday session.

This year for the first time the Supervisors were involved in the budget process on an experimental basis somewhat earlier than is usual. The departments and the CAO were under a Board order to hold spending proposals to a level which could be supported without increasing the 1973-1974 tax rate. If this had actually occurred, it would have required very substantial cuts in virtually all County programs. In response, the CAO convened a special budget review committee made up of a deputy from each supervisorial office and representatives from the CAO's budget staff. Departments made presentations to the Committee explaining where they might cut their budgets to stay within the guidelines, and what the effects of such cuts would be on the mission of the departments. After this process had been carried out, the CAO actually proposed a budget requiring a 9.2% increase in the previous year's tax rate, and the Board adopted a budget based on a 5% hike.* The

* This rate was later adjusted downward still further because the Assessor's annual report of assessed property values was almost 3% higher than was contemplated in the revenue estimates upon which the Board had based its budget decisions. The continuing dilemma posed by this uncertainty on the revenue side is discussed on pp. 128.

cuts in the CAO's recommended requests required to live within this rate implied by this tax rate decision translated into a 3.2% across-the-board cut which, after a brief suggestion that it might try to distribute the reduction itself among County programs, the Board remanded to the CAO to translate into specific cuts. This exercise, experimental as it was, is one of the country's most notable recent examples of innovative ways to induce legislative bodies to examine the specific implications of the general budgetary principles they have a propensity to adopt.

Budgeting is the major overall policy-making enterprise for the Board and for the County. It is the point at which departments announce and commit themselves to the next year's program, and decisions are taken on the priority of particular activities within departments and among departments. In general, the Board's budget debate concerns increments to the previous year's spending, whether the increment is recommended by the CAO or by a Supervisor. Rarely, if ever, does the full Board get into any extended analysis or debate concerning the budget "base," as distinguished from proposed increments. Although all Supervisors have the right to demand the data necessary to do this, only one or two traditionally take a strong and continuing interest in these details. There is much evidence that other Supervisors rely on this specialty in their colleagues and consciously allocate their time to other things. Also, although the County has taken the beginning steps toward a program budget, departmental accounting systems still are based on line item expenditures and most departments do not have management information and reporting systems which permit detailed evaluation of the performance of a department against a set of accepted program goals. There is little evidence that budgets are much used by the Board as a tool to evaluate the performance of department heads. The deviation of the department from its budget priorities might seem to be one measure of management performance, but the Board does not generally use available records to show consistent patterns of over- or underspending for departments.

In general then, the Board's formal role in budget formulation reduces to selective review of the CAO-proposed increments of particular size and sensitivity, decision on the allowable tax rate which sets the overall ceiling on appropriations, and proposal of further increments beyond those suggested by the CAO. In practice, in recent years the Board has almost never proposed to cut a specific request proposed by the CAO; most Board decisions of this degree of specificity are add-ons (Table I). Of course, the Board, like the CAO, finds more and more of its budgetary decisions predetermined by the collective bargaining process, which is the major influence upon fluctuations in payroll costs.

However, the Board has also kept a substantial number of "handles" on the administration of the budget after adoption. For many purposes the budget is enacted as a general spending plan for which detailed expenditure proposals require subsequent Board actions. This is true of a number of specific activities (e.g., travel), and of most which must be carried out by contract or other such action. An average public meeting agenda carries many such items, most of which are passed without debate. Still, the Board has not delegated this responsibility to the CAO, nor has it made general policy to govern such items in various

TABLE I: BUDGET ALLOCATIONS, NINE SELECTED DEPARTMENTS - FY 1972-1976

	<u>Budget Request</u> <u>Appropriation</u>	<u>CAO Recommen-</u> <u>dation</u> <u>Appropriation</u>	<u>% Diff.</u> <u>Request/CAO Recom-</u> <u>mendation</u>	<u>Approved by Board</u> <u>Appropriation</u>	<u>% Diff.</u> <u>CAO Recommen-</u> <u>dation/Board</u> <u>Appropriation</u>
<u>Auditor-Controller</u>					
1971-1972	7,888,000	7,656,000	- 2.9	8,074,000	+ 5.5
1972-1973	9,314,000	8,289,000	-11.0	8,450,000	+ 1.9
1973-1974	8,973,000	9,164,000	+ 2.1	9,672,000	+ 5.5
1974-1975	9,620,000	10,021,000	+ 4.2	10,195,000	+ 1.7
1975-1976	11,405,000	10,706,000	- 6.1	11,301,000*	+ 5.5
*Includes \$556,000 for salary increases.					
<u>Treasurer-Tax Collector</u>					
1971-1972	4,218,000	4,073,000	- 3.4	4,270,000	+ 4.8
1972-1973	4,367,000	4,316,000	- 1.2	4,209,000	- 2.4
1973-1974	4,364,000	4,309,000	- 1.3	4,475,000	+ 3.8
1974-1975	4,768,000	4,706,000	- 1.3	4,731,000	+ .5
1975-1976	5,288,000	5,081,000	- 3.9	5,337,000*	+ 5.0
*Includes \$236,000 for salary increases.					
<u>Museum of Art</u>					
1971-1972	2,810,000	2,336,000	-16.9	2,412,000	+ 3.2
1972-1973	2,533,000	2,483,000	- 2.0	2,520,000	+ 1.5
1973-1974	2,975,000	2,551,000	-14.2	2,650,000	+ 3.9
1974-1975	2,861,000	2,678,000	- 6.4	2,763,000	+ 3.1
1975-1976	3,312,000	2,957,000	-10.7	3,017,000*	+ 2.0
*Includes \$162,000 for salary increases.					
<u>Health Services</u>					
1971-1972	360,801,000	288,294,000	-20.1	312,347,000	+ 8.3
1972-1973	381,963,000	342,820,000	-10.2	356,724,000	+ 4.1
1973-1974	405,643,000	378,095,000	- 6.8	499,521,000	+32.1
1974-1975	571,192,000	523,594,000	- 8.3	533,223,000	+ 1.8
1975-1976	613,753,000	578,719,000	- 5.7	594,537,000*	+ 2.7
*Includes \$17,420,000 for salary increases.					

TABLE I: BUDGET ALLOCATIONS, NINE SELECTED DEPARTMENTS - FY 1972-1976 (Cont'd.)

	Budget Request Appropriation	CAO Recommen- dation Appropriation	% Diff. Request/CAO Recom- mendation	Approved by Board Appropriation	% Diff. CAO Recommen- dation/Board Appropriation
<u>Data Processing</u>					
1971-1972	3,161,000	2,457,000	-22.2	2,200,000	-10.4
1972-1973	6,572,000	4,151,000	-36.8	4,156,000	+ .1
1973-1974	2,723,000	2,515,000	- 7.6	2,515,000	0
1974-1975	2,467,000	2,162,000	-12.3	1,652,000	-23.6
1975-1976	2,760,000	1,709,000	-38.1	1,665,000*	- 2.6
*Includes \$19,000 for salary increases.					
<u>Parks & Recreation</u>					
1971-1972	17,180,000	14,660,000	-14.7	15,339,000	+ 4.6
1972-1973	18,232,000	16,083,000	-11.8	16,732,000	+ 7.6
1973-1974	19,352,000	16,806,000	-13.2	18,014,000	+ 7.5
1974-1975	20,374,000	18,702,000	- 8.2	19,302,000	+ 3.2
1975-1976	21,889,000	21,111,000	- 3.6	21,302,000*	+ .9
*Includes \$1,254,000 for salary increases.					
<u>Sheriff</u>					
1971-1972	119,920,000	92,401,000	-22.9	104,072,000	+12.6
1972-1973	126,824,000	112,088,000	-11.6	112,789,000	+ .6
1973-1974	151,720,000	122,735,000	-21.7	122,558,000	- .1
1974-1975	155,943,000	130,713,000	-16.2	144,118,000	+10.3
1975-1976	153,338,000	145,271,000	- 5.3	149,021,000*	+ 2.6
*Includes \$8,937,000 for salary increases.					
<u>Registrar-Recorder</u>					
1971-1972	10,243,000	8,954,000	-12.6	9,585,000	+ 7.0
1972-1973	9,534,000	9,542,000	- .1	10,730,000	+12.4
1973-1974	12,498,000	10,951,000	-12.4	12,673,000	+18.0
1974-1975	12,705,000	12,001,000	- 5.5	11,649,000	- 2.9
1975-1976	16,378,000	12,785,000	-21.9	13,458,000*	+ 6.2
*Includes \$470,000 for salary increases.					

TABLE I: BUDGET ALLOCATIONS, NINE SELECTED DEPARTMENTS - FY 1972-1976 (Cont'd.)

	<u>Budget Request</u> <u>Appropriation</u>	<u>CAO Recommen-</u> <u>dation</u> <u>Appropriation</u>	<u>% Diff.</u> <u>Request/CAO Recom-</u> <u>mendation</u>	<u>Approved by Board</u> <u>Appropriation</u>	<u>% Diff.</u> <u>CAO Recommen-</u> <u>dation/Board</u> <u>Appropriation</u>
<u>Road Department</u>					
1971-1972	84,592,000	84,592,000	0	106,071,000	+87.5
1972-1973	82,928,000	82,928,000	0	110,635,000	+82.9
1973-1974	103,397,000	103,397,000	0	123,235,000	+19.2
1974-1975	133,246,000	133,246,000	0	139,737,000	+ 4.9
1975-1976	87,306,000	87,306,000	0	126,053,000*	+85.6

*Includes \$3,279,000 for salary increases.

categories of appropriations. In the eight-week analysis of agenda items, a total of \$140,010,000 in expenditure proposals was considered; of this amount 68% was approved. In no instance was a CAO recommendation on appropriations rejected. Projects involving 25% of the total were held for discussion, while 63% of the total approved were passed en masse. (See Chart IX.)

Supervisors may define their own staff assignments in relation to whatever role in the process they wish to play. One Supervisor, for example, bases the primary division of staff assignments upon a distribution of detailed items from the County budget. Every department, commission, and committee that receives an allocation in the budget is assigned to a member of the Supervisor's staff. Staff members are also assigned functional areas and to review all budget items and departments that fall within a functional range. This supervisorial staff requests detailed information about the justifications for the allocation of resources and personnel in departments, encourages departments to set quantifiable goals and objectives, and monitors the operations of departments to establish whether they are operating in relation to these goals in a cost effective manner.

The Personnel Process

This third mechanism for managing County operations is a dual structure, encompassing a civil service system to recruit, select, train, and discipline employees, and a collective bargaining system to negotiate salaries, hours, and other conditions of employment. The Board has responsibility for overseeing all aspects of the personnel function not specifically reserved to the Civil Service Commission (recruitment, training, and classification). Since 1950 the number of County employees has grown by 218%, while the population has increased by 69%. Job classifications increased by 95% in the same period. The County now employs one person for every 86 citizens, compared to a ratio of 1 to 163 in 1950.

The civil service system, which contains almost all County employees, is controlled by a three-member Civil Service Commission, appointed by the Board, which makes policy and hears appeals from employees. The Director of Personnel, an appointed official independent of the CAO, administers the system. The Board approves the number and kinds of employees in each department, and it approves requests from departments to add new positions each year. But it cannot make rules for the civil service or veto rules established by the Civil Service Commission.

There are very few exempt positions in the County service. These include all elected officials; a total of eight positions in the offices of the three independently elected officials; members of Commissions - Civil Service, Public Welfare, and Regional Planning; plus those serving without compensation. All other employees are within the classified service, including supervisorial staff personnel.

It is difficult to enter the system laterally, since almost all positions filled through open rather than promotional examinations are at the entry level or at the very top. Thus, it has been difficult to

CHART IX: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ACTION ON APPROPRIATIONS, 4/15/75-6/3/75

	Amount in Dollars	Percentage of Total Proposed
Total Proposed	140,010,000	100
Held for Discussion	34,877,000	25
Continued	45,417,000	32
Total Committed	94,593,000	68
Reject CAO Recommendation	0	
Accept CAO Recommendation	94,593,000	68
Split Vote:	7,889,000	6
4-1	0	
3-2	5,614,000	4
3-1	2,275,000	2
Passed en Masse	59,716,000	43 (63% of total committed)

achieve vertical parity in the Affirmative Action program of the County. At a minimum, it normally requires 18 examinations for an individual to advance from an entry level clerk to a department head. Each classification has five automatic step increases in salary, but to advance to the next classification an employee must compete in an exam for an opening. Within classifications, raises can be delayed only if an employee receives a "needs improvement" evaluation. When an employee gets such an evaluation his raise is delayed up to six months until he receives a "competent" rating. If the rating is not achieved within six months he is dismissed or demoted. An outstanding rating, in contrast, does not carry an incentive bonus or an extra raise with it. However, when employees take examinations for promotions, there is an "appraisal of promotability score" given by the department to its employees competing in the exam. This score can add up to 25% to the base examination score. The civil service system limits eligibility to three people for any position. Top candidates are rank-ordered by score with a 10% bonus for veterans. This system is not controlled directly by the Board, but is administered by the Personnel Department which both administers the civil service process and supervises employee relations functions.

Since the Board of Supervisors is the only body in the County which can commit it to a contract or expenditure, it is ultimately responsible for the management position in collective bargaining. The County's position is prepared by the Personnel Director, who serves as chief negotiator. The CAO and the Personnel Director then present the position to all of the Supervisors in private. All experienced observers agree that there has never been any unauthorized disclosure as a result of these discussions, despite what would appear to be strong pressures to do so. As in all negotiations, of course, most real decision parameters are determined by the parties at the bargaining table. Nevertheless, nothing is official until the Supervisors approve it.

Until this year union representation in the County often included people in supervisory classifications, up through departmental deputies. The managers' bargaining unit has now been disbanded, but the managerial group is still tied to the collective bargaining system for fringe benefits and receives the same benefits as represented employees. In lower level management classes, the same union can represent both the manager and the employees he manages.

The collective bargaining system is administered by a three-member Employee Relations Commission appointed by the Board from a list of candidates agreed on by the County Management Council and the unions. The Commission has certified 50 units to represent employees in various classes. The assigned members of the Commission, who did the bulk of the certification, were concerned that the system would certify narrow units. Its guidelines grouped classifications based on a requirement for "community of interest." The certification now places the 73,000 represented employees in 50 units. Of these employees 51% actually pay dues to the unions. Contracts are negotiated yearly on salaries and fringe benefits. There are some two-year negotiation periods for other items, but most also have mid-term reopener clauses.

The setting of salaries is also regulated by a provision in the County Charter that requires that members of the classified service be paid a "prevailing wage," that is, a salary comparable to that paid in the private sector for equivalent positions. The Personnel Department conducts a survey of salaries in the private sector to establish benchmarks, and attempts to provide comparability with other public agencies for jobs not found in the private sector. The prevailing wage is the practical minimum for union-negotiated salary increases, although this year fringe benefits were also calculated into the prevailing wage. The Charter provision is a very real and effective governor over the Board's discretion in negotiating salaries.

Collective bargaining will soon further alter the Board's role since work loads have now been ruled a negotiable item. This means that the County may need to develop productivity measures and attempt to quantify what is expected in return for the salaries negotiated. The work load requirement will also affect the kinds of decisions the Board can make with respect to numbers of employees, as it has in several other jurisdictions. Work load standards may mean, for example, that individuals cannot be cut from a program if the effect is to alter the work load of the remaining employees working under a negotiated contract.

The aspect of the personnel process in which the Board's role is most active is in the appointment of all department heads, the evaluation of their performance, and the setting of their salaries. Department heads are currently nominated through open competitive examinations. The Board then selects from the top three candidates on the list. The process prior to 1972 relied more on promotional examinations and less on open competitive examinations. Worry that the system was becoming too ingrown produced a Charter amendment which changed the recruitment pattern for department heads, deputies, and the first in rank of commission staffs to provide greater leeway for the recruitment of outside personnel. Since 1973 the Board has appointed ten department heads drawn from outside the County service, and six who were career employees. Most of the present department heads with longest tenure are career employees, however. Chart X indicates the career pattern of the heads of all departments. Of the 51 departments and commissions about which we have information, 32 were previously career employees of the department in question or came from the CAO's office.

The evaluation of department heads by the Board takes place each year in executive session. Department heads are the only group of employees in the County who are on a merit increase plan. The CAO and the Personnel Director, in a procedure just recently revised, make recommendations for salary increases based on a set of criteria put forth in the document creating the merit plan. But the Board retains and exercises the final authority to set salaries. In the past, salary increases generally followed a pattern based on type of department, with one scale for heads of service and clerical departments, another for construction heads and so on. Currently, there seems to be more variability. This year, for example, individual salary increases ranged from zero to 11%. The department heads are not evaluated by the Board itself according to a list of objective performance criteria with resulting ratings and corresponding

CHART X: PROFILE OF DEPARTMENT HEADS

Department	Background		Recruited from Outside	Appointment	Years as Department Head				
	Career Employee/ Dept.	Career Employee/CAO		Since Jan. 1, 1973 Inside - I Outside - 0	Month/Yr. Appointed Head	Less than 1 Year	1-3 Years	4-7 Years	8 Years
Adoptions Dept.	X			I	5/74	X			
Agricultural Commissioner	X			I	3/75	X			
Air Pollution Control Division	X			I	1/74	X			
Arboreta & Botanic Gardens	X				5/70			X	
Assessor	X				12/62				X
Auditor-Controller	X				6/67				
Beaches, Dept. of			X		1/72			X	
Board of Supervisors, Exec. Officer		X			9/66				X
Building Services	X				3/69			X	
Chief Administrative Officer	X			I	1/75	X			
Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner	X				12/67				X
Civil Service Commission			X		12/69			X	
Communications Dept.			X	0	2/74		X		
Community Services	X				12/63				X
County Clerk	X				3/73		X		

Departments	Background		Recruited from Outside	Appointment		Years as Department Head			
	Career Employee/ Dept.	Career Employee/CAO		Since Jan. 1, 1973 Inside - I Outside - O	Month/Yr. Appointed Head	Less than 1 Year	1-3 Years	4-7 Years	8 Years
County Counsel			X	O	5/73		X		
County Engineer	X				7/71			X	
County Public Library			X		12/73		X		
Data Processing Dept.			X	O	3/75	X			
District Attorney	X				1/71			X	
Employee Relations Commission			X		9/69			X	
Facilities Dept.			X	O	2/75	X			
Farm Advisors			X		2/71			X	
Flood Control District	X				3/70			X	
Forester & Fire Warden	X				7/69			X	
Health Services Dept.		X			2/72		X		
Human Relations Commission			X	O	11/74	X			
Marshal of Municipal Courts	X			I	3/75	X			
Mechanical Dept.	X				1/65			X	

CHART X: PROFILE OF DEPARTMENT HEADS (Cont'd.)

Departments	Background		Recruited from Outside	Appointment	Years as Department Head				
	Career Employee/ Dept.	Career Employee/CAO		Since Jan. 1, 1973 Inside - I Outside - O	Month/Yr. Appointed Head	Less than 1 Year	1-3 Years	4-7 Years	8 Years
Military & Veterans Affairs			X		6/72		X		
Museum of Art	X				7/66				X
Museum of Natural History			X		6/70			X	
Otis Art Institute			X	O	3/74	X			
Parks & Recreation Dept.			X	O	1/74		X		
Personnel Dept.		X			11/67				X
Probation Dept.	X			I	11/74	X			
Public Administrator- Public Guardian			X	O	1/74		X		
Public Defender	X				5/67				X
Public Social Services	X				1/67				X
Purchasing & Stores		X			4/70			X	
Regional Planning Dept.			X	O	10/74	X			
Registrar-Recorder					3/73		X		
Road Department	X				7/66				X
Sanitation Districts	X				9/61				X
Schools, Superintendent			X		10/67				X

CHART X: PROFILE OF DEPARTMENT HEADS (Cont'd.)

Departments	Background			Appointment		Years as Department Head				
	Career Employee/ Dept.	Career Employee/CAO	Recruited from Outside	Since Jan. 1, 1973 Inside - I Outside - O	Month/Yr. Appointed Head	Less than 1 Year	1-3 Years	4-7 Years	8 Years	
Senior Citizens Affairs	X				4/71			X		
Sheriff's Dept.	X				12/58					X
Small Craft Harbor, Dept. of	X				1/71			X		
Superior Court		X			5/69			X		
Treasurer-Tax Collector			X	O	2/75	X				
Urban Affairs, Dept. of	X				3/69			X		
Weights & Measures	X				5/66					X

increases in salaries which conform to the ratings. Nor do they receive a written evaluation of their performance explaining why a particular level of increase was given. In general, the salaries of department heads, as set by this process, have not advanced as rapidly as the salaries of other departmental employees not on the merit plan. In consequence, many departmental chief deputies are now paid almost as much as, and in at least two cases more than, the corresponding department heads. This problem of executive salary "compression" is, of course, among the major management problems facing most governments in the United States.

The civil service status of department heads makes it difficult for the Board to dismiss them. In recent history the Board has only dismissed three department heads and all three dismissals have been appealed, in one case successfully. The usual disciplining procedure is to suggest that a department head whose performance is considered inadequate take a voluntary demotion, which has happened twice in the past few months. Department heads do, however, serve a probationary period when first appointed, and the Board can replace probationary department heads during this period if they do not perform satisfactorily.

The only positions to which the Board makes direct appointments are to the 103 separate, formally established commissions and committees in the County. There are 1,164 members of such bodies, which expend about \$260,000 per year from the County budget. Until this year, these appointments were not based on any set criteria except to the extent that these were established in the ordinance or Board order which created the Commission. It appears that the number of the commission members is consciously made a multiple of five, that Supervisors divide the appointments equally, and that most of a given Supervisor's appointees live in his district. However, the Board has now passed an order creating a screening panel for these appointments. The Economy and Efficiency Committee is doing a study of all commissions and committees and is attempting to look at the membership of each in terms of specific qualifications which might be required in the future.

3. Departmental Oversight - The Chairmanship Role

In addition to the procedures by which the Board collectively supervises administration, the Supervisors act individually to oversee the operations of the departments. The traditional means of dividing this labor is the system of designated chairmanships described on pages 6-7, but, as also noted, the significance of these assignments seems to be changing. Prior to 1972, there appears to have been something of a working consensus among several Supervisors on a relatively inactive administrative role for them. Department heads were expected to run their departments under policy guidelines established by the Board collectively in the agenda, personnel and budget processes. They responded to requests from their departmental chairman, usually in relation to district needs or projects, but it was relatively unusual for the Supervisor serving as department chairman to establish any semblance of line authority, a role which

would clearly conflict with the contemporary perception of the duties of the CAO. Public criticisms of departments were, however, referred to departmental chairmen, who apparently felt it appropriate to be the public defender or advocate of the department. Chairmanship assignments also gave the departments an established point of contact on the Board to introduce new programs, and to get emergency matters placed on the agenda. Departments took matters which needed placement on the agenda first to their chairmen. The supervisorial deputies assigned to a department area also maintained a more constant relationship with departments chaired by their Supervisors than with other departments.

Although this pattern has not altogether disappeared, it does appear that several Supervisors have tended recently to become more active in many areas and to choose those areas without great regard for their chairmanship assignments. Thus, a somewhat broader interpretation of the mandate to supervise departments is now in operation. For example, one current Supervisor has asked that all departments identify their service delivery goals in terms of human needs, and is attempting to promote such considerations in all departmental decision-making processes, rather than engaging in close and detailed supervision of the particular departments he chairs. Another Supervisor is more oriented toward policy issues than toward day-to-day supervision. His assigned departments are required to brief a particular member of his staff weekly, and that deputy then summarizes the departmental briefings for the Supervisor. Still another, as previously indicated, tries to oversee operations for all departments through analysis of their budgets and other indicators of their operating effectiveness. The Board is also collectively increasing its use of the Tuesday meetings as a forum for questioning departments about their operations and programs. Department heads are increasingly identified as a distinct group, responsible for their departments, answerable to the Board as a whole, and required to keep the Board informed of their problems and progress, rather than to perform their functions with respect to a single Supervisor assigned as chairman. It may be, therefore, that the role of the departmental chairman is no longer a significant determinant of the Supervisors' investments of time and energy.

4. Capacity for Supervision of Implementation

The process of implementing an established policy is sufficiently critical, and a sufficiently chronic problem in government, to warrant separate treatment. This is particularly true because one of the major claims made in favor of the structure as it now operates is that the weakness of capacity for implementation, now said to be a problem in the national and other "separation of powers" systems, is not present where powers are unified in a single body.

It is clear that the Board of Supervisors has available to it authority to monitor processes by which policy is executed. It need not stop at passing laws or resolutions. It can at the

same time order all departments involved to begin drafting a plan to implement the new policy, it can set dates for departments to complete their planning, it can budget new personnel for a policy or appropriate funds for its execution, and it can form an advisory committee to give advice on the progress of a new program, and so on. Whether it should take the actions, or delegate them to a single administrator is a much-argued question.

In practice, however, responsibility for insuring implementation has been delegated to the CAO, except in areas in which Board members have special individual interest. In these areas the insuring of implementation is indeed quite detailed. For example, one Supervisor has been involved in the writing of job classifications, after the passage of the Ordinance he sponsored created a new Department of Consumer Affairs. Another has set timetables for the Health Department to complete explicit steps in its reorganization, including dates for the provision of a new organization chart for the agency and for the regional organizations into which the Department is now divided. Another acted to see that in the aftermath of a Special Resolution on problems of Southeast Asian refugees instructions were issued to legislative representatives in Washington to seek appropriate legislation. All County departments affected were expected to prepare contingency plans for refugees by a fixed date and work was begun to form an advisory committee. However, as a general rule, Board Orders and Ordinances are not ranked by priority or accompanied by progress milestones or deadlines from the Board, so that departments do not receive a direct indication of which programs are to be implemented first or fastest. Nevertheless, one Supervisor has adopted a rule of five-day maximum response time which he imposes on the departments. After a Board Order has passed and five working days have elapsed, the department receives a letter each week requesting information on conformity to the order. Supervisors also follow the implementation of capital projects within their own districts quite carefully, sometimes nearly to the point of playing the role of project manager.

While there are two widely reported cases in which Board orders failed to be implemented with negative consequences, there is little evidence of consistent disregard of Board orders. By not delegating routine decisions that appear on the agenda, the Board can indirectly insure that departments are both aware of Board positions and in a position to correct deviations from established policy. However, in the absence of this type of consideration, there is no other collective procedure to track the period of time which elapses between Board actions and changes in agency operations used by the Board, and no effort to sanction agencies who do not respond to executive decisions promptly. There is also no locus in the Board's activities of responsibility for insuring that the policies of different agencies are coordinated, scheduled or sequentially ordered outside of the role of the CAO in this regard. This subject is dealt with more extensively in the discussion of the absence of a central project management function

which appears in the following section (see pages 75-76). Suffice it to note here, however, that all apparent means by which their members gauge the speed and fidelity with which their decisions are carried out are in the offices of individual Supervisors, not available to the group as a whole.

5. Distributional Equity

Up to this point we have discussed the operation of the Board mainly as a decision-making body which determines the proper course among policy options and supervises the execution of its decisions. But the Board is also responsible for seeing that the actual results achieved by such policies are equitable; that citizens in the County receive fair allocations of benefits and burdens according to some general criteria. There is probably no real state of distribution or treatment which provides absolute equity, but it is important to know by what process the Board examines the question, how considerations of equitable distribution condition policy-making and execution, and whether efforts are made to balance inequities which have been identified.

The equity principle primarily employed by the Board appears to be geographical and to conform to the general proposition of dollar equity among the five supervisorial districts. While the CAO orients his budget recommendations to Countywide definitions of need, the Board pretty clearly analyzes both additions and allocations in terms of district divisions. The budget of the Roads Department, the Capital Projects budget, and the budget of the Department of Parks and Recreation are acknowledged in part to show the equality of funds spent from district-to-district. Community Revenue Sharing funds are also distributed to groups with strict attention to equivalence of totals for each of the five districts. Some Supervisors have indicated that although "division by five" is not necessarily the ideal formula for the distribution of resources, it is the one encouraged by the present County structure. Others indicate that since Supervisors are elected to represent and deliver services to their districts, more of the budget ought to be distributed by a formula which divides all funds equally by district, with some fractional weighting and adjustment for the presence of special needs or facilities.

At the current stage of our study, it appears that the geographical "division by five" mainly affects the division of new funds and projects, rather than the operating costs of existing projects. The service studies will add more definite information on the relation between Board debate on new projects and drains on future operating funds.

Within supervisorial districts, Supervisors have some considerable latitude to affect the distribution of services. The areas of first attention in the County seem to be the unincorporated areas, since the County is the primary source of services in these areas. Departments indicate the general service area

and the available sites for a given project and the Supervisor then makes the final de facto decision on the site selected. Supervisors can also reallocate resources in their districts. One Supervisor, for example, is actively overseeing the implementation of a new health service plan in his district, based on cost effectiveness formulas developed by the supervisorial staff, which requires the Health Services Department to reallocate personnel and restructure the service capacity of its district offices. Another Supervisor was able to obtain Board agreement to cancel a contract already let to remove some trees in his district, after he became aware that citizen groups were concerned about the removal of the trees.

As noted above, appointments to boards, commissions, and committees are also conditioned by the "division by five." No information is compiled regularly as to the equitable distribution of commission appointments among different groups in the community. For example, no tabulations of the existing representation of women on County committees were available in considering the establishment of the new Commission of the Status of Women. Appointees do not have to be from the supervisorial district of the appointing Supervisor, but most are, so that the geographical division is in general carried over from the Board to the commissions and committees which serve in advisory capacities to the County.

There are projects which the Board treats as Countywide. These projects are considered of sufficient importance to cut across district lines and are not attached to the principle of geographic division in the budgeting process, or are projects where districts in general have no wish for a facility similar to what another district has. The proposed juvenile hall is in this category. Whether the phenomenon of five-way division is one of the inevitable concomitants of a plural executive with no countervailing influence whose constituency is the entire County, is a difficult question to answer on the basis of existing evidence. Whether tension between district and Countywide representatives would produce a better (i.e., more equitable) distributional system is an issue which must be dealt with in the course of the Commission's further work.

6. Responsiveness

Responsiveness refers to the ability of government to hear, understand, and respond to citizen preferences and needs. Citizens are now represented in the County in a ratio of one Supervisor to each 1.4 million people. Recent surveys (see Table II) indicate that citizens are more critical of the way County government is run and feel less capacity to affect it than do residents governed by other large units in the area.

The major procedures which the Board of Supervisors as a collectivity* uses to assure reasonably broad representation

* Individual responsiveness is discussed on pages 61-64.

TABLE II: CITIZEN EVALUATION OF
COUNTY GOVERNMENT

"In general do you think your city/the county government is run the way it should be, not run the way it should be, or don't you happen to have an opinion on that?"

	<u>LA County</u>	<u>LA City</u>	<u>Long Beach</u>	<u>Other Cities</u>
Run the way it should be	40%	55%	60%	57%
Not run the way it should be	26%	30%	19%	14%
No opinion	34%	15%	21%	29%

N-1016

"Some people tell us that there is nothing they can do to affect what the city/county government does. Other people say they can influence what gets decided here in. . .if they want to. How about you? Do you feel that you can affect what your city/the County government does or not?"

	<u>LA County</u>	<u>LA City</u>	<u>Long Beach</u>	<u>Other Cities</u>
Yes, can affect	57%	70%	65%	72%
No, cannot affect	43%	30%	35%	28%

N - 989

Source: Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Survey #7 U.C.L.A. Social Science Research Institute, (Fall 1973).

for the principal public groups which wish to express views on policies and procedures are in legally-mandated public hearings, and in the opportunity to listen to, appear at, and give testimony during regular Board meetings.

The regular Tuesday meetings are open to the public. They are not, however, well attended. Only five individuals and groups in the County actually receive the agenda and papers of the Board of Supervisors which form the basis for these meetings. (This fact does not seem to reflect a policy of Board denial or exclusion as much as a lack of public interest and/or knowledge that the papers exist.) In addition, the Board has the discretion to limit or prohibit people from speaking at the Tuesday meetings, a power it mainly employs to deal with the so-called "gadflies" who attend repeatedly.

Mandated public hearings are held on Thursdays to consider the execution of County policy. These hearings are required for zone changes, the execution of some Federal grants, land acquisition, the Community Redevelopment program, and passage of the budget. There are strict requirements for publication and notification of these meetings. The public always has the right to appear and testify and the Board must hear those who appear. In mandated meetings, citizens and groups are notified by mail in addition to newspaper notification. In zone cases, for example, all property owners or residents within 500 feet of an area in which a zone change is requested are notified. The attendance at such hearings varies. Thursday meetings often do attract groups of varying size depending on the issue. Environmental issues attract active groups with some frequency. The Board has been criticized for holding hearings in the daytime only, when it is inconvenient for working people to attend, but an effort to conduct budget hearings in the evening this year did not produce major changes in public attendance. There is also some criticism of the holding of meetings in the downtown area where parking is limited and expensive without provision for public parking except by arrangement with a Supervisor. Thus, groups often arrange to be heard, particularly at budget hearings, through their Supervisor.

Environmental groups have complained that, outside of the Tuesday meetings, when the public is generally limited to raising issues relevant to pre-specified agenda items, and the Thursday meetings, when the public is limited to comments on changes in the mandated areas on which the hearings are held, there is no collective forum to raise new policy ideas. There is a procedure by which a citizens' group can put items on the agenda, or the CAO or Executive Offices' initiative, without obtaining the cooperation of an individual Supervisor, but it is used only for miscellaneous and relatively routine communications.

The traditional locus, of course, of supervisorial responsiveness is not collective but individual, not whether the Board

as a group is responsive, but whether Supervisors individually are responsive. Individual responsiveness is discussed below in Section C of our discussion of the Board. Note, however, that the traditional test of individual responsiveness is reelection. This is a test which can be applied to the Los Angeles County Board as a collectivity as well since from 1958 to 1971 each of the Supervisors individually was consistently reelected, producing a Board of static membership in that period. (No incumbent lost an election from 1956 to 1972). In contrast, in 1972, for the first time, four of the five supervisorial seats were subject to election, and the consequence was the replacement of only one member. Thus while the electoral process is individual, County voters have had the opportunity to see in operation and to remove Boards in some collective sense, but have chosen not to do so.

7. Intergovernmental Relations

The County has extremely broad programmatic responsibilities, when compared with most American counties or with the City of Los Angeles and other incorporated cities. The County provides at least two types of services - regional services, often State mandated, such as health, welfare, and air pollution control; and "municipal-type" services such as fire and police protection and libraries, within unincorporated areas. In addition, the County of Los Angeles provides many municipal-type services to cities on a contract basis through the Lakewood plan. Our concern in this section is not to document the extent or consequences of this pattern of service provision, but to examine the processes through which the Board of Supervisors pursues intergovernmental relations in providing policies and services throughout the area.

Individual Supervisors unofficially represent the Board on various intergovernmental units such as the Southern California Association of Governments, the Los Angeles Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board, the Local Agency Formation Commission, and the Southern California Rapid Transit District. Each such representative is appointed by a vote of the full Board. During his tenure in this type of office, the Supervisor sits as a member of the body, not as an official representative of the Board of Supervisors. He is not expected to come back to the Board for instructions on matters before the body. If the Board of Supervisors has taken a general position on business coming before the body, the Supervisor is expected to vote in accordance with the Board's guidelines. However, for good or ill, there is almost never a matter of such clear-cut policy before these groups. In some cases, the Supervisor has delegated his role to a deputy. The deputy then represents the Supervisor's position and casts his vote for him.

State policy centrally affects the County in terms both of authority and finance. Changes in State law can fundamentally

alter the programs of the County. A recent example is the threat to the mental health programs if the State reduces funding. The Board responded by setting aside enough money from revenue sharing funds to offset State cuts should the State program be reduced. Because of the County's close relation to State policy, it maintains two lobbyists in Sacramento to present the County position. The Board has regular votes in the public meetings on pending State legislation to determine the official County stand on a State bill. Supervisors often bring these issues before the Board as special items. The Board then transmits its position to the lobbyist. The County also has one lobbyist in Washington, D.C. to track legislation and notify the County of sources of Federal funds. In addition, individual Supervisors lobby through personal contacts with Federal officials. One Supervisor, for example, was instrumental in having Community Development funds made available to urban counties. He did so prior to the establishment of any official policy indicating that the County would seek such action, but with the support of the County Supervisors Association of California, which had indicated its support for a general move in this direction.

Other than its joint participation in regional associations, the County does not have an official coordinating mechanism with the City of Los Angeles other than the CAO himself and the limited role of his Special Services Division. It is difficult to discern whether this is a cause or an effect - or neither - of the aforementioned suit in which the City of Los Angeles has claimed that because taxes are Countywide and because many County services are provided only to unincorporated areas, Los Angeles and other large cities subsidize services to unincorporated areas. The City calculates that this alleged subsidy adds up to over \$16 million per year. The City also claims that because the County does not charge a portion of its overhead for contract services to the cities served, primarily in the law enforcement area, cities which do not have contracts with the County actually subsidize contract cities. The City also claims that gasoline taxes paid from incorporated areas are not equally redistributed and that the County approves projects in small cities worth more than their share of gas taxes, while the City suffers a deficit of as much as \$11 million. The County and Federal Affairs Committee of the City of Los Angeles has recommended, and the City Council has authorized, the creation of a task force to consider the creation of a separate county or city-county encompassing only the City of Los Angeles. The City has also investigated what State legislation would be required to decrease the mandate of the County to provide municipal-type services. The County is offering equally vehement rebuttals to these charges.

However, many County-City relations are very cooperative. There are also areas of cooperation. The most obvious is the recent approval by the City and the County of the consolidation of the City beaches into the County public beach program. Councilmen, Supervisors, special study commissions and grand juries have

called for merging administration of beaches since 1940. The Board had previously approved some contributions to the operation of City beaches, but the beach merger finally occurred largely because of the special interest of one Supervisor and the Mayor of Los Angeles. There is no formal or continuing organization through which the City and the County agree that each is satisfied with the consolidation in this area. All such agreements reflect ad hoc negotiations. Citizen complaints are relied on to alert Supervisors that joint arrangements are encountering problems.

As individuals, the Supervisors are active in intergovernmental relations with cities within a given supervisorial district. Cities do not appear before the Board as a collectivity to make requests of the County, despite the fact that as a group they receive funds under a variety of Federal and State programs from the County. Neither is there any mechanism by which the cities participate as a group in determining the allocation by the County of funds available to the incorporated cities. One Supervisor, whose district contains 29 incorporated cities, meets regularly with the councils and managers of the incorporated cities in his district. In other offices contacts with incorporated cities are through field deputies or as requested by each city. Supervisorial staff members have repeatedly described the institutional structure for dealing with intergovernmental relations and systematic evaluation of procedures for and performance of functions by different governments as a "vacuum." Despite this absence of regular machinery, creative contact does seem to occur.

C. Optional Themes of Emphasis for Supervisors

The previous section described the overhead instruments through which the Supervisors operate to maintain central direction. Since, however, various officials are likely to act and invest their time differently, one task of an inquiry into the formal central structure of the County is to examine the broad areas of possible concentration and the ways in which the current structure may influence a hypothetical Supervisor to select among them. There seems to be widespread agreement at all levels in the County that some such selection process is necessary. The responsibilities assigned to the Office of Supervisor are so broad that there is not the realistic option of fulfilling them equally while at the same time making an individual contribution that is satisfying in personal, professional, or political terms. In general, therefore, the current structure emphasizes the freedom of each Supervisor to select the areas, processes, and representational functions in which he wants to invest the greater part of his time. In doing this, the structure also implicitly contemplates that the individuals who hold the office will, either through voluntary cooperation or because of joint fear of joint failure, manage informally to apportion labor and responsibility so that no important "specialty" remains uncovered by one of their number. Within this constraint (if it actually functions as one) each Supervisor chooses the role most appropriate to his vision of the priority problems facing the County. Obviously, there is an infinite variety of such roles possible within the broad scope

permitted by the merged legislative/executive structure. Nevertheless, it may be a useful aid to thought to list some of the more obvious themes which represent discernible choices of emphasis and which seem reasonably likely to be featured in any combination of supervisorial personalities. These themes cannot, either alone or in combination, be used to characterize any individual Supervisor, past or present. They are presented in order to show the range of plausible choices which the present structure permits, in the hope that this might be useful in considering the likely effects of structural change.

1. Programmatic Administration

The structural characteristic which most distinguishes Los Angeles County from other urban counties is the very extensive opportunity it provides for executive-type activity on the part of officials elected through a single-member district process usually employed to elect legislators. The importance of this feature is underscored by the repeated statements of Supervisors and other knowledgeable observers that many of those elected to the office would have no interest in running for it if this executive role were not available. In simplest terms it means that there is no formal barrier to impede any Supervisor from involving himself in the administration of any program to any depth he desires. Until early in the present decade, as noted above, it appears that most Supervisors did not become deeply involved in day-to-day administration, either because of personal taste or in deference to the CAO. Since 1972, however, the trend seems to have reversed. Coupled with the decline in the significance of the departmental chairmanships as determinants of areas of concentration, this has meant that each Supervisor has a virtually clear field from which to select areas of special interest.

Having identified a limited number of programs in which he wants to build expertise, each Supervisor can often exert the kind of immediate and decisive influence usually associated with strong executives. His "specialties" quickly become known and often - although not always - respected by his colleagues in all except the most controversial issues. On any decision which does not require Board action, he is likely to be especially effective because he is likely to be the only Supervisor personally knowledgeable and interested in the matter, because he is in a position to cause the department major problems on other items which do come before the Board if his opinions are ignored, and because he can usually insist that the matter be presented to the Board if he feels it necessary. Thus, if he is prepared to invest his own time and that of his staff in sustained monitoring and consultation, the Supervisor and his office can become a major factor in the implementation of Board policies, in the exercise of executive dis-

cretion within them, and in the deployment of personnel, equipment, and operating procedures at the grass roots of administration.

Of course, the price of such investments is that their depth is inversely proportional to their number. If the Supervisor wants to monitor a few programs closely, it implies that he will pay much less close attention to most others. Unlike the CAO he has not the staff resources to attempt to monitor everything. Increasingly, however, this is the only factor which really differentiates the Supervisor from the CAO in the former's areas of specialization, except where it is widely known that there is deep controversy on the Board with respect to a particular matter and the department must take pains not to seem to be "playing favorites" among Supervisors. It is also apparent that the growth in the size of supervisorial staffs is expanding the number of "specialties" which each Board member can develop and maintain.

2. Systemic Administration

Each Supervisor also has the option to concentrate on the overall management processes of the County. He may elect to master the esoterica of the budget process and its associated jargon, and conduct detailed reviews of budgetary administration in all departments. The personnel and collective bargaining processes offer the same opportunities. There are also many government-wide policies (e.g., division of responsibility among service districts, rules on overtime and sick leave) which present important decisions which do not fit into any particular programmatic area. This field also includes the continuing effort to evolve fully and partially objective measures of productivity of all programs. A Supervisor may decide to concentrate his efforts on these across-the-board concerns rather than on narrower areas of specialization.

Even with the recent expansion of supervisorial staff, however, this is a prodigious undertaking. It probably requires a more conscious and perhaps more time-consuming personal and staff investment than most of the other principal themes of concentration. It requires a particularly close relation to the CAO's Office, where such data are compiled if they are compiled at all, or it may involve initiating some duplicate reporting by departments. As a practical matter, it is probable that the stress within the administrative system would become nearly intolerable if several Supervisors - each, presumably, with his own ideas of how data should be collected and analyzed - were to choose to concentrate primarily on overall management.

3. District-Centered Project Management

There are always strong pressures on Supervisors to devote time and staff attention to making certain that both the

capital and the service projects which the Board authorizes are brought to reality promptly and in ways that are responsive to the wishes of the constituencies they are designed to serve. These pressures are most powerful, of course, when the project is physically located in a Supervisor's district. Since he is likely to have advocated the project in the departments and before the Board - and because the speed and quality with which it materializes are likely to be perceived by his constituents as a highly visible and legitimate index of his effectiveness - the "home" Supervisor has good reason to be deeply interested in the implementation process. Experienced in government processes, he is also aware that most such undertakings involve a number of departments and subunits, and that the capacity to weld them together to carry out an overall project plan is not among the outstanding characteristics of this (or any other) level of government.

These concerns may lead to a variety of approaches to the supervision of project implementation. On the one hand, the Supervisor may simply designate a member of his staff to monitor the process by careful review of the status reports which are either routinely produced by the implementing department or are prepared by special request of the Supervisor. On the other hand, the Supervisor's office may undertake to become the de facto project manager, preparing a detailed implementation schedule, convening regular meetings of the principal working-level personnel from the departments involved, identifying and solving day-to-day problems, escalating issues for decision where necessary, and monitoring the utilization of money and other resources. Between the paper monitoring and this full-scale project management role lie many other possible blends. The number of projects underway at any one time in each of the supervisorial districts is so large that some such blend of paper review and direct management is a practical necessity even if the Supervisor has elected to concentrate in this area.

The following section of this paper (pages 75-76) notes the fact that this central project management function is not now explicitly located in the CAO's Office or in any other central organ of County government. It may be argued, therefore, that those Supervisors who choose to develop this capacity are simply performing a role which is evermore clearly necessary to the efficient functioning of government, and that they would relinquish it if and when a more regularized process were developed. However, the political sensitivity of such projects is so great, and the Supervisors' sense of intellectual and personal identity with them so pronounced, that they are likely to require extremely compelling assurances if this theme of concentration is to recede in importance. Here again - although it does not appear to have happened in any important case - the dangers of more than one Supervisor's office attempting to adopt this role for a particular project are obvious. It is also clear that placement of the project management role in

their offices may subject implementation to a singular set of priorities in which some unpopular projects (e.g., a landfill, a prison) may get somewhat less attention than others.

4. Legislative Work

It is entirely feasible for a Supervisor to concentrate his attention upon the classic functions of the legislator: policy review and reformulation, priority and criteria setting, mediation between conflicting interest groups, and the framing of new law. The scale and importance of these functions is sometimes obscured by the fact that the Board's work rhythms are largely expressed (and perhaps controlled) by a stream of agenda decision choices which accentuate the executive-type roles it plays. However, it should be remembered that the Board produces a large volume of new local law each year (an average of 233 ordinances per year for the past four years), and that the process by which it is generated is not basically different from the workings of other legislatures although the context in which issues arise is often quite different. Each new ordinance reflects a period of intense fact finding in the subject area in question, a process of consensus building among the interested publics and within the Board, and the delicate task of drafting and negotiating the legal language which conveys the agreement achieved. The legislative needs of a \$3 billion government are quite sufficient to offer another "specialty" to a Supervisor who elects to leave the monitoring of administration largely to his colleagues and the CAO.

Indeed, it may be argued that the legislative function is particularly and perhaps increasingly demanding as the Board expands its executive role. It may be more difficult, for example, to get the Supervisors to focus on broad policy issues involving several departments when the Board's fundamental division of labor is made by subject matter specialties each of which is expressed in a specialized bureaucracy in which a particular Supervisor has come to have a strong operating role. Quite apart from its executive activities, however, consensus building in the Board appears remarkably intricate because of such factors as the current tradition of virtually no contact between Supervisors outside public meetings. Finally, the trend toward greater public interest and participation in County government, some of it broader than any single issue or geographic area, is steadily producing greater needs for the bridging function between populace and government which legislators have traditionally served.

5. Public Contact and Advocacy

Whatever his chosen fields of substantive concentration, and whether he chooses to emphasize the executive- or legislative-type functions within them, a Supervisor must

develop his own tailored balance between the "inside" (administrative and legislative) and "outside" (constituency-oriented) aspects of his job. This involves much more than selecting his own personal and media appearances. For example, it requires him to choose between a pattern of staff deployment which maximizes his capacity to know and respond to the complaints of citizens in his district (most of which do not raise issues of general department policy or operations), or to choose a pattern which maximizes his knowledge of events and issues within the bureaucracies in which he has taken special interest. Of course, such choices are never made to the total exclusion of the lower priority; all Supervisors do some of both. Yet the patterns which have evolved are of sufficient variety to reflect a fundamental and inescapable choice which goes to the heart of the question of role definition.

Such choices are made more difficult by the fact that the nature of supervisory politics is almost certainly changing. All objective and subjective evidence suggests that for many years prior to the present decade the gap between the real power of the Supervisors and public understanding of their power was very great. The result of this and other factors was a very low level of public visibility. (Even today, one Supervisor remarks that the only way he can get many of his constituents to remember who he is is to remind them that he was once a City Councilman - a much less powerful but much more visible position.) Supervisory choices with respect to kind and extent of public activity were presumably geared to a political universe in which intense and continuous media attention were not necessary to reelection or maintenance of influence. Since the average postwar Supervisor served more than four terms (Table III), it seems clear that this choice was reinforced by the electorate.

Many experienced observers see signs, however, that this universe is rapidly evolving in the direction of the highly visible, contentious politics characteristic of city and state office. No definitive data exist to prove the thesis, but there is a widespread sense that County programs and - even more noticeably - County taxes are becoming more prominent in the public mind; that the personalities and the voting records of Supervisors are of increasing general interest; and that competition for supervisory seats, which has traditionally been much less intense and therefore less dangerous for the incumbent than competition for other offices, is becoming as fierce as for other major public positions.

If they are authentic trends, these changes will weigh heavily in the process by which future Supervisors choose their fields of emphasis. Selection of systemic administration, for example, may be unlikely to produce the visible, easily understood, personalized contributions which may result

TABLE III: AVERAGE TENURE¹ OF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, IN TERMS

<u>Period²</u>	<u>Terms/Persons³</u>	<u>Average Tenure⁴</u>
1852-1868	65/44	1.48
1869-1886	47/31	1.52
1887-1909	32/23	1.39
1911-1928	24/13	1.85
1930-1948	30/12	2.5
1950-1968	22/5	4.4
1970- Incomplete period		

¹ The average tenure is figured on the basis of the following considerations:
 1) Terms, rather than years, are counted. The length of the term is not taken into account. 2) A supervisor is counted at the year he was first elected. The results are even more striking when years are used. Terms increased in length from one year, 1852-53 to four years after 1887.

² The first three periods were constructed to coincide with changes in the formal provisions regarding elections and the length of Supervisors' terms. The last three approximate twenty-year periods. For purposes of comparability, the chart does not include information past 1968 as this current twenty-year period has not yet elapsed.

³ The number of terms served divided by the number of men serving during that period of time. For example, from 1852 to 1868, there were 65 terms served altogether. This figure is divided by 44, the number of different men who served these terms.

⁴ The average tenure. This figure results from the calculation in #2 above. Thus, for 1852 to 1868, 65/44 represents an average tenure of 1.48 terms per person.

from programmatic administration or project management. Concentration of staff time on individualized responses to citizen complaints may impair the Supervisor's capacity to be a leading figure in the broad and/or dramatic issues which capture the public eye. Whether these principles or their opposites are borne out in practice, there seems little question that future holders of the office will face a more trying choice among kinds and degrees of public involvement, or that by and large they will probably choose more rather than less emphasis upon their "outside" (i.e., widely visible) roles. If present trends continue, it is quite possible that public criticism and advocacy can reasonably be expected to become the central theme of concentration of one or more Supervisors.

6. Investigative Reporting and Analysis

Los Angeles County differs from many other urban governments in that it has no independently-elected comptroller or auditor. Thus, despite the impeccable reputation earned by the appointed Auditor-Controller and the respected work performed by the Grand Jury and the Board-appointed Commission on Economy and Efficiency, there is no truly independent source of deep, detailed, and systematic reviews of policies and operations. Particularly in an increasingly contentious political universe, this is a natural vacuum for one or more Supervisors to decide to fill. If the credibility of his independence can be publicly established - and if he is prepared to accept whatever joint responsibility is attributed to him as a Board member for the shortcomings he identifies - the Supervisor is in an excellent position from which to launch investigative projects.

His assets for this task are clear. The incentives for departmental cooperation and data collection are very powerful, even if the investigating Supervisor is not the department chairman. He is also in a position to stimulate and collect experiences, complaints, and allegations from the public at large. He can bring to bear analysts experienced in the inner workings of County administration, and he can keep them in their assignments as long as may be necessary. When his findings and recommendations are completed, he is sufficiently interesting to the media as an individual that he can assure broad dissemination of the product. If his work holds up under public and departmental scrutiny, he may soon be able to cite a long and diverse list of corrective actions and innovations which are directly traceable to his activities.

Along with these advantages go some complications for the Supervisor who selects this field of concentration. No matter how professional and unbiased the investigation, it is certain to cause discomfort in the bureaucracy and among other members of the Board because it always represents

explicit or implicit criticism of past practice. This is true of every independent investigative operation in the country, from the Comptroller General of the United States on down. Unlike the Comptroller General, however, the Los Angeles County Supervisor must oscillate between his investigative role and his membership on the collegial body which is collectively responsible for the activities he is investigating. His overall effectiveness depends not only upon his capacity to perform penetrating analyses and offer innovative suggestions, but also on his ability to work with his colleagues on the administrative and legislative issues with which the Board is presented. The mere fact of his concentration upon investigative activity, and the publicizing of the results which is a necessary part of the process, may alter the tone and character of intra-Board relations and spawn similar activities by other Supervisors in areas in which he is seen as most vulnerable. Whether this sequence of events is good or bad for County government is a subjective matter which turns on one's view of the priorities among supervisorial functions, but it appears that the present structure makes it nearly inevitable.

7. Reformism

Every executive and legislative choice presents the option of going beyond the issue at hand to argue for fundamental change in the policy, procedure, or organizational structure in the context of which the question arises. It is entirely possible for a Supervisor to direct the bulk of his energies to this deeper kind of change, rather than to concentrate on the specific issues which come before the Board. The most sweeping example of a reform issue, of course, is the nature of the Board itself, along with the related questions of an alternative executive, relations between Board and executive and the departments, and the other grand dilemmas of central structure. Behind these, however, is a collection of similar questions as large as the 50-department mass suggests. A government the size of the County constantly generates enough such issues to provide a diverse and intellectually satisfying agenda for any Supervisor who elects to put primary focus on them.

It should be emphasized, however, that this agenda is quite different from that which results from concentration on day-to-day items. In many instances the two perspectives are necessarily competitive. Many of the split votes on the current Board, for example, are less reflective of differences on the issue immediately before the House than they are of one or more Supervisors' view that the immediate question should not be decided without a prior policy or structural decision on the subject area of which the question is a part. The role of the reformer is to order large quantities of daily experience to test whether the whole approach of government

serves its proper ends. If he decides that it does not, he marshals his arguments, works out an approach which he considers an improvement, and sets about finding ways to use the smaller issues which are the Board's daily fare to present and dramatize the need for broader reform. As we have noted, however, the Board agenda is not geared to lengthy or generalized discussions of broad issues. Their introduction is likely to be a fairly obviously forced fit which may provide little public audience for the reformer's case, while at the same time creating costly frictions with other Supervisors intent upon getting the day-to-day items through.

In practice, therefore, the reform-minded Supervisor may find that his most dependable forums are the public at large (where the most fundamental revisions are concerned) and the bureaucracy (where the issue is a departmental policy or structure). In either case, however, any substantial change will eventually require approval by the Board, so that the craft of the successful reformer must include the capacity to guide and shape the issue on its way to the top in the manner which most ensures that it will be approved. The somewhat surprising result is that the effective reformer, far from divorcing himself from the mechanisms he is trying to change, must probably get more deeply and continuously involved in the present structure than Supervisors who adopt other themes of concentration.

* * * * *

To repeat, these themes do not begin to exhaust the array of role choices which are offered to each Supervisor. Neither is any choice totally exclusive of the others, nor must it be static over time. Each Supervisor is constantly changing the blend of emphases in response to his personal tastes, the changing needs of his constituency, and the pressures of events. The other side of the broad choice presented to the Supervisor is that the system does not permit him to totally ignore any of his roles. However, even these sketchy outlines of a few potential themes of concentration may begin to explain the very wide variety of individuals and operating styles that turn up on each successive Board. Of course, diversity is to be expected in a jurisdiction of the size and complexity of the County. It seems clear, however, that the richness of the variety owes something to the singular structure (or perhaps the lack of structure) of the Supervisor's job description.

D. The Representational Problem

As noted in the section on the responsiveness of the Board as a unit (pp. 47) each Supervisor must respond individually to citizens in his district. The problem of representation and

responsiveness is made difficult by the fact that each Supervisor serves 1.4 million residents. Thus in addition to his other roles, each Supervisor organizes to respond to the needs of the very large constituency of his district.

All Supervisors have procedures for responding to constituent mail inquiries. They answer all letters from constituents and refer those containing complaints to the departments. Supervisors require the departments to send their office copies of the response to the constituent. Some of the offices also make a follow-up call to the complaining constituent to check on whether the complaint has been taken care of. In several of the offices, the Supervisors sign all letters to constituents personally. In one office the Supervisor answers all of his own mail to monitor constituent feelings, identify service deficiencies and track issues of concern to constituents. The amount of constituent mail varies, as estimated by the staff offices, from about 50 to about 100 pieces of mail per day.

All Supervisors also have similar procedures for answering constituent phone calls. All calls are logged and the caller is referred to a supervisorial deputy assigned to the area of the complaint. The deputy takes the problem as an assignment and calls the appropriate department. Some offices make follow-up calls to the constituent as well to make sure the problem has been taken care of. The range of estimates for daily phone calls is from 75 per day to 250 calls per day.

All Supervisors also have staff assigned to field duties in their districts. The arrangements for staff assignment are not uniform and vary far more widely than do the procedures for responding to mail and phone calls. The existing pattern is:

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| First District: | Geographical division into north and south. Deputies spend a portion of their time in the district but all have their offices in the Hall of Administration. Eight district offices are located in County-owned buildings. Each is open for two hours per week. |
| Second District: | All deputies spend a portion of their time in the district, but none is assigned to the field on a full-time basis. There are 14 field offices in County buildings, manned for a few hours each week by four deputies. |
| Third District: | Plans to have a series of five field offices located in store fronts. Two are in operation. Separate staff for field offices will have no in-house duties, but will |

have a staff contact in the Hall of Administration staff.

Fourth District: Seven field deputies in seven geographic regions in the district. Two of the offices are staffed with secretaries and are open 40 hours per week, five of the offices are open from three to six hours per week. Deputies send in weekly briefings on the district.

Fifth District: District divided into five geographic regions, each with a full-time field office open and staffed every day. Field deputies have a staff contact with the in-house staff, but no in-house duties.

In addition, all Supervisors attend citizen meetings in their districts, attend meetings of local groups and visit the offices of departments and facilities in the district.

Beyond these common procedures, each Supervisor has his own technique for dealing with the special problems and configuration of his district. Since the First District has 29 incorporated cities the last two Supervisors from this district have held regularly scheduled meetings with each council, mayor and city manager in the district. One Supervisor has a newsletter and an intermittent public opinion survey of his district. Another spends a day each week in his office and invites people from the district to come into the Hall of Administration and see him at the time.

As previously noted, Supervisors respond actively to requests from community groups during the budget process. Some Supervisors have sought proposals for the use of revenue sharing funds from community groups. This year, requests from 766 community organizations for about \$112,370,000 in Federal revenue sharing funds were received. Last year, the Supervisors pledged 25% or \$22.5 million of their Federal revenue sharing allocation to community groups. The community organizations were encouraged to make oral presentations to the Board by the Supervisors from their district in the public hearings on the proposed budget, although the CAO had recommended that no funding be given since County social service programs, many of which are mandatory, were being recommended for curtailment because of financial shortages.

The traditional test of the responsiveness of individual Supervisors is in the last analysis the electoral process. The district system was historically intended to overlay voter concern on a system which otherwise might have focused on needs defined by departmental or service areas. Since 1933 there has not been a Supervisor who has

held office for less than two terms (see Table III and Appendix II). Over the last twenty years, elections for the Board involving an incumbent have often been relatively uncompetitive, given the power and responsibilities of the post involved. In five of these elections the incumbent did not have any opponents. Only two incumbent Supervisors in that period competed in runoffs and these two were the only ones in this period to fail to win reelection. It has been more common for a Supervisor to leave office by choice or due to death than for him to be defeated at the polls. In all but a few of the elections over the last twenty years, the incumbent has been reelected with a total vote margin of well over two to one. The highly competitive elections have tended to bring out more voters than normally participate. A poll taken in one such election indicated that one out of every four voters was voting in his district for the first time. Campaign expenditures also vary with the competitive or less competitive nature of the campaign. Candidates spend more money in the competitive campaigns and less in the non-competitive, even given the rising costs of materials and personnel in the recent past.

E. Summary of De Facto Exercise of Powers and Responsibilities

In this section we shall review the major powers of the Board addressed in the first section, and comment on the character of their de facto, as opposed to their de jure character. In addition, we shall comment on some of the ad hoc processes used by the Board to address issues or crises which arise.

The Board as Legislature

The most obvious function of legislatures includes making statutes, determining and authorizing expenditures of all public monies, conducting investigations in part to uncover information necessary for new legislation and to inform the general public about what is going on. Most legislatures have lost the initiative in the direction of governmental finance, and as policy initiators, but have increased their powers as checkers, revisers and critics. The Economy and Efficiency Commission, in discussing reform of the Board as an institution in its July 1974 Report, indicates that the Board could, in theory, be well suited to play a legislative role since the deliberative structure encourages it to concentrate on matters which require debate by five individuals.

There is however, at present, little public discussion on most matters before the Board. Most agenda items are passed en masse. This could indicate consensus on the Board on policy; or it could indicate that a prior filtering process removes controversial items early; or that informal consultation occurs. The system maximizes individual consideration by each Supervisor

of items. Thus items can be continued if individuals believe they have not had enough time to arrive at a conclusion and vote; in the interim staff work for each person occurs rather than general or committee debate. Usually continued items pass without debate when they reappear on the agenda.

Department heads recognize the need for three votes to get agenda items passed and budgets approved. It is commonly said by Supervisors and public commentators alike that the system reduces to those three votes. Departments go from office-to-office to produce the three votes rather than presenting their case for resolution before the Board collectively. Similarly the Personnel Director and the CAO go individually to each office before the Supervisors go into executive session to determine the collective bargaining position.

It is possible in the current arrangement for individual Supervisors to choose to emphasize the legislative aspects of their roles, as well as for the Board to act together as a legislature. One Supervisor has developed a legislative package based upon his campaign commitments and interests in County organization. Another has maximized the investigative role associated with legislative functioning. The goal has mainly been to determine whether existing statutes and orders were being well enforced by departments, rather than to uncover information necessary for new legislation. The investigations were also conceived as one aspect of the collective function of informing the public, given the limitations on existing legislative debate which is the traditional legislative alternative for providing the public with insight into the rights and wrongs of an issue. Another Supervisor believes that he should assume a leadership role in determining which issues are important for the future of the County and act as a catalyst to get these issues before the public. To achieve this, he has organized his staff in part around issues. Thus while collective debate is not the main forum, individuals have acted to conduct investigations in order to inform and activate public opinion and provide the basis for new legislation. Such activities do not appear to change Supervisors' votes. Nevertheless, if an informed and enlightened citizenry is indeed one of the prime requisites for healthy County government, informing the public may be among the most significant of a legislator's functions.

The Board as Executive

Executives generally perform two roles. They act as the ceremonial heads and spokesmen for the government. They also act as the implementers of the government's policies. In most big governments the executive has also increasingly become the source of policy-making as well as the center for policy enforcing.

In the County, a great deal of staff time is devoted to the policy reconfirmation and enforcement role. The agenda is long and the same kinds of items appear over and over again. For example, the Board has to approve letting bids for numerous small construction projects. This is a mechanism by which the Board can have a potential check on departments, but these are not matters which require much policy debate. Preparing the agenda, reviewing the items, seeking additional information, preparing for and attending Board meetings constitutes a major portion of staff and department head activity. Officials estimate that in these positions, about 20% of total time is spent on such enforcing activities. The percent of time increases dramatically for construction departments which are regulated through sets of incremental steps necessary to complete budgeted projects. The Board makes not only an initial decision in public meeting to undertake a project, but also approves it at the stage of land acquisition, design, the letting of construction bids, change orders and acceptance of the work. The Board has not delegated such decisions and retains this mechanism for monitoring department operations as a principal device, in addition to its use of departmental chairmanships and salary setting for department heads as controls.

The policy-making role, which is a traditional legislative role but in most systems now increasingly rests with the executive, is in some sense a residual of other functions except in the case of the collective bargaining position. On the advice of the Personnel Department and the CAO, and after consultation between these officers and individual Supervisors, the Board does take a position on its collective bargaining goals. There is no evidence that the position is leaked by individuals. There is some indication from union personnel that positions initially taken are sometimes altered, but this is not easily identifiable as the product of changes in positions by a single Supervisor.

In other cases the Board has, however, been charged with inability to arrive at a consistent policy position. The County has vacillated, for example, in its position on the use of outside contractors to provide services, going as far as inviting bids on some projects and then reversing itself by later refusing to let contracts on the grounds that no outside vendors were to be used.

In two recent court cases, the failure of the Board to set a definite policy was cited as a reason for a decision against the County. Superior Court Judge David Thomas voided the County's first general plan this year, principally on the grounds that the environmental impact report contained in it was inadequate, but also because projections for the County bore no relation to the previous governing document, the Environmental Development Guide. The Guide sets aside for

urban expansion 173 square miles of the more than 3,000 miles for that purpose with no indication of the rationale for the expansion. Judge Thomas, therefore, enjoined the Supervisors from enacting zoning ordinances or density designations or issuing building permits in the 178 square miles added for urbanization in the General Plan, as well as in County areas considered ecologically significant or designated open in the Guide. Judge Thomas states that the land use plan was developed "without relationship to goals and policies but upon accession to individual requests for particular treatment of specific parcels."

Another brush with policy inconsistency occurred this year in the area of employee relations. Judge Norman R. Dowd in March upheld a County management contention that the orders of the Employee Relations Commission are not binding on County management. The three members of the Commission subsequently resigned. Since the passage of the original ordinance there has been contention over whether the Commission had the authority to compel the County to obey its orders. Previous court cases had ended in the County being ordered each time to comply with Employee Relations Board rulings, but the Board had made no general decision to support the Commission. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Board adopted an interpretation of the ordinance which gives the Commission greater authority.

Other Powers Exercised

In regard to other Charter powers the Board also:

Appoints from a civil service list all agency heads and department heads except elected officials

The relatively high turnover rate of department heads has given the Board greater opportunity to exercise this power. As previously noted, the trend is toward increasing hiring from the outside. Board actions and policies have been supportive of department heads hired from the outside. The Board introduced one charter revision to the electorate to remove department heads from civil service to allow greater flexibility in dealing with them. The department heads believe if appointments were made by Supervisors outside the civil service system department heads would become policy arms of the Board rather than department managers. A system of permanent ranks with temporary assignments has also been suggested as a possible middle ground.

Appoints all members of advisory commissions and committees

This has been the only traditional source of independent appointing power for the Supervisors. Appointees are often designated by district and Supervisors have defended their qualifications in Board meetings. The new screening com-

mission may change the character of the appointments process by attaching explicit criteria and regularizing the collection of background information. Since few commissions or committees have a major and continuing role in affecting the County system, other than the Civil Service Commission, the Employee Relations Commission, the Regional Planning Commission and the Business License Commission, appointees are more a vehicle for tapping community views than overseeing policy.

Approves an annual budget outlining the number of positions and expenditures of all departments, including those with elected heads

The budget is the most important policy-making instrument in the County. The Board played a more continuous role in the budget process this year than in the past. The Supervisors traditionally have accepted most of the proposed budget. They use the hearings to respond to groups requesting program support. Because of fiscal constraints, this year the Board had announced it would consider the whole budget and not only proposed increases. Its considerations were, however, still quite specific and in the end the Board added a downward adjustment across the board rather than doing intensive critiques of departmental programs.

The budget is the major control exercised by the Board of Supervisors over independently elected heads. But as is indicated in Section IV, the Board treats the elected officials as peers and tends not to intervene in their deployment policies. The Board's control is also limited by the fixed costs in these proposed budgets created by existing contracts. The Board also is constrained in its control over a portion of the budget by the collective bargaining process which decides salaries, and the prevailing wage clause in the Charter.

Supervises the activities of the Chief Administrative Officer and all appointed department heads

The Board exercises this power by dividing departments among Supervisors for oversight. The Rules of the Board specifies that the Supervisor is to keep fully informed of the business performed by departments, institutions, and districts assigned to him and to report to the Board information and recommendations concerning the departments, institutions, and districts necessary to properly administer and legislate for them. The departments are divided, but department chairmen are not formally asked to report on them regularly to the Board; the department heads are asked directly for information. The minutes of Board meetings show little relation between departmental chairmanship and discussion on agenda items from the departments. Chairmen do not necessarily move to have items approved, present the department's view in debates, offer special insights into

the needs of their departments, or defend the department in Board meetings. From time-to-time, emergency matters are presented by the departmental chairman.

The Board's supervision of the CAO is discussed in Section III in detail. The CAO is a principal staff person to the Board. As indicated, its rate of acceptance of his recommendations on budget and agenda items is high, but his role is complicated by the rapid and substantial growth in personal staff to each Supervisor.

Provide, publish and enforce a complete set of rules not inconsistent with general laws or the Charter, prescribing in detail the duties, and systems of office and institutional management accounts and reports for each of the offices, institutions and departments in the County

The Board accomplishes this through its annual report on the departments which is a summary of revenue and expenditures and through the Administrative Code. The CAO has been delegated the responsibility for enforcing the Code.

Serves as the governing body of the special districts including Flood Control, Air Pollution Control and Fire Protection Districts

The heads of the Districts are supervised very much as if they were department heads. The Board appoints them from the civil service list, supervises their departments, has approval over parts of their budgets, and requires the same kinds of responses as from the County departments.

Sets salaries of all County personnel other than the Board of Supervisors itself

For all employees except the independently elected officials and the department heads, salary setting is actually done through approval of salary recommendations from the Personnel Director during the salary hearings. These recommendations become the Salary Ordinance. Most of the salary determinations are a product of collective bargaining. The Board has direct control only over the department heads.

Determines the management position in collective bargaining

The Board acts on the recommendations of the Personnel Director and the CAO in determining the County position. During the negotiations, the Board is consulted if there are major changes.

The Supervisors have not, outside of the determination of the bargaining position, moved to prepare further for the consequences of having a collective bargaining system in

the County. They have not, for example, granted increased funds for training managers to deal with the problems created by the unionization of County employees. They also appear to be reluctant to support a major change in the salary structure for managers that would provide incentive bonuses for meeting goals. The Board has not yet taken major action to deal with the likely future effect of negotiation on work loads on their decision-making by beginning intensive productivity studies in the CAO's Office and relating these to decisions on personnel and budget.

Adopts ordinances and rules, both to control the administration of County government and to regulate public conduct within the unincorporated areas of the County

The Board exercises this power at public meetings on Tuesdays. Individual Supervisors also hold investigative hearings on issues they believe should be publicly aired in a legislative mode. But, the opportunity to actually conduct public debates on legislation collectively is in practice limited by the use of Board time also in dealing with matters arising from administrative roles.

Acts as an Appeals Board on zoning exception cases of the Regional Planning Commission

The Board at present hears two to three zone appeals every Thursday. The appeals include conditional use permits, variances, animal variances and appeals on zone change decisions by the Regional Planning Commission. The Board has four options, it can approve the decision of the Regional Planning Commission, send the matter back to the Commission with or without suggestions, order a transcript to hear the case or set a hearing de novo.

The Board is setting more cases for de novo hearing. This is more time consuming than other options. It has the effect of increasing the role of the Board in appeals without having the number of appeals increase drastically. In 1974-1975 there were 461 variances and permits files. Of that number 40 were appealed. There were 80 zone changes filed with 22 ordinance amendments. In 1973-1974 there were 333 cases filed and 26 appealed.

In the hearing of appeals, zoning used to be defined so that information was brought to bear on zoning appeals principally by the district Supervisor in whose district a matter occurred. With the growth of Countywide environmental concerns, the Supervisors have now advocated an areawide look at all zoning appeals that come before them. Supervisors often now use field staff to inform residents of pending zoning changes and solicit opinion on them. The increasing interest in zoning had led the Board to consider hearing all zone cases that come

before the Regional Planning Commission rather than serving only as an Appeals Board.

Sits for hearings on County Improvement Districts

County Improvement District items appear regularly on the Thursday agendas. The number of cases has not changed in several years, the average is two to four cases per meeting. State law sets the percentage of property owners, registered voters or assessed valuation necessary to initiate a new improvement project. The law also sets a percentage that can protest the matter and defeat the project.

If there are not sufficient numbers to defeat the project, the Board can declare that no protest exists and approve the project. It can also adjust the boundaries for a particular project. Boundaries are adjusted if the project does not benefit land included in the proposed Improvement District. The Board must also judge the impact of the adjustment on the total project. Some adjustments can de facto destroy a proposed project or place the burden on too few to support it.

The Board adjusts approximately 2% of the cases and rejects another 2%. The decision usually has little districtwide effect because the projects are quite small.

III. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

A. Formal Powers and Responsibilities

The position of Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) has been established in every populous California county as well as in all of the State's large cities. In Los Angeles County it was created in 1938 by local ordinance. Here, as elsewhere, the office is designed to provide the central focus for the lines of administrative authority and responsibility which is often held to be necessary to managerial coherence, efficiency, and accountability, but to do so without creating a separate and equal executive with independent powers which are historically in the hands of the Board of Supervisors. Accordingly, there is a clear and continuous tension between the CAO's role as a chief line officer with central responsibility for resource allocation, supervision of operations, and management audit, and his role as a staff officer providing information, analysis, and recommendations to the Board for the exercise of executive powers which continue to be in its discretion to wield or delegate.

Chart XI lists the formal powers of the CAO as of July 1975. In the typology of American county governments, they add up to what is generally described as the "weak"* form of appointive executive. This classification basically reflects the following characteristics of the position:

- It is established by Board action - which can be repealed or overruled at any time by simple majority vote - not founded in County, charter, State, constitution, State statute, or other mechanism beyond the easy reach of day-to-day Board operations.
- It does not contain any powers not subject to review and approval/disapproval by the Board at any time. All powers are received by delegation from the Board and can be revoked by simple majority vote of three.
- In particular, the CAO has no power to select, appoint, or remove heads of County departments. He also has no formal (and in the past usually no informal) power to affect their salaries, raises, or promotions.
- The position has no fixed term of office, during which the incumbent could be removed only for limited and stated cause, nor is there any personal service contract which guarantees the holder of the office any benefits or appellate rights in the event of his removal.

* This word should not be taken as pejorative or even definitive. Many compelling arguments are advanced for maintaining ultimate executive power in an elected collegium, and many CAOs who are "weak" in formal powers have managed to build enough informal influence so that the question of formal mandate is almost academic.

CHART XI: FORMAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

- . Responsibility for annually submitting to the Board estimated budget requirements for all County departments and commissions.
- . Analyzing, investigating, and holding public hearings on departmental budget requests.
- . Authority to recommend increases or reductions of budget estimates.
- . The right to attend all Board meetings.
- . The authority to discuss any matters with the Board concerning the operation and affairs of County departments.
- . Authority (on behalf of the Board) to enforce and execute the policies, rules and regulations of the Board relating to the administration of County departments and districts.
- . Authority to supervise expenditures of County departments and districts.
- . Authority to report to the Board on the necessity of requested departmental expenditures.
- . The authority to recommend to the Board establishment or abolition of any personnel position in any County department.

The above primary responsibilities are supplemented by numerous other County Administrative Code functions designed to provide the Chief Administrative Officer with the capability to implement his formal responsibilities. These include:

- . Authority to provide for legislative representatives.
- . Ability to limit mileage permiitees.
- . Development of a records management and archives program.
- . Establishment of a disaster services organization.
- . Right to review safety programs.
- . Approval of a tuition reimbursement program.

- It provides for no formal policy-making role of any kind except by Board order. In particular, it provides for no independent voice on Board actions - no right of veto, no independent capacity to suspend expenditures, and no authority to present an independent point of view to the State, the Federal authorities, or the people at large.
- It establishes no legal rights of confidentiality of executive documents or processes (e.g., budget requests) from the Board as a body and probably from each supervisor as an individual.

The "weakness" of the CAO, therefore, lies in the fact that he has no independent base from which to challenge a Board majority if that majority wants to revoke, amend, supersede, or refuse to expand its past delegations. In fact, however, the Los Angeles County Board (unlike those of some surrounding counties) has never formally removed a CAO and has only rarely reduced the formal delegated powers of the office. In practice, the formal delegations serve as the outer limits of day-to-day working relationships, to be employed or questioned only were a full-scale confrontation to be unavoidable. This results, as a practical matter, in the application of the "rule of three votes," the operating principle that the CAO can do anything which can plausibly be interpreted as having been delegated to him as long as he is able to keep fewer than three Supervisors from opposing him.

Viewed from the perspective of the line departments, the strength and weakness of the CAO is a function of his perceived capacity to:

- Maintain constant access to the Board and control the timing and the subject matter addressed in formal sessions between the Board and the department heads.
- Compile and sustain a high "batting average" of Board approvals of his recommendations, particularly when there is an opposing recommendation from a department.
- Act with de facto independence on the myriad of lesser items which require central approval but not, in the opinion of the department, Board action.
- Serve as an effective advocate for a department with the Supervisors when he agrees with the former, and act as a buffer against what he perceives as unfair or politically-inspired criticism from the Board.
- Arbitrate inter-departmental disputes and achieve reasonably well-coordinated joint action when a problem requires the cooperation of two or more departments.
- Perform penetrating management audits and investigations.
- Provide efficient and responsive central data processing and communications services.

- Demonstrate advisory influence with the Board in personnel matters, particularly on the adjustment of the salaries of department heads.
- Carry enough personal weight with selected publics - particularly interest groups - so that his support or opposition is perceived to involve some political significance in the event of controversy.
- Avoid being ignored or circumvented by the independently elected officials.

Chart XI shows that the principal instruments of operational oversight provided to the CAO by the Administrative Code are those concerned with budget formulation and expenditure control. Although the Code contains language authorizing general supervision of County operations and the implementation of Board policy decisions, it establishes no regular process for monitoring of progress or performance. Experience suggests that the actual regulator of CAO supervision is the frequency of a requirement (legal or political) for Board or CAO approval of some specific action, usually a commitment of funds, the signing of a contract, or a change in Board policy. Put more simply, where money is involved the CAO's powers are spelled out in the Code; where the question is one of general supervision, the direction and extent of his reach tends to be heavily influenced by the need for some approval from a central authority, impacted upon by the strength of personality of the individual CAO.

At least as interesting as the executive delegations the CAO has received are the central overhead functions which have not been vouchsafed him. Principal among these are the executive role in collective bargaining and control of the central personnel process (except for his right under the Code to recommend the creation or abolition of positions). Both have been delegated to an independent Personnel Director who reports directly to the Board. This division is not trivial with respect to the integrity of the County's central structure. Collective bargaining increasingly controls the bulk of the operating budget, and of the work rules, flexibility of assignment, and general administrative style of most program operations. Personnel policy determines the incentives and penalties available to workers and program managers as well as the priorities for recruitment and training. The present system reflects the belief that these powers should not be vested in the same official responsible for budget and general administration. The grounds for this division may be that this would be too great a concentration of power below the Board. In addition it reflects a belief that a personnel specialist is likely to place greater weight on the conservation and improvement of human resources, as opposed to short-term budgetary savings.

There are also two central-type functions which do not seem to have been created in the CAO's Office or elsewhere in the central establishment.

First, the CAO has no clear mandate or clearly organized method to conduct regular central project management to assure that high priority

activities which involve a number of departments will proceed according to a pre-established schedule which integrates the dozens to hundreds of individual steps required to get from the starting point to the programmatic objective during a stated period and within a given level of resources. This reflects the view, shared by the current CAO, that this function is an inextricable part of implementation, which is the proper province of the operating departments. The CAO does get involved in multi-departmental project management activities when the Board requests him to do so, or when he feels that the participating departments cannot do the job themselves.

However, in the jurisdictions where regularized central project management exists, this function is increasingly viewed as essential to reasonable assurance that a policy decision will be implemented with measurable promptness. This has resulted from repeated recognition, in a wide variety of governmental settings, that weaknesses in performance lay less in the process of formulating policy than in the process of implementing it. Over and over again, at every level of government, sensible policies have been vitiated by the administration's inability to designate a central individual, experienced at designing and monitoring complex work schedules, who could convene the working-level principals, negotiate agreement on an implementation plan, integrate progress reports into an information flow which was useful to top management, and provide a forum for mediation of the inevitable disputes and bottlenecks which always arise.

At best, of course, a project manager has a difficult role. He normally does not and cannot receive line authority to direct the operating officials or agencies he is charged with coordinating. Also, he cannot be as expert in any of the technical activities necessary to the project as his colleagues are certain to be. Nevertheless, armed with good judgment, reasonable diplomacy, and the known personal interest of the central executive, central staffs given this responsibility seem to have substantially improved the capacity of governments to do what they decide to do.

As noted above, in Los Angeles County this function is left substantially to departments if it is to be performed at all. However, there is some evidence that at least some Supervisors and the CAO have made or are making provision in their own staffs to perform it. Apart from the question whether it is feasible to play this role from a Supervisor's office, this trend raises worthy issues of individual versus collective executive control and the clarity of the lines of authority between the CAO and the heads of departments.

The second central-type function which seems partially fragmented is the allocation of Federal funds. All such funds are in the County budget compiled by the CAO. However, a substantial portion of funds for categorical programs have been distributed on the basis of recommendations developed by the Urban Affairs Department, subject to Board approval. The creation of a line department with the function of distributing Federal funds violates the general resource allocation theory

which underlies the regular budget process. Neither this nor any other theory should be held sacred, but the rationale for this particular contravention remains obscure. From the point of view of the CAO's prerogatives, it also cannot be ignored that direct relations between the Board and this department have been the rule rather than the exception.

The handling of other general revenue sharing funds currently is more in the traditional mode, with revenue sharing funds treated as an element of budgetary income. Departments in turn request spending authority, with the CAO and of course the Board making the final decision.

Of course, it is not clear that either the project management function or all distribution of Federal funds should be the responsibility of the CAO. However, the fact that most conventional wisdom classifies these among the tools most appropriate to the central executive structure suggests that their current placement, or, in the case of project management, their non-placement, is worth examination.

B. The CAO's Office as an Operating Entity


Chart XII shows the present organization of the CAO's office. It contains 158 professional employees and approximately 17 support personnel. They are organized into six divisions, each of which reports directly to the CAO (though theoretically through a single assistant CAO, a position which has been vacant since December 1974). The following sections describe the functions of each division.

1. Budget Division

The 85 professionals assigned to the Division are organized into nine program teams, each of which monitors a cluster of departments with related responsibilities. Each team contains several administrative analysts - junior and senior - and a team leader and in some cases another specialist required for effective analysis by the particular program area. The head of each team or team leader acts as the personal representative of the CAO in dealing with departments on matters ranging from minor or technical budgetary issues to the broadest questions of policy management or operation. Appendix I describes the steps in the budget process.

There seems to be no standard pattern with respect to use of the teams by the Board or the CAO as general executive staff on issues in which budgetary considerations are not predominant. The evidence suggests that in a few individual cases the Board, in the manner of many chief executives in other governments, treats the head of the budget team as a chief source of information, staff analysis, and independent (of the department) recommendation. But the Budget Division is not, by and large, treated by the Board as an in-house general staff which serves as their principal eyes and ears in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the CAO very much does use them for

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this purpose, interposing no personal staff between them and him. In bureaucratic terms, they clearly "belong" to the CAO, not to the Board, and the two are generally viewed as quite separate. In the post-1972 movement toward greater administrative involvement on the part of the Supervisors, their informational and analytic needs have clearly been reflected in the growth of staffs reporting directly to them. They have not co-opted the staff of their own principal "staff officer," the CAO.

The primary responsibility of the Budget Division is to develop recommendations for the annual operating budget of all departments, and to monitor commitments and expenditures after the Board has adopted a budget. In practice, as in all large governments, the extent and complexity of these functions varies enormously from department to department. Many of these variations are based on historical or other idiosyncratic factors, including the personalities involved in each team. In general, however, the process will be more intense and continuous:

- Where there are larger sums involved.
- Where the County's own tax receipts are involved, as distinguished from a predominance of Federal, State, contract city and special grant funds (which, taken together, make up approximately 40% of the County budget).
- Where the supporting funds are drawn from generally utilizable sources, rather than those earmarked for a few limited purposes (15% of the budget consists of earmarked funds).
- Where there is a history of intense Board or public interest.
- Where there is a history of natural or controlled under-expenditure which can provide a reserve against the sudden emergence of new demands or a shortfall in anticipated revenues.
- Where there is reason to fear that what appear to be small commitments may obligate the County to make much larger and long-lasting commitments.

The programmatic studies now underway by the Commission's staff will provide examples of the variety of these levels of oversight and supervision.

2. Management Audits Division

Created in 1974, this Division of approximately 15 professionals is one of a number of recent attempts by the County's largest government to provide the central executive with a permanent capacity to conduct intensive studies of the effectiveness and efficiency of program operations. Although the term "audit" has generally been used in governmental circles to describe detailed reviews of financial

transactions, the "management audit" is directed to broader questions. It is less concerned with accounting for each dollar spent than with measuring the degree to which the managerial structure and procedures are best suited to effective and efficient achievement of the programmatic goals established. Pioneered by the U.S. General Accounting Office, the concept is still controversial - particularly among operating agencies who resent "auditors" judging the effectiveness of their programs - and many of its techniques are still in the developmental stage.

Historically, the establishment of a separate and central management audit staff has tended to narrow the range, and thereby the influence, of the traditional budget staff, who often had previously been the only analysts in a position to attempt such judgments. In a number of cases the resulting division of function has effectively emasculated the management analysts by depriving them of a linkage to an individual or process capable of guaranteeing them access and forcing serious consideration of their recommendations - which are rarely popular with the operating agency in question. It is too early to tell whether this will be a problem in Los Angeles County. However, the county has avoided the single guarantor of bureaucratic demise - organizational separation of management analysts from budgeteers. Also, it has regularly involved Budget Division staff members in audit teams. Finally, the CAO and the Board have shown a lively interest in the Audit Division's products, and the Auditor-Controller has agreed to a set of distinguishing criteria which demarcate his financial audit from the CAO's management audit. Thus, in general the signs are positive.

The Division has no regular annualized schedule for audits. The leadership believes it more important to address the priority problems as currently perceived than to develop a pattern by which every program is guaranteed at least one audit in a prescribed period. About 80% of the audits are generated by request of the Board, but requests may also come from individual Supervisors, the CAO, an operating department, the Grand Jury, the Economy and Efficiency Commission, or citizens' groups. (Appendix III presents the audits actually conducted to date.) Audits of very large programs are specifically budgeted for where the need is clear well beforehand (e.g., eight were budgeted this fiscal year), but most are performed on request without prior budgetary provision. At this relatively early stage, the Division seems to have no written criteria for judgment about the priority of one request over another. The decision device - which may be the best possible - reduces to a poll of knowledgeable staff people in the CAO's Office, the Board's staff, and the relevant department.

The audit teams contained in the Division are fluid in composition depending upon the job at hand. In general, they tend to be made up of administrative analysts drawn from the CAO's Office, from operating departments, and occasionally from the Personnel Department. For example, the audit of the 1974 Regional Planning Commission was performed by a team consisting of a chief CAO analyst, two senior

CAO analysts, a personnel deputy from the Personnel Department, and an auditor from the Auditor-Controller's Department. In no case to date has a member of a Supervisor's staff been a member of an audit team though there is not a standing rule against such an assignment. It is important to note in this respect that some Supervisors have mounted inquiries which very much resemble a management audit. There is much in the history of the establishment of the Management Audit Division to suggest that the Supervisors saw it both as necessary to better administration of the County and as a way to generalize a flow of data and criticism which had previously been available to only some of their number.

Thus far the relationship between the Division and the operating departments seems to be working surprisingly well. The smooth audit of key sections of the Sheriff's Department, an exacting test for many reasons, is a positive example. Whether this relationship can and will continue, it is impossible to say, just as there is not yet sufficient evidence to permit reliable judgment of the practical effect of the Division's recommendations. At best, the tension between the CAO's traditional protective function vis-a-vis the department heads and the Board's political/administrative needs for dramatic findings and improvements will require an exquisitely delicate balancing of the CAO's roles.

3. Capital Projects Division

Like most large governments, Los Angeles County separates its capital budget (for facilities and equipment of long-term utility) from its operating budget (which contains the payroll and fringe costs of employees, along with programmatic funds which are rapidly expended, and money to purchase consumables). Unlike some, however, the County also groups the central analytic staff concerned with capital expenditures in a separate division within the CAO's Office. The merits of this separation have long been debated. On the one hand, capital project analysis often does require different expertise (e.g., engineering training) from that required to analyze operating programs, and analysts of capital projects are often happier with a separate structure in which they can rise to senior authority without direct competition with their operating budget counterparts. On the other hand, many argue that insulation from operational costs and other problems impairs the quality of judgment exercised by capital specialists and keeps the true budgetary trade-offs implicit in a capital investment decision from being addressed. For better or for worse, Los Angeles County has opted for separation of the two functions, although the two staffs occupy a common class of civil service positions and must compete with each other for promotional slots.

The Capital Projects Division contains 13 professionals responsible for preparing and maintaining a long-range construction financing forecast, coordinating all activities related to the capital budget, coordinating and reviewing detailed project implementation plans, and recommending to the CAO and the Board the priority capital

projects and corresponding optimal financing methods for each. In the course of this, the Division is also responsible for reviewing Facilities Department recommendations regarding lease versus construction, rehabilitation versus replacement, and the like.

The annual process begins when the capital portion of each department's budget request is reviewed and approved by the Budget Division. Because the cost estimates and implementation schedules are likely to change during formulation of the request, the Capital Projects Division requests and receives from the Department of Facilities an update on both. The CAO then sets an upper limit on the availability of capital funds during the coming year. Unlike many jurisdictions, this limit is not effectively established by a statutory debt ceiling or other such externally imposed constraint. (Although such a limit exists, the County is operating so far below it that it is not the effective constraint.) The most effective constraint is informal. The annual capital projects budgets total equals approximately 8.6% of the total County operating budget. This total is established as a guideline by the CAO. The Division also relies on such subjective criteria as the "tolerable" load of debt service which can be borne by the operating budget, the "urgency" of the need for various facilities as determined by various programmatic and replacement rules of thumb, the known desires and priorities of the Supervisors, and such other factors as it may deem appropriate.

Having settled on a budget policy the Division then compares it with the departmental requests, which will now be arranged in descending order of priority. These priorities are established by the departments, budget teams, and Capital Projects Division in negotiation with their Budget Division counterparts. It is also likely that they are constructed with some regard for the resulting dollar equality among Supervisorial districts, although this intent is rarely acknowledged even in private. After the priorities are clear, the implementation plans are examined to determine what amounts can actually be spent during the budget year, and the funds available are allocated among projects according to their priority and their practical dollar requirements. (This last point is not trivial; many of the bitterest budgetary arguments concern the amounts which can actually be expended in the year at issue. It is often very difficult for operating agencies and their constituents to understand or accept the sheer length of the construction process.)

The resulting one-year capital budget in the past was not related to any project-specific long-term capital plan. The Capital Projects Division had little time to fulfill its long-range planning function because it was preoccupied with its dealings with architects and contractors in a system which provided no other central focus for the activities of the several dozen separate agencies engaged in construction. Their Economy and Efficiency Commission investigation of the construction function resulted in 1973 in establishment of the Facilities Department, which took much of this burden off the

Division. It is now free to devote substantially more time to planning and setting priorities.

There is also overwhelming evidence that here, as in most large urban areas, the capital budgeting process is more subject to constant and direct involvement of the Board than is the operating budget. In a sense, the annual capital budget is merely a list of ongoing projects and those to be initiated all conditions being equal. In fact, of course, conditions are never in the predicted equilibrium. Some projects are subject to special delays because of strikes, material shortages, the withholding of State or Federal funds or approval, and innumerable other causes. Other projects proceed more rapidly than expected and/or escalate in cost. Just as important, the priorities of Supervisors, their constituents, the Department or even the CAO can change with changes in objective circumstances, making a long-range plan difficult to sustain without numerous changes. The result is a substantial volume of reallocation, compensatory action, and other adjustments in the course of the budget year, much of which seems to take place directly between the agencies and the Board. Although the CAO's Office must be involved in any money shifts, it appears that many of the agreements underlying such shifts do not involve the Capital Projects Division staff prior to the making of decisions. Again, one would expect some tension between this operating style and the existence of a semi-authoritative long-range facilities plan.

The Division also provides the Board with special reports on major capital projects under consideration. Typically, these reports include the need for facility, alternatives available to meet the need, the cost and time variables for each alternative, the policy and program implications of each alternative, and a recommended course of action.

Examples of reports completed in recent years include:

- . Sheriff's Administration Building
- . Cerritos Regional County Park
- . Sheriff's Criminalistics Lab Facility
- . San Fernando Valley Juvenile Hall
- . 10-Year Health Services Construction Program
- . Master Plan for Court Facilities

The Division expends much time and energy as administrator of the current Capital Projects Budget. In close concert with the Department of Facilities, it strives to insure that total expenditures remain within the budget total. This function includes analysis of project cost overruns, identification of potential surplus funds, response to Board directives to transfer funds, and the processing of budget adjustments for the Board's agenda.

4. Management Systems Division

The 21 professionals in this Division are charged with establishing government-wide priorities and standards for two of the most critical

services required by many departments - automatic data processing and internal communications - and with performing a major share of the work measurement performed by the County.

The management of computer services is among the most common and vexing problems facing every large urban government. Almost invariably a need has developed to establish a small staff close to the central executive which can establish priorities among competing requirements, set standards for system development and application, and develop operations and budget policy with respect to the use of in-house computer time, outside service bureaus, and other sources of computer services. This Division performs this function, principally through a committee chaired by the Division head and comprised of the head of the Department of Data Processing and that of each of the several other operating departments with extensive computer needs. The Division is not designed or equipped to be a provider of services. The Data Processing Department implements the policies established.

The same pattern holds for communications. The Division works with the Communications Department and major user departments to establish priorities for funding, operating, and maintaining large-scale communications systems. The resulting standards are applied in the cooperating agencies.

Work measurement is an older required service but is less developed as a central function than the others. This reflects a 1964 decision by the then CAO to decentralize this activity to the departments, on the ground that their operations are so different from each other that central management was wasteful. Ten departments (comprising 62% of County employees) have their own work measurement staffs all trained by this Division. Five additional departments have some engineered time standards. This Division checks the work of the departments, performs work measurement in other departments, and trains work measurement staff. It is not a major objective of the Division to develop standards which are applicable across departmental lines because, it is argued, tasks in different departments are usually non-comparable. In fact, there is not much evidence of success in this field. The central County authorities have recently initiated a number of efforts to install systems to monitor and measure productivity, but there is not yet in place a comprehensive effort. The precise reason for this is unclear, particularly in view of the fact that substantial efforts of this kind do exist within a number of the departments, notably the Department of Public and Social Services. If the lack of emphasis by the central staff is perceived as a problem, it may lie in part in the separation of this Division from the budget function. As in general management analysis, it has proven virtually impossible to stimulate genuine attention to work products and managerial changes to improve them unless the analytic process is backed by a large and clearly visible stick.

5. Special Services Division

It is the responsibility of this Division of 20 professionals to serve as a traffic cop for agencies wishing to apply for Federal or State grants which require matching local contributions. Every such grant application must first be endorsed by the head of the relevant Budget Division team and by the head of that Division. The Special Services Division can then, in theory, set priorities among applications so approved. In fact, however, few if any such applications are denied permission to be forwarded to the financier.

This Division is also the central office for supervision of relations between the County and the cities to which the County provides contract services. It operates a central "complaint desk" and a central point of information for such cities. Some departments actively "sell" the idea of service contracts, but as a formal matter the city must request the Board to enter into one.

The actual drafting of a standardized contract is done by the County Counsel and the City, but once it is signed this Division has formal responsibility for overseeing the relationships thereby established. The departments are informally requested to keep the Division apprised of City complaints, and there is a good deal of evidence that it had mediated some real disputes that would be hard to deal with at any other level. In practice, however, it appears that the squeaky wheels dominate the Division's attention and that supervision of "quiet" contracts is minimal.

6. Special Investigations Unit

This small (approximately four positions), new office was created by the Board effective April 1, 1975. It was originally recommended by two current Supervisors and later by the Economy and Efficiency Commission, which suggested that it be directly appended to the Board. The CAO objected to this arrangement on grounds that it would duplicate services available with existing resources and that it was in any case a proper staff function of the CAO. After considerable debate, it was agreed that the Unit would be a regular part of the CAO's Office.

Thus far, the office appears to be a cross between the crisis teams maintained by many government auditing units, for use when the threat of scandal requires fast action in a narrow field of concern, and the quasi-independent investigation units which are part of the normal bureaucratic machinery of several large urban governments in the East. The mandate of the Unit essentially permits it to perform whatever studies and analyses may be necessary to determine facts and responsibilities in the situation in question. It can audit management, finance, organization, performance, personal conduct and responsibility, or, presumably, any combination. Since regularized exercise of these powers would cut athwart the established turf of the Management Audits Division, the Grand Jury and the

Auditor-Controller's Office, it is assumed that they will be used mainly to head off crises, and when there is need for a fast-moving investigative staff, but one with no intention of taking permanent possession of a regular function.

Yet, at present, it is apparently not expected that the Unit will evolve into the para-law enforcement agency which investigative staffs often become. In other jurisdictions, large-scale anti-corruption work, much of it undercover, has become the primary work load of such agencies. They have been encouraged to perceive the principal indicator of their output as their success in ferreting out government officeholders and employees found to have engaged in corrupt practices. This typically involves elaborate schemes to test the probity of the target individual or group, along with extensive use of "wired" go-betweens who seek to record any transgressions. Such agencies usually have a legal mandate which includes the power to subpoena but not the power to grant immunity to witnesses, in order to remove the danger of self-incrimination. The Special Investigative Unit has neither power. There seems to be a consensus that it should not concentrate in areas where either would be needed. Where there is any cause to believe that criminal violations are involved, the intent seems to be immediately to turn the case over to the District Attorney for investigation and prosecution. It is worth remembering, however, that this is also the way that most previous investigation departments have started out.

Although insufficient time has passed to form any solid pattern of activities, it appears that the Unit's current practicable goals are two. First, it should provide the Board with a roving squad of audit-trained "shock troops" which can respond quickly to the threat of scandalous or dramatically inept administration. If it works well, it may even be able to get into a problem and recommend corrective action before the situation hits the newspapers. Second, it provides the CAO with the capacity to respond to the requests of departments for a fast-breaking, quietly effective investigative instrument which is outside the web of relations of the departments but inside the government and knowledgeable of its rules. This latter function seems to be primary at present, with the Unit doing fact finding on relatively narrow but potentially difficult situations which do not involve violations of law so much as of administrative regulations or standards of personal or professional conduct. In the longer term, however, it is open to question whether this role will satisfy the Board's expressed needs. The activities of the Unit are likely either to expand or to wither until it is eventually absorbed into one of the regular watchdog agencies. The issue is likely to be quite lively in the years immediately ahead.

7. Lobbying and Intergovernmental Relations

The relatively rapid increase in dependence upon Federal and State financial support, although slower paced in Los Angeles than in many other major metropolitan areas, has underscored the need for personnel permanently stationed in Sacramento and Washington, D.C. These

representatives present the County's position on legislation, keep leading County officials advised of the progress of important bills and the strategic times and means to affect it, and conduct ongoing relations with like-minded organizations with whom the County finds itself allied on issues (e.g., with the National Association of Counties and other such groups on Federal revenue sharing). There are currently three such representatives, two in Sacramento and one in Washington. All report directly to the CAO.

It is characteristic of Los Angeles, as of other local jurisdictions dealing in what most local personnel regard as "foreign" legislatures, that development of an annual legislative program is a relatively new and not yet firmly institutionalized function. Although the CAO's Legislation Section (established in 1974) conducts a process which eventually yields such a program, most Supervisors and their staffs do not appear to use the program as a primary vehicle or to view it as in any major way restrictive or directive of their personal lobbying activities. This is not to say that the County's legislative representatives do not make use of the Supervisors on specific bills, nor are they likely to proceed on their own agenda without periodic confirming instructions from the central authorities to whom they report. But, outside of the office responsible for it, there seems to be little familiarity with the government-wide process by which legislative needs are systematically collected and reviewed, bills are drafted, priorities are assigned, and regular monitoring of the progress of all relevant major bills is provided for through a reporting system.

The Legislative Section consists of the Section Head, four legislative analysts, two secretaries and four clerks. The Section Head reports directly to the CAO (or to the Assistant CAO when that position is filled). The workload is divided among the four analysts on the basis of related subject matter, with each having liaison responsibility with both the County departments and the CAO Budget Teams falling in his subject area. The four areas are governmental operations, environment/engineering, health/welfare, and justice.

The Section has two basic responsibilities:

1. Initiation and pursuit of County-sponsored legislative proposals.
2. Identification of and action to influence the outcome of legislative proposals affecting the County.

In the fall of each year, proposals for legislation are solicited from all County departments and reviewed by the County Counsel, CAO analysts and the County's Legislative Representatives. The final list of approved proposals is presented to the Board of Supervisors for adoption as the County's legislative program. After holding it over several meetings for study, the Board acts on the program as a whole, excepting some items to which one or more members object. However, this summary adoption is not interpreted as blanket approval

of each individual proposal in the package. Such individual approvals require subsequent specific actions by the Board on the initiative of one of its members.

Other proposals are added to the program during the course of the year, at the instance of the CAO or a Supervisor, and usually at the request of an operating department. The Section also develops general policy guidelines for broad areas of legislation, in concert with the Departments and Budget Teams, and these guidelines are presented to the Board for adoption.

Upon the adoption of the legislative program by the Board, copies are sent to all State Legislators and the full California Congressional delegation. The Legislative representatives in Sacramento and Washington seek authors for the various proposals, work with legislators and their staffs, testify themselves or arrange for expert testimony as needed, and report frequently on the progress of the legislative program. The entire process is coordinated by the Legislative Section.

The second major activity of the Section is the identification, analysis and recommendation regarding all proposed legislation affecting the County. The Section receives all bills directly from the State Legislature. Congressional bills likely to affect Los Angeles County are forwarded to the Section by the Washington Legislative Representative. The bills are reviewed initially by the Legislative Analysts who make the determination as to potential effect on the County. If a bill is determined to have a substantial potential effect, it is referred to all concerned departments for thorough fiscal, operational and programmatic analysis. These departmental analyses are then reviewed and coordinated by the legislative analysts, who reconcile, when possible, conflicting positions. (When departments cannot agree on a final recommendation, conflicting viewpoints are included in the final staff analysis, but the CAO determines what recommendation will be made to the Board of Supervisors.) The analyses assign specific weights (major, secondary, minor, no effect) to the bills being reported.

From the hundreds of bills which are analyzed, those of substantial fiscal, operational or program impact on the County are incorporated into a State and Federal Legislative Bulletin and presented by the CAO to the Board. (These analyses are updated and revised with each substantial amendment of the bill.) Any Supervisor can then move to adopt the recommendation made on any of the bills, to modify it or to delete it from the Bulletin, while adopting the remainder. The analyses and recommendations represent a consensus of the views of the County officials charged with implementation of the proposed legislation, and the Supervisors rarely take formal actions reflecting disagreement with the recommendations. On the other hand, Supervisors do not hesitate to delete or modify recommendations, especially in the broader policy areas, or to request their colleagues to support or oppose specific bills which have not

been referred to them for action by the CAO. These efforts are most frequently in response to a direct request from the Legislator authoring the bill.

Upon their adoption by the Board, the CAO's Office considers these analyses and recommendations to be the official policy guidelines for the Legislative Representatives and department personnel to follow in dealing with State and Federal legislative bodies. His position is that no County employee, with the exception of the other elected County officials and their representatives, is authorized to represent as a County position any other than that adopted by the Board of Supervisors. It is not at all clear that this rule is in actual force among members of the Board or in the bureaucracy outside the CAO's Office. In any event, however, it is generally agreed that this does not preclude an ongoing exchange of views between County departments and their corresponding legislative committees or supervisory governmental agencies. While requesting that communications with Legislators and their staffs be shared with the Legislative Section and the relevant Legislative Representatives, the CAO does not seek to impede such contacts.

The departments, on the other hand, often have substantial legislative proposals born of the problems encountered in operating under existing law. The screening and coordination of these is apparently left very largely to the legislative representatives, although budgetary implications may be reviewed by the Budget Division if they are substantial and if the department elects to present them to that Division or the legislative representative does so. There seems to be no formal "legislative clearance" process similar to that in the Federal and many other large systems, but there is a fairly effective procedure requiring CAO approval before any formal appearance before a State or Federal legislative committee. Here, as in public utterances in general, the CAO's Office usually does not screen the testimony of department heads in detail; the official is trusted to stick to the County's official position unless he clearly indicates that he is speaking unofficially and for himself alone.

The CAO's instruments for maintaining discipline in this area are largely informal, except where a written response to a written request for a County position is involved. His only formal check on departmental appearances is the need for his approval of major - particularly out-of-state - travel. The precise volume and content of inter-governmental communication is probably unknown to him. Nevertheless, there are no frequently cited cases in which a departmental representative has made an egregious misstatement of the County's position (i.e., a statement at variance with the established position of the Board or the CAO.) The issues in this area, if any, are largely ones of omission. As the Federal and State roles become more critical to County policy and implementation capacity, however, these issues may loom larger.

C. Managerial Style

1. The CAO as an Individual

The problem of institutionalizing and multiplying the range and effectiveness of the chief general staff officer of a central executive - individual or collective - is among the classic dilemmas of administrative theory. Even where executive and legislative roles are clearly demarcated, serious questions of general versus specific expertise and interposition of a "layer" between the executive and the department heads invariably arise. Where the executive and legislative roles are not separated, and the chief staff officer is also the principal focus of any of the line executive processes - even though he can be overruled by the Board at any time - the normal uncertainties are increased manyfold. In either case, however, it is clear that the CAO's personal role differs substantially from that of his staff. Like a Supervisor, a CAO has some leeway in determining the character of his role and the activities he will emphasize within it. However, this flexibility is, on the evidence, substantially less broad than the Supervisor's.

Most fundamentally this reflects the inescapable fact that the CAO is the individual who is always expected to be present during formal Board deliberations, whether ad hoc or regularly scheduled. He is also the person to whom an individual Supervisor expects to talk when he has a problem. The same is often true of one or more of the Supervisors' deputies. He is expected to be knowledgeable and in command when a crisis of any proportion emerges, and is increasingly involved directly, together with or on behalf of the Supervisors, in any negotiations with citizens groups, unions, or other interested parties which may be necessary to reach a settlement. Most of this individual responsibility seems to be non-delegatable in practice, although the last CAO was able to make his Assistant (the present CAO) interchangeable. The impression of most knowledgeable people seems to be that this interchangeability can survive only so long as a CAO's absence is not perceived as habitual. With the current vacancy of the Assistant CAO's position, the question does not arise.

Our inquiries suggest that this requirement of personal appearance has at least three major effects. First, so far as the general public is concerned, no one in the CAO's Office below the CAO himself has any sustained visibility or commands the personal recognition to make him an effective spokesman or advocate of the CAO's position. Thus, to the degree that an "outside" role is part of the job, it must all or virtually all be performed by the CAO himself. This is, of course, a natural concomitant of the tradition that there is no substantial and legitimate "outside" role - that the CAO is the "inside" person doing the Supervisors' will while they handle senior-level contacts with the public.

Second, it is clear that his staff responsibilities for the Board consume - rightly or wrongly - a very large proportion of

the CAO's time. His presence at scheduled Board meetings requires, under current meeting patterns, all of each Tuesday and the bulk of Thursday. Much of each Monday is devoted to preparing for the Tuesday session. Thus, as much as half the normal work week may be taken up in preparations for Board meetings and in the meetings themselves. Also, the number and length of Board meetings is increasing. No one feels that the necessary business can be transacted at fewer meetings than are now called. Thus, the current meeting work load is probably the minimum a CAO is likely to have.

Of course, every modern CAO has worked much more than a normal work week. The average work day seems to be on the order of 12 hours, with a somewhat shorter day on Saturday and as many Sundays free as events will permit. But the requirements levied on the Board's chief staff officer also extend far beyond those connected with regular meetings. Each Supervisor has his own separate list of items for immediate attention. His perception of their urgency has, perforce, much to do with the CAO's definition of a "crisis" which merits his attention. A cause celebre which excites media attention can easily devour whole days and even weeks. Since the only publicly recognized signs that the government is taking the matter with high seriousness are the visible activities of the department head and the CAO, the Supervisor most directly involved has every incentive to demand that the Board's chief staff officer make whatever changes in his routine may be necessary to demonstrate this continuing concern.

Finally, there seems little question that the principal competitor for the time consumed in these staff functions is the CAO's role as de facto executive overseer of all County programs. Although the evidence suggests that all CAOs have paid extremely close and personal attention to the budget process, as their principal instrument for government-wide management, there are many signs that most other forms of supervision (e.g., regular monitoring of the degree of achievement of program goals) are difficult if not impossible to fit into the CAO's personal schedule. To the degree that these functions are performed by his office, therefore, they are delegated to his staff and usually carried out through some enriching of budgetary supervision, rather than through regular top-level progress reviews and non-crisis trouble shooting. There are few indications that systematic, across-the-board reviews of program goals, management structure, or productivity levels have formed a regular part of the CAO's annual work regime, except in connection with budget formulation. The quarterly performance reports that are collected from the departments are not translated into changes in money or personnel allocations except at budget time because the allocation system is not sufficiently sophisticated to permit such adjustments. There are even fewer signs that this type of function could be made a part of the CAO's staff role for the Board. It may be that it is simply impossible to carry out such regular supervisory functions through a plural elected executive.

It is also worth noting that the current organization of the County makes it unlikely that effective central supervision could

be carried out even if the CAO were freed from some or all of his staff functions. The problem of span of control implicit in the fact that about 50 departments report directly to him (or, legally, to the Board) is obvious. It is inevitable in these circumstances that some programs will receive much more attention than others, and that systematic reviews addressed to all program areas will be held to an absolute minimum. In the absence of any level below him which reduces the span to a manageable number, settles the lesser disputes between departments, and serves as an intermediate base for crosscutting analyses of operations and performance, it seems clear that no CAO can reasonably aspire to fulfill the sweeping supervisory powers delegated to him in the Administrative Code. Moreover, if any grouping of departments occurred under the present plural executive it might well weaken the CAO's influence because the same factors which made it easier for him to deal with the bureaucracy might also make it easier for the Supervisors to reach around him.

As a result, the central supervisory functions do not appear to fare well in the competition for the CAO's time - except when a problem in a department has come or threatens to come to the notice of the public and/or the Board. Advocates of decentralized management will see this as an advantage, since it has the effect of leaving many large departments essentially alone, especially if they are financed by earmarked funds. Those who believe that there is value in central monitoring of performance, program goal setting, and resource utilization may be less pleased.

Regardless of his attitude toward such questions, however, there can be no doubt that the principal factors in determining the role of the CAO are his own conception of his proper place and his effectiveness in persuading a majority of the Board to share it. On the one hand, he has been delegated a series of powers which, given a pattern of consistent support in the Board, can allow the CAO to exercise all the de facto authority of a "strong" executive. On the other hand, he can lose all or any part of those powers on any Tuesday that he cannot marshal three votes. He alone can decide what role he can and should play within these constraints. Some have stayed well within the outer limits of their powers; others have constantly pressed against those limits, often with the explicit or tacit support of the Board. The CAO's role is a residual; it is that portion of the executive function which the Board decides not to exercise directly. The clear trend in recent years has been for Supervisors to become more and more inclined to get deeply into administrative matters, and better equipped with the staff resources necessary to establish an effective presence. Does this trend represent a healthy assumption of responsibility which is to be welcomed, or an ominous harbinger of administrative turmoil which must be resisted? The structure does not determine an answer to this question for the CAO. However, it does make clear the risks should he miscalculate.

2. The CAO's Staff

The central engine of institutional involvement and decisional role for most of the CAO's staff is the budget process. Appendix III describes the formal steps involved in that process and the responsibilities assigned to each party. As in most large governments, budgeting has evolved from a relatively short, seasonal compilation of proposed expenditures to a full-year enterprise incorporating many techniques of program analysis, cost/benefit calculation, works measurement applications, and computerized monitoring of revenue and expenditure flows. It follows that the proprietor of the budget process enjoys the most consistently strategic vantage point from which to discern issues and play a central role in their resolution. It appears that long and effective development of this asset has made the CAO's Office a thoroughly professional and bureaucratically formidable central staff. Moreover, this evolution has been managed without either the widespread resentment in operating departments which has often accompanied it elsewhere, or the atrophying of departmental budget sections which is also a frequent corollary.

The budget role of the office provides a power base which is to a considerable degree independent of the level of personal influence of a particular CAO. This is the staff's bedrock claim on relevance. Its full depth is rarely evident in journalistic analyses of government operations. In practice, for example, the process of budget administration is often much more controlling of decisions and events than the much better publicized process of formulation. Even in the latter, it is unusual for the CAO personally to inquire into the deep detail of the staff's proposals (although the current CAO, a long-time budget professional, is more inclined to this practice than most), and it is very rare for the Board to do so. (Specific budgetary actions by the Board are almost invariably additions to CAO proposals; when cuts are necessary the Board has recently decided on the total reduction which must be made - usually expressed in percentage terms - and has left the distribution of the cuts to the CAO and the department.) In the administration of an adopted budget, the CAO's staff has even more leeway in influencing such critical actions as modifications of the budget, transfers between accounts, filling of vacant positions, the rhythm of apportionment of appropriated funds, conditions on the use of lump sum appropriations, and many others.

Although these and other powers place the CAO's staff squarely at the jugular of most County operations, it is also important to recognize that they have their limitations. As noted above, for example, they do not provide much control over agencies operating with earmarked funds. Nor do they provide a role for the staff in decisions which do not have major budgetary impact. They tend to focus staff attention where the large sums are, rather than upon any other measure of the importance of issues. Moreover, a budgetary perspective is often distorted by the habit of concentrating only on the compelling problems of the coming year. Finally, the aforementioned collective bargaining process is increasingly

becoming the real forum for many major budgetary decisions. The CAO's staff has thus far been largely unused in the process of defining objectives, trade-offs, strategies and tactics.

With all of these limitations, however, it seems clear at present that the staff is not only firm in its traditionally strong powers, but is also benefiting from the CAO's high "batting average" with the Board. Chart XIII presents an analysis of the 1,163 regularly scheduled items which appeared on the Board agenda (access to which is controlled by the CAO) during the eight meetings held April 15 - June 3, 1975. The CAO was not overruled on a single item. In 91% of the cases the Board decided to approve his recommendation immediately; they decided to hold the remainder for further discussions. It is also reflective of the relationship between the CAO's Office and the departments that the CAO did not recommend disapproval of any departmental proposal. He suggested that 18 items (1%) be returned to departments for further study and that two items be held over pending receipt of further information. This, and all other information we have developed, emphasizes the low probability of successful departmental opposition to the CAO before the Board. Informal evidence further suggests that this is not the result of pre-meeting negotiations in which the CAO's Office recedes to avoid a public overruling. The general principle is that in case of confrontation the Board generally remands the issue for negotiation between the relevant department and the CAO. The Board rarely flatly overrules the CAO in favor of a department.

The main issue which is emerging with respect to the CAO's staff, related to the evolving power position of the CAO, is its relation to the growing personal staffs of the Supervisors. As in the case of the project management function - and the near miss represented by the attempt to establish the Special Investigative Unit as a direct staff to the Board - there is currently a clear tendency to create a sizeable, administratively-minded staff resource (actually, a series of them) in the service of the central plural executive in more or less direct competition for some of the functions which one would normally expect to see carried out by a single, organizationally connected group. At a more basic level, the tension is between a career staff to a career surrogate chief executive and a personal staff to a group of elected members of a plural executive. We have noted some of the stress lines this has already created, but it appears very likely that the most trying attempts to sort this out lie ahead - if indeed these roles can be sorted out without basic structural change.

D. Distributional Equity

Our earlier discussion of the Board of Supervisors noted the tendency to use the five districts as equilibrating units to achieve equitable distribution of program benefits. As the only top official with an alloyed Countywide perspective, the CAO is the natural counterbalance to this tendency. He and his staff strive to

CHART XIII: THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER'S BATTING AVERAGE ON AGENDA ITEMS, 4/15/75-6/3/75

	Number of Agenda Items*	Percentage of Total Recommendations
CAO recommendations	1163	100
Approve/adopt/award	1117	96
Disapprove	0	
Continue	2	less than 1
Refer back	18	1
Receive & file	26	2
Board:		
Accepts CAO rec.	1061	91
Continue	102	9
Hold for discussion	97	8
Approve by mass vote	862	74
Unanimous vote	1056	91
4-1 split	1	less than 1
3-2 split	2	less than 1
3-1 split	2	less than 1
Reject CAO rec.	0	

* Excludes S-Series, Board Items, and Special Items

pose decisions, make administrative arrangements, and allocate resources according to Countywide criteria which make as little reference as possible to the "rule of division by five." For service operations this is relatively simple; the problems of geographic attribution of operating expenditures in such service areas as police is formidable (which is one of the major reasons that geographically-based budgeting is extremely rare in major states and cities). Moreover, public notice and resentment of alleged "shortchanging" of their areas is, by and large, less pronounced when the subject at issue is a service rather than a physical structure. This attitude is reflected in the less militant distributional posture adopted in such matters by most Supervisors most of the time.

However, where construction or other highly visible changes are involved, the situation is quite different and the CAO has much more difficulty making the Countywide perspective stick. Particularly where roads, parks, and health facilities are concerned, the Board's tendencies toward geographic equalization are usually quite strong, and the actual distribution of both capital and operating budget allocations indicates that these tendencies largely prevail. What alterations in the pattern of County investments are made thereby are impossible to judge with accuracy without a detailed analysis of the pre-request budget options considered by each department, for it is at the departmental level - before the request is formulated and forwarded to the CAO - that the principle is applied and it has been the rule for so long that the entire planning process is, in most cases, geared to take it into account. There is no question, however, that successive CAO's have struggled hard to reduce its influence, chiefly by refusing to acknowledge its existence in their own planning and budgetary processes and in their formal dealings with the Board.

This technique has doubtless produced some benefits in the form of low-priority projects in which premature investment has been avoided. It has also had some clearly evident costs, however, in terms of the CAO's power position. The most obvious is the irresistible incentive the CAO's position creates for direct Supervisor-department relationships which bypass him. The geographic equivalency is of sufficient perceived importance to the Supervisors that they believe they must get it attended to in the planning and budgetary processes. Since the CAO's Office refuses to talk in these terms, the Supervisor tends to deal directly with the department and, over time, to influence the entire departmental perspective so that eventually the CAO never receives a proposal or plan which is free of concern for geographic equivalence. Also, the fact that the CAO does not present the budget or any other proposal with a geographic breakdown means that if the Supervisor's perceived needs for staff work are to be met someone else must perform this analysis. Often this is done by the relevant department, but it is increasingly becoming an accepted part of the function of the growing personal staffs of the Supervisors. On balance, it is a close question whether the CAO's traditional non-recognition of the geographic equity principle serves or impedes his substantive and bureaucratic interests.

Finally, and quite apart from the personal or political needs of the Supervisors, there is the basic issue whether some form of geographic

equity principle (though not necessarily the division by five) is not a reasonable part of the decision process. Like most urban budget offices, the CAO's Office apparently does not usually attempt such attribution of County expenditures and thus does not know, at any point in time, what the differential geographic effects of County operations are. The only exception is in the recent case of the distribution of Housing and Community Development Act funds where part of the funds were divided among supervisorial districts on the basis of numbers of families below the poverty level in the unincorporated areas and a record was kept of the impact of this formula on the five districts. In many other jurisdictions, particularly where citizens groups from neighborhoods or districts want a greater role in affecting service levels, the absence of these kinds of data is perceived as a serious problem which effectively keeps them from having the information necessary to determine and press their preferences. There is no obvious reason to believe that this phenomenon will not also occur in Los Angeles County.

IV. INDEPENDENTLY ELECTED OFFICIALS

Traditionally, at all levels of government, the primary rationale for elected positions has focused on the need for independence from other political bodies, while the rationale for appointed heads has focused on the need for supervision, control, and coordination. In Los Angeles County, there is a continuum which ranges from the elected, independent Supervisors at one end to the appointed officials subject to full administrative and budgetary controls at the other end. In between, however, there are three departments which have elected heads and yet are partially meshed into the County administrative control mechanisms through budgetary and personnel processes. These departments are the Sheriff's, the District Attorney's, and the Assessor's.

Where, then, do these departments fit into the overall County government? The focus for consideration here is the extent of their independence. The following skeleton description will suggest that, compared to the other departments in the County, the Sheriff, the District Attorney, and the Assessor do appear to have greater independence, both in a formal structural sense and in their actual operations. Each department will then be described individually.

For the purposes of this paper, no attempt has been made to assess the operating effectiveness of the departments headed by the independently elected officials. We do not discuss the quality, programmatic biases or efficiency of the appraisal, law enforcement or prosecutorial processes in these offices. The discussion is on relationships with the central structure. (For the law enforcement agencies, operating effectiveness will be discussed in a later staff paper on service provision, albeit with continued emphasis on central capability for directing and analyzing service provision.)

Within the formal structure of the County government, three elected heads are allotted substantially more independence than other departmental heads. By virtue of being elected, and elected Countywide, all three officials are equals or peers of the Supervisors. Their positions are mandated by the Government Code of the State of California and their continuation in office depends on elections.

While the Board of Supervisors, thus, cannot remove these officials, there are a number of other formal mechanisms to provide a check on the conduct of their operations: 1) According to the State Government Code, the Sheriff and the District Attorney come under the "direct supervision" of the State Attorney General. 2) The Assessor's Office is audited as to assessment and management by the State Board of Equalization. The Assessment Appeals Board, which is composed of citizens nominated by the supervisors and chosen by lot as in the Grand Jury, also hears appraisal appeals independently of the Assessor's Office. At present an appraisal can also be appealed through Appeal Board hearing officers. 3) The Grand Jury has the authority to examine and investigate the Departments of the Sheriff, the District Attorney, and the Assessor, as it does all other departments.

At the County level, according to the Administrative Code, the elected officials are subject to fiscal audit by the Auditor-Controller but do not come under the administrative supervision of the Chief Administrative Officer. The Code delineates the "administrative supervision and control" duty of the CAO as follows:

To execute on behalf of said Board of Supervisors its administrative supervision and control of the affairs of the County placed in his charge by said Board; and of all departments, services, institutions and districts of the County for whom or for which the Board of Supervisors of the County is required by law to adopt an annual budget, except the Sheriff, the Assessor, the District Attorney and the Civil Service Commission;. . . (Sec. 120, underlining added.)

However, in practice the departments with elected heads do submit to the budgetary and personnel processes as do other departments. Their budgets are subject to the CAO for review and analysis and to the Board of Supervisors' approval, as are the budgets from the departments with appointed heads.

In reality as on paper, these three departments appear to operate with substantial independence. While they submit to the regular budgetary processes, there is little evidence to suggest that they are severely restrained through this process. Table IV on departmental budget increases suggests, in fact, that the Sheriff and the District Attorney have been two of the departments to survive periods of budgetary stringency (e.g., FY 1972-1976) with the largest percentage increases in appropriations. The Assessor stands apart from these other two by its relatively very low percentage increase. Unlike some other departments, who return to the Board after their budget is passed to receive approval for specific projects once the budget is authorized, the expenditure of most funds is here under departmental control. It appears that the elected officials are insulated from close supervision of how they expend their budgeted funds to a greater extent than are other departments. Yet another indication of their actual independence is their tenure in office. (See Table V). This apparent independence also may be based on factors other than the elected position of the head - particularly with regard to the Sheriff and District Attorney Departments. Traditionally, their very functions lend them a high degree of independence. The fact that all three departments require a very specific expertise also is relevant here as is the extent of secrecy and the protection of individual privacy necessary to the operations.

Both the District Attorney and the Sheriff provide services for a number of contract cities. Additionally, their budgets include grants from federal sources. The Sheriff's Department received \$2,275,000 of LEAA block grant funds from the beginning of the Federal program in 1969 through February 1973. A total of \$16 million - or 15% of the Sheriff's total operating budget in fiscal 1972 - was from sources other

TABLE IV: TOTAL DEPARTMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS: INDEPENDENTLY ELECTED OFFICIALS

	Fiscal 1972 \$ Amount	Fiscal 1973 \$ Amount	<u>Increase</u> %	Fiscal 1974 \$ Amount	<u>Increase</u> %	Fiscal 1975 \$ Amount	<u>Increase</u> %	Fiscal 1976 \$ Amount	<u>Increase</u> %	Total Increase since 1972 %
<u>SHERIFF</u>	104,071,843	112,789,244	8.3%	122,558,125	8.7%	144,117,976	17.6%	149,021,060	3.4%	+ 43.2%
<u>DISTRICT ATTORNEY</u>	16,220,152	18,804,848	15.9%	19,416,426	3.3%	22,836,957	17.6%	34,365,873	50.4% *	+111.1%
<u>ASSESSOR</u>	21,628,749	21,887,967	1.2%	22,344,878	2.1%	24,280,178	8.6%	25,988,614	7.0%	+ 18.6%

* Most of the increase is attributable to the acquisition of the child support monitoring function from the Department of Public Social Services.

TABLE V: TENURE IN OFFICE OF
INDEPENDENTLY ELECTED OFFICIALS

<u>Assessor</u>		<u>Sheriff</u>		<u>District Attorney</u>	
1962-1975	13	1958-1975	17	1971-1975	4
1938-1962	24	1932-1958	26	1964-1971	7
1910-1938	28	1921-1932	11	1956-1964	8
1906-1910	4	1914-1921	7	1951-1956	5
1902-1906	4	1906-1914*	8	1946-1951	5
1898-1901	<u>4</u>	1902-1906	4	1943-1946	3
		1898-1902*	<u>4</u>	1940-1943	3
				1928-1940	12
Ave. Yrs.		Ave. Yrs.		1923-1928	5
Per Person		Per Person		1914-1923	9
=	13**	=	13**	1902-1914	12
				1898-1902	<u>4</u>
				Ave. Yrs.	
				Per Person	
				=	6

* The same person served as Sheriff from 1898 to 1902 and again from 1906 to 1914. The averages represent average years served per person and, thus, the Sheriff's average is calculated on the basis of six persons.

** These averages would increase were the present Assessor and Sheriff to remain in office.

than County General Funds, including the sales of services to related agencies, State reimbursements for training, contract services, and grants-in-aid from the Federal government and, occasionally, private foundations. Thus, their independence is reinforced by the external sources of funds not derived from the County General Fund.

A. Summary of Formal Powers and Responsibilities: Elected Law Enforcement Officials

In addition to giving the Attorney General "direct supervision over every District Attorney and Sheriff" (Article 5, Section 22), the State Constitution includes the District Attorney and Sheriff under its general provisions for county charters; thus, it authorizes the county charter to provide for the powers and duties, compensation, terms and removal of all county officers and, additionally, to provide for the "election or appointment" of all officers other than the Supervisors (Article II, Section 4).

In Los Angeles County, The Charter makes the Sheriff, the District Attorney, and the Assessor the only elective departmental heads (Article IV, Section 12). They also are distinguished from all other County bodies by the fact that one or more of the departmental positions beneath the elected head are included in the unclassified service to which the head can appoint without using the eligible civil service list (Article IX, Section 33). The Charter further provides that the "Sheriff shall be the head of said Department (Constabulary), and shall so organize the same as to give the County efficient and effective police protection" (Article VIII, Section 29).

According to the State's Government Code, the County Sheriff is responsible for preserving the peace within the county, making arrests, preventing and suppressing disturbances, attending the Superior Courts, commanding the aid of inhabitants, taking charge of the county jail and the prisoners, releasing attachments and garnishments, endorsing process and notices, serving process and notices, acting as Court Crier, and a number of other duties. (Section 26600-26612). It also provides that the Board of Supervisors may authorize the Sheriff to provide other specified services such as searches and rescues (Section 26613-26614). Under the responsibilities of the Board of Supervisors, the Code states that "The Board may direct the Sheriff to attend, either in person or by deputy, all the meetings of the Board, to preserve order, and to serve notices, subpoenas, citations, or other process, as directed by the Board" (Section 25206).

In general, it is the Sheriff's duty to enforce the laws of the state and the ordinances of the County. He has sole responsibility for these duties in the unincorporated areas of the County; he also has such sole responsibility in the incorporated cities which contract; and he has concurrent jurisdiction with the police chief in the incorporated cities which have their own police forces. If a crisis occurs or if a municipal police department within the County is unable to handle a situation, the Sheriff can intervene, either by request or at his own discretion.

The State's Government Code gives the District Attorney the responsibility of public prosecutor for the county; "He shall attend the courts, and conduct on behalf of the people all prosecutions for public offenses" (Section 26500). This responsibility extends to drawing up indictments and to instituting criminal proceedings before magistrates and attending before and giving advice to the Grand Jury (Sections 26501-26502). A number of additional duties, such as the recovery of illegal payments of county funds, also are specified in the Code (Section 26520-26529).

The District Attorney prosecutes all felony crimes in the County and all misdemeanors in unincorporated areas of the County and in those incorporated cities which do not have prosecutors. Additionally, in Los Angeles County, the District Attorney prosecutes city ordinance violations for a number of cities on a contract basis. Altogether, he prosecutes about 50% of all misdemeanors in the County. The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office also has initiated a series of activities in such areas as organized crime, fraud, public officials' malfeasance, pollution, juvenile justice, failure to provide child support and campaign law violations.

The Sheriff's Department is hierarchically organized; beneath the Sheriff are the Undersheriff, two Assistant Sheriffs, and eight division chiefs (see Chart XIV). Four line divisions (Administrative, Detective, Patrol East, and Patrol West) report to one Assistant Sheriff, three support divisions (Custody, Civil, and Technical Services) report to the other Assistant Sheriff, and the Special Services Division reports to the Undersheriff. The eight division chiefs, the two Assistant Sheriffs and the Undersheriff meet weekly as the Executive Planning Council to develop and coordinate management priorities and long-range planning. The only unclassified position to which the Sheriff may appoint is the Undersheriff.

The organization of the District Attorney's Office is more complicated. The Chief Deputy District Attorney and the Assistant District Attorney both report directly to the District Attorney, and three main bureaus (Central Operations, Branch and Area Operations, and Special Operations) report to them. Additionally, three bureaus or divisions are specifically under the direction of the Chief Deputy District Attorney, while four sections are directly under the District Attorney (see Chart XV). The Charter allows the District Attorney to appoint both his Chief Deputy and Assistant District Attorney.

B. Relation to Central Authorities

1. Office of the Sheriff: Relations with the Board

The Board of Supervisors' major control over the Sheriff's Department is through the budget. This control appears to be primarily expressed as the regulation of that portion of the budget represented by requests for additional funds. Gross



CHART XIV: ORGANIZATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

CHART XV: ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

1/74



budgetary figures, however, do not suggest that the Sheriff is severely constrained by this control. The 1974-1975 total departmental appropriation of approximately \$109,840,000 represents an increase of 74% over the comparable 1970-1971 figure of \$63,037,000. According to CAO staff, part of this increase is attributable to an informal commitment made by the Board in the late sixties and early seventies to allocate funds for 1,200 additional sworn personnel to the Sheriff. They funded approximately 300 additional positions each year from 1968-1969 to 1970-1971 and again in 1972-1973, ending with the last year budgeted by the Board as constituted prior to changing composition in 1972. This agreement was strictly between the Supervisors and the Sheriff; the CAO was not a partner. As such, it suggests a favorable relationship between the Sheriff's Department and the Board at that time. While there are no indications of this type of commitment by the post-1972 Board, it did not immediately curtail the rate of increase in the Sheriff's budget. The total departmental appropriation increased by about \$18,355,000 between 1973-1974 and 1974-1975.

While the Board makes the decision of how much to cut or add to the Sheriff's annual request, the Sheriff's staff maintains that he has ultimate say on where to cut his budget. Once the budget is passed the Sheriff may on occasion adjust the funding for specific programs within the framework the budget has provided. Thus, whereas the Board's authority over the budget is clearly recognized in the Sheriff's Department, the Sheriff has control over the deployment of personnel. A Supervisor does not have the authority, as perceived by the Department, to request that more personnel be employed in a particular area or function, Supervisors can attempt to gain such a response through the budget or personal negotiations with the Sheriff or his representatives. This latter has occurred on occasion but apparently not frequently. There is an occasional suggestion, however, of Board involvement in the deployment of Sheriff's personnel. In particular, the Sheriff wanted to close certain custody camps while the Board wanted to keep them open. The Sheriff argued that it would be more effective to close the camps. The Board was concerned over the effects on crime and the immediate loss of inmate labor which would be incurred by such a move. There were more issues involved than control over deployment, but after negotiations, the camps did stay open. The overall issues of who controls the deployment of an elected official's personnel currently was raised at recent budget hearings. As a consequence of questions raised by Supervisors the question will soon receive further interpretation by the County Counsel.

Most communications between the Supervisors' offices and the Sheriff's Department go through the top of the organization, primarily through the Sheriff, the Undersheriff, and the Assistant Sheriffs. Supervisors' staff do discuss the budget with the Sheriff's budget people so they will be familiar with it. The Sheriff himself remains somewhat removed publicly and formally from the Supervisors. He rarely if ever goes before the Board in person.

While at least one division chief in the Sheriff's Department viewed the supervisorial chairmanship as primarily ceremonial, the Department does channel its interaction with the Board of Supervisors through its Chairman. He is "the contact man." As such, the Undersheriff maintains regular contacts with his office. The Department will go to him first for assistance on such things as ushering through a grant request, and he is informed before and after the Department deals with another Supervisor on an issue. When there is a problem in another Supervisor's district, that Supervisor sometimes will also go through the Chairman rather than directly to the Sheriff.

Whereas in other departments in the County the Supervisors may assess a program and ask for its revision, particularly with regard to district facilities, the Sheriff's Department says that the Supervisors generally do not make such specific changes for their Department. As a rule, they do not expect to hear that a Supervisor wants more deputies in one of his areas. However, there are occasional indications of such supervisorial involvement. One Supervisor, for example, in his executive role, requested an additional patrol car for one community in his district and, in his legislative role, worked to get the necessary funds included in the budget. Within specific issues contexts, there are examples where Supervisors became directly involved in a Sheriff's program or policy. As one such example, the Supervisor serving as chairman came up with an idea for revised Sheriff policy pertaining to juvenile courts which was implemented on an experimental basis in a juvenile court in his district. Additionally, some Supervisors do have specific interests which relate to the Sheriff's Department. One periodically raises questions on how various activities affect placing more policemen on the streets while another is particularly interested in mental health in the jails.

In terms of distributional equity, there are no indications of budgeting by supervisorial districts. The budget is based on considerations of need rather than on geographic factors.

A Supervisor, of course, interacts with the Sheriff's Department over issues and complaints coming from his constituents. In most cases, the Supervisor's office will channel a complaint to the top level of the Sheriff's Department where it will be channeled down by the Sheriff for investigation and response. In a few cases, the Supervisor may become more directly involved. For example, one Supervisor handled one particular set of complaints from his district by arranging a meeting, which he attended personally, between the community people and representatives from the Sheriff's Department. Also in attendance were a local Congressman, the Captain of that area's station, and the Inspector for that area. The Inspector stated that he did not talk with the Supervisor on the issue prior to the meeting.

The Sheriff's Department also appears to operate independently of the Board in the area of legislative positions and issues. The Department has its own legislative advocate, the Chief of the Civil Division. He reports that he has received no calls from a Supervisor's staff to change or tone down a position, and while he has never known of this happening, he expects that any such request from a Supervisor would go directly to the Sheriff. He does receive a number of requests for technical information from Supervisors' offices and responds to these, but does not automatically submit all the Department's legislative positions to the Board. Although the Sheriff could take a position opposed to that of the Board, he can remember no occasions where this has happened.

There appears to be no ambiguity in the minds of the Sheriff's personnel over whether the Board or the Sheriff is their boss; they account to the Sheriff. While recent accusations and the related tensions between the Sheriff and individual Supervisors have left their imprint on the Sheriff's personnel, it seems fair to say that this area is viewed as circumscribed and unique. In general terms, the Department appears to view relations with the Board of Supervisors as amiable and does not complain that the Board has been unresponsive to its needs. Very conscious of his independence from the Board, the Sheriff maintains a distance between himself and the Board. However, there are no indications of severe conflicts outside the context of the specific set of accusations.

The Board has at least two other mechanisms available to limit the independence of the Sheriff's Department. One is the CAO's management audit. Last fall the Board ordered the CAO, the Auditor-Controller, and the Personnel Department to conduct an audit jointly on the Sheriff's Department's management practices. The conducting of the audit was negotiated with the Sheriff before the Board Order was passed. The Sheriff opposed the hiring of an outside auditor and agreed to an audit by the CAO instead. The auditors began the process by looking into areas outlined by the Supervisors and then surveyed other management issues. This is the first time any elected official has been subject to a management audit. This audit could be the first clear indication that the Board is trying to reduce the distance between the Sheriff and the central authorities. It is also possible that the audit is merely a device to lay to rest the supervisorial charges against the Department and will not produce a tradition of CAO management audit supervision in the Department.

The Board also could potentially limit the independence of the Sheriff's Department through its ability to approve all requests for State or Federal grant funds. There is evidence of growing tension in this relationship. In addition to individual Supervisor's questioning or criticizing particular grants, the Board believes it has not always been fully informed about the

grants received by the Sheriff in the past. For example, the Department, according to CAO staff, has not been able to tell the Board what the annual cost to the County will be for maintaining the information systems developed with Federal funds. They are just now attempting, with the assistance of the CAO's staff, to do cost analyses in this area. There is feeling in the Sheriff's Department, on the other hand, that the Board causes undue delays in the grant process and forces the County grant process out of phase with the Federal process. It is likely that closer scrutiny could be given to the implications of grants requiring matching funds than has in fact been the case in the past, but that the tradition is not one of close analysis of the Sheriff's proposals to external funding agencies.

2. Office of the Sheriff: Relations with the CAO

At present, there are five major areas of interface between the Sheriff's Department and the CAO's Office: 1) budget deliberations, 2) the management audit, 3) legislative review and advocacy, 4) systems development planning, and 5) Federal grant review.

The Sheriff's budgetary route through the CAO is similar to that of other departments. While the Sheriff, as an elected official, may get somewhat different treatment from the CAO's office, the actual process to which the Department must submit is the same. At the same time, the Sheriff has created a public posture with which the CAO has to deal when it comes to the budget. The CAO's Office is aware of the fact that the Sheriff's Department develops its budget in response to needs which are widely recognized and publicized and has the support of a large clientele in both the cities and the patrol stations.

The CAO has two full-time budget analysts who work on the Sheriff's budget. They are rotated as in the case of other departments. Sheriff's Department personnel believe that these budget analysts should be assigned to the Department for a greater number of years and should be allowed to "live in" in order to better understand the needs of the Department. The opinion that only law enforcement people know law enforcement needs and problems is generally expressed as part of the Sheriff's Department's strategy when discussing the budget with the CAO's staff. Since of course the CAO's rotation plan is in some sense designed to prevent the kind of familiarity with the organization that the Department would like, the difference in perspectives is here quite clear.

Communications go across parallel levels of the two hierarchies. The Sheriff deals with the CAO directly: the CAO Division Chief deals with the Undersheriff: and the budget analysts usually relate at a level lower than the Sheriff and the Undersheriff. At least some of the Sheriff's division chiefs are directly involved in the budget negotiations with the CAO's Office.

The Sheriff is the first elected official's department in which the CAO has conducted a management audit. The management audit, still in progress currently, was a response both to supervisorial accusations and to a regularly scheduled fiscal audit conducted on the Sheriff's Department by the Auditor-Controller in 1974. The Sheriff was opposed to the idea of having an outside firm do the management audit and, thus, did not oppose the CAO coming into his Department. By October 1974, all the Supervisors originally seeking an outside audit had withdrawn their objections and the Board vote for the CAO management audit was unanimous. The CAO was then ordered to conduct the management audit on the Sheriff's Department in cooperation with the Auditor-Controller and the Director of Personnel.

In line with this directive, the CAO is looking at the way that the Department is organized and the way it does business. It is not looking into substantive law enforcement policy issues. The audit is close to conclusion. A number of interim reports have been issued and the final report is expected over the summer. While the CAO has suggested improvements in a number of quite specific areas, recommendations are well within the confines of the overall management structure and strategy now used by the Sheriff. They are in no way questioning the overall management. In general, the CAO's staff reports the Department is a reasonably well-run organization.

The CAO's guiding concern in doing this audit appears to be to find those areas in the Sheriff's operations where the greatest improvements in efficiency and economy can be realized. The areas being examined include at least the following: the use of overtime, the use of mileage, the use of non-sworn personnel, custody assignment of academy graduates, reorganization of selected staff bureaus, planning for systems development and implementation, management information systems, staffing and relief formulae, reorganization of the business and fiscal functions, the Sheriff's Information Bureau, and the Automotive Unit. Under orders from the Board, the CAO was to develop these analyses into budget recommendations.

The CAO's Office has no complaints about the Sheriff's Department's cooperation with the audit team. The Department, in fact, appears to have gone out of its way to develop a cooperative working relationship with the CAO's people and to provide liaison with personnel with management expertise in the law enforcement area. The CAO team found that the Sheriff's Department also is extremely responsive to suggested changes. As they started to discuss recommendations, they often would find that the changes concurrently were taking place. The Department has maintained in fact that they were being criticized for areas which they had already recognized as needing change and were beginning to deal with internally when the audit began.

The so called "civilianization" recommendations provides one example of the working relationship now occurring between the Sheriff and the CAO. Civilianization is the term used to refer to the replacement of sworn personnel in selected positions with non-sworn personnel. The Department on its own had been civilianizing positions for a number of years prior to the management audit. For example, its dispatch radio operators are civilians. When the audit team came in, however, they found a number of additional positions which they thought could better be filled by civilian personnel. The issue between the CAO and the Sheriff's Department, then, was the degree of civilianization. The process of settling the issue was one of negotiation. The substantive issue primarily centered around the need to have people in control who know from experience the law enforcement job versus the economic and service advantages of releasing the sworn personnel under consideration to perform other tasks. The CAO originally recommended that the top employee relations position be filled by a civilian. The Department accepted having the second to the top position civilianized instead. According to the April 15, 1975, Interim Management Audit Report, the CAO team found, in an examination of four bureaus, 76 positions which they thought could be filled by civilians. They eventually reached an agreement with the Sheriff's Department that 42 positions should be civilianized. This agreement is viewed as one of the major achievements of the management audit. While this agreement was reached too late to be included in the budget, the Sheriff's Department did request the additional 42 civilian positions in a separate item to the Board and appears to be fully supporting the agreement. In budget hearings when a Supervisor suggested that the non-sworn personnel replace the sworn personnel by attrition instead of releasing the sworn personnel to perform other tasks and adding new civilians, the CAO, in turn, defended the program as agreed upon with the Sheriff's Department.

The CAO is encouraging greater cost analysis in the area of grants management, particularly with respect to automated information and/or communication systems. These efforts appear to be part of a general attempt to have the CAO help provide management capability and also be more involved in the Sheriff's internal management.

As noted earlier, the Sheriff's Department has its own legislative lobbyist. At present, he appears to operate independently but not competitively or in conflict with the lobbyists in the CAO's office. The Sheriff's lobbyist generally maintains a low profile. If he testifies, it is usually on technical aspects of pending legislation. He usually works through the California Peace Officers Association (CPOA) rather than advocating legislation directly. If, however, the CPOA and the Sheriff's Department do not agree, they can present their positions independently.


When the CAO's management audit team inquired into the Sheriff's legislative advocate, they found no example of direct conflict between the positions of the CAO's and the Sheriff's advocate. When differences were found to exist, they were differences of degree. On some pending legislation, the CAO legislative advocate will request to know the Sheriff Department's analysis and position and the Sheriff's Department will respond appropriately. Overall, the Sheriff's advocate feels that he is not preempted from establishing a legislative position, by either the CAO or the Board - a fact that he views as directly attributable to the Sheriff being an elected official.

The CAO has always been involved in the Federal grant process through budget activities. However, the Sheriff's Department's relations with the CAO through this process currently appear to be in the process of change. Up until a year ago, a grant request often went from the Sheriff's Department to the Los Angeles Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board, a part of the State apparatus for distributing money from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, before the CAO became involved. Within the last year, the position of Coordinator for Law and Justice and the Justice Action Coordinating Committee were established in the CAO. They represent an effort to consolidate and coordinate the grant process in the County. Now grant proposals will have to go through the CAO at an earlier stage of development and will be screened both by budget analysts and by the Justice Action Coordinating Committee. (See the attached grant process diagram, Chart XVI). A member of the Sheriff's Grants Management Unit reported at one Executive Planning Council meeting that the Justice Action Coordinating Committee is becoming more and more influential. This Committee may be a potential CAO tool for monitoring long-range programs, since the Sheriff has received substantial grant funds.

The Sheriff's Department also must relate to the CAO through the data processing systems development process. The planning and prioritizing of the County's systems development projects is done in the CAO's Office by the CAO's Electronic Data Processing (EDP) leader, who is the Division Chief of Management Services, and the EDP Advisory Committee, which is chaired by the EDP leader and consists of the head of the Data Processing Department and the heads of the major user departments. This appears to be part of an effort to centralize the County's systems development activities and to reduce the independent role of the major departments such as the Sheriff's Department in setting priorities for the development of software.

The nature of the Sheriff's Department's relations with both the Board and the CAO perhaps is best illustrated by the emerging picture of this year's budget process. After discussions with the CAO and the Board, the Sheriff directed his department to draw up a "no increase" budget for 1975-1976. While including increases

CHART XVI: THE GRANT PROCESS FOR THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT



for inflationary costs, the "no increase" directive meant no new programs. Since, in the past, the Sheriff routinely requested sizable increases, this "no increase" directive represents a significant departure from established routine. The Sheriff, as an elected official, may well have been himself independently responding to the economic conditions and the current political climate by holding the line on his budget quite apart from the Board's stated desire to keep taxes at their 1973-1974 level.

Each of the eight divisions then proceeded to draw up its budget. The divisions' requests were coordinated through the Office of Fiscal and Planning Services in the Special Services Division. The Division has a budget unit which is comprised of one sergeant from each Division. While each worked individually with his own division, they also worked to coordinate the overall departmental budget. The Undersheriff then worked over the budget before submitting it to the CAO. The major share of the scrutinizing and cutting had already taken place by the time the budget reached the stage of being officially submitted to the CAO. The specific strategies for insuring the least cuts from the CAO are not obvious. One division chief did indicate, however, that here they "don't ask for ten when they need five so they'll get four."

The first budget submitted by the Department was in fact a no-increase budget. The CAO's budget analysts, however, questioned how realistic it was since it did not include requests for personnel for either the new Lomita station or new central jail facilities, both of which are currently near completion. It is possible that the Sheriff, by submitting a no-increase budget which omitted personnel for these facilities was attempting to point out to the CAO, the Board, and the public what the consequences of no increment for the Department would be. The Sheriff's Department then submitted a "supplemental" budget request which included the new station and the jail and which, in effect, became the regular budget request. A good share of the cuts made by the CAO's budget analysts represented paring in these two additional areas.

The Department actually submitted three separate budgets: 1) the regular line-item budget, 2) a program budget, and 3) a target budget. The target budget, a narrative document in which the Department discussed the impact of returning to the 1973-1974 levels, was at the request of the Board. There was a \$17 million difference between this budget and the regular one. The program budget, drawn up as part of the "management by objectives" program, was divided into five separate programs: 1) patrol, 2) civil law enforcement, 3) criminal investigation and apprehension, 4) technical services, and 5) custody.

The CAO's Recommendations for the Proposed 1975-1976 Budget list the Sheriff's request as a gross figure of \$114,956,000. After the Department's negotiations with the CAO, the CAO's recommendation stood at \$109,610,000, a decrease of about \$5,346,000. While this recommendation is slightly below the 1974-1975 allowance of \$109,835,000 and substantially below the 1974-1975 estimated actual of \$112,627,000 which includes supplemental funding, there also has been a substantial reduction in revenue and costs applied. In terms of the net County cost, the budget has increased by \$3,179,000. These figures do not cover the custodial institutions. The Sheriff requested an additional \$39,911,000 for such institutions and the CAO recommended \$37,007,000. The budgeted positions requested were cut from 5,409.4 to 5,271.8. This latter figure represents an increase of 6.8 Departmental positions from the number allowed the Sheriff in the 1974-1975 budget. Correctional facilities, on the other hand, lost 21.1 positions from last year.

At the end of the negotiations with the CAO, the Sheriff agreed to accept the CAO's recommended figures. He did not go before the Board to argue for any additional funds, a fact that represents a significant departure from previous budgetary relations with the CAO and the Board. This is the first time in years that the Sheriff's Department has not gone to the Board to argue against the CAO's recommendation.

The Board did not alter the recommended figures except for the three and a half percentage cut which it ordered applied to all departments. They did refuse by a split vote, however, to approve the 42 additional civilian positions which were submitted to them as a separate item. While the main deliberations on the Sheriff's budget are finished, some budgetary considerations continue, as the Department has now requested a "budget adjustment" representing an additional \$5.4 million. They have indicated to the Board and the CAO staff that the 3 and 1/2 percent across-the-board cut will mean that they will have to lay off personnel. To avoid this, they will need funding for 259 positions. The Board has not yet agreed to authorize this request, which would require the use of funds from the reserve fund.

3. Office of the Sheriff: Relations with Other Agency Heads

The Sheriff is a major figure within the County government. In the information-communication systems area, he has played a very strong leadership role in getting other agency heads, from both within and outside the County government, together to discuss, initiate, and coordinate. He is a member of a number of multi-agency groups, including the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Justice which is composed of judges, the President of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, and the heads of other criminal justice agencies from within the County government and from municipal governments. The current Sheriff is very actively involved with other police agencies. For example, he has spearheaded consoli-

dation with the Los Angeles Police Department in such areas as records keeping, booking procedures, and jails. The Sheriff's Academy also trains personnel for thirty-six law enforcement agencies.

The Department is also involved in relationships with departments which provide central services to it - cars are maintained by the Mechanical Department, stations maintained by Building Services and so on. The Department would like to be able to exercise greater control over these central service agencies or alternatively would prefer to have such functions housed within the Department itself. The Department also has requested a position for its own counsel, but continues to have to use the County Counsel's Office as its legal arm instead.

4. Office of the District Attorney: Relations with the Board

The District Attorney primarily relates to the Board of Supervisors in two major areas: 1) the budgetary process and 2) Board requests for investigations of problems and allegations of official misconduct elsewhere in the County government. As with all other departments, the Board maintains budgetary controls over the Office of the District Attorney. However, as with the Sheriff, the overall picture does not suggest that this control placed severe constraints on the District Attorney's activities, although the office believes the current order for a 3.5% across the board cut would, if implemented, seriously limit District Attorney operations. The total departmental appropriation increased 86% from 1970-1971 (\$14,883,000) to 1974-1975 (\$27,683,000) for the District Attorney. A large share of this increase represents child support operations costs applied to DPSS. In fact, the District Attorney and the Sheriff received two of the largest departmental percentage increases over this period.

The Board's involvement in the Department is different, however, in the District Attorney's Office than in the Sheriff's Department. Whereas the Sheriff's Department stresses that they have complete control over the deployment of their personnel, the District Attorney's Office does not. The District Attorney's Office believes it should have greater discretion over the allocation of resources. At present, if the office receives the funds for new positions in a certain program area, they do not feel that they can take those added positions and apply them to a different area, were needs to change, without Board authorization. To manage the introduction of new programs, the District Attorney's Office speaks of "stealing" personnel within the organization. That is, as a strategy for obtaining a new program, they will in certain cases "steal" a few people from other divisions and announce the formation of a new program unit. They will then put the new unit in the budget and, in essence, ask the Board to legitimize it. This strategy, and indeed the terminology of "stealing", suggests that they do not have complete control over deployment. On the other hand, it does suggest substantial control, particularly since the situation may continue for a number of years while awaiting Board approval.

The District Attorney's Office will investigate all issues of official conduct sent to them by the Board. This task has become a particularly important part of their efforts of late. The District Attorney's Office was given 20 detectives on a temporary basis this year to deal with Board referrals. There is some feeling within the District Attorney's Office that the Board requests them to perform such functions beyond their responsibilities. Most of the investigations they conduct revealed problems which they considered problems of mismanagement rather than criminal conduct and thus are not within the purview of the public prosecutor.

Communications between the Supervisors' offices and the District Attorney's Office appear to follow patterns similar to those between the Board and other departments. Supervisors tend to deal directly with the District Attorney; the Chief Deputy and the Assistant District Attorney deal with the Supervisors' chief deputies. They deal mainly with their chairman's chief deputies and seldom with those of the other Supervisors. If a Supervisor receives a complaint concerning the District Attorney, his Field Deputy will send a note to the District Attorney who, in turn, will give it to the Assistant District Attorney. After checking the problem, he will prepare a letter explaining the situation for the District Attorney to send to the Supervisor. If a Supervisor's field deputy receives a complaint concerning the District Attorney, that field deputy will refer it to the chief field deputy who will either send it to the District Attorney by the letter route or will contact the Chief Deputy District Attorney, the Assistant District Attorney, or the Director of the District Attorney's Community Affairs Division.

The current District Attorney's own communications with the Board appear to differ from at least some other department heads' insofar as he goes to Board meetings only infrequently. He refrains from going before the Board unless it's very important. An example of when he would go is the situation where he had been told that he did not have three votes on a budget item. He would like the Board to know that when he does appear, he is really talking about a serious issue. Also, he does go to talk with some of the Supervisors when he is at the Hall of Administration. The District Attorney's Office does work through its Chairman. They feel they can rely upon him to help get an issue through the Board, particularly since they feel they only press an issue when it is very important.

In the area of legislative advocacy, the District Attorney appears to be very independent of the Board. When the District Attorney takes a position on a legislative issue, he goes directly to Sacramento and does not go through the Board of Supervisors. He gives them notice of his position, but does not submit the position to them for their approval. There are instances in

which the District Attorney has taken a position directly opposite to that of a Supervisor; as an example, one Supervisor supported Assemblyman Sieroty's juvenile bill while the District Attorney opposed it.

The Board retains some control over the District Attorney in the areas of Federal grant approval and authorization for outside vendor or consultant contracts. In negotiations over a large Federal grant such as the one for PROMIS, the District Attorney's management information system, the District Attorney would make sure that his staff has thoroughly briefed the Supervisor's staff and would himself go over when the issue came before the Board. One example where the Board has exercised control over the District Attorney concerns a data processing system which the District Attorney's Office wants to develop with Federal funds for the County's child support activities. The issue is whether the system should be developed within the County or by an outside contractor. Requests for proposals twice have gone out to outside vendors, and twice have been cancelled by the Board.

In general, the District Attorney's Office perspective on the Board is not basically antagonistic nor does the Office appear to have severe problems in relating to the Board. However, it might also be added that the District Attorney does not feel an obligation to refrain from taking a public stand in opposition to that of the Board.

5. Office of the District Attorney: Relations with the CAO

The DA's Office relates with the CAO in the areas of the budget, governmental investigations, and systems development planning. In terms of process, the DA's relations with the CAO do not appear to differ on a large scale from other departments. As an elected official he may get more courtesy of office, but he submits to the same procedures.

It is the DA's administrative personnel, and primarily the top management, who do most of the budget negotiating with the CAO's Office. The rest of the organization has no contact with the CAO. The division chiefs, after consultation with their staffs, submit preliminary budget requests. After the Chief Deputy has worked over these requests, the resulting budget is turned over to the DA for review. The personnel responsible for the budget meet and discuss the requests with the CAO's budget analysts assigned to the DA. After the CAO has made a first set of cuts, the DA will take the list of net differences and decide what will be the "points of issue" on which further negotiations will rest. The DA alone will then meet with the CAO and his staff. The DA asks every year to meet directly with the CAO.

Not only has the CAO's Office endorsed and opposed various items in the DA's budget, they also have used a third alternative in which they refuse to endorse an item but will not actively oppose it before the Board. As an example from this year's budget, the CAO refused to endorse the DA's request for juvenile investigators on the grounds that it represented a new policy matter not a mandated function which, as such, was out of their purview. While the DA's Office agrees with the assumption that the CAO's Office should not be making policy decisions, there evidently is considerable room for disagreement over what items are in fact new policy matters requiring Board scrutiny. This situation suggests that the DA's departmental policy is open to most question where he works in new areas of perhaps great interest to the public but less clearly mandated by the State.

When the CAO's Office presents budget recommendations to the Board and the Board orders additional cuts, the CAO will not, however, recommend specific items to be cut. These would be left to the discretion of the DA. This year, when pressed by the Board, the CAO did present a list of programs which could be cut in the DA's Office but did not recommend any specific cuts.

The DA's Office appears to take the CAO seriously; they see him as powerful. (One person suggested that if the CAO calls a meeting, they will attend that before appearing before the Grand Jury.) They also appear to view their budget negotiations with the CAO as crucial business. There is little indication, however, that they consider themselves under the authority of the CAO in any sense. When an order is received from the CAO's Office, they decide whether to follow it.

Some points of contention are evident. According to the District Attorney's Office, the CAO's budget analysts place emphasis on whether a particular function is or is not mandated by legal statute, but are less willing to allow funding for what the DA considers his public mandates. Consumer protection is one example of a function which, in the DA's view, is mandated by public considerations. Moreover, the Department of the District Attorney is reluctant to officially prioritize among such public functions for fear that the CAO could more easily cut some of them. This tension between the DA's Office and the CAO may be attributable to the fact that the DA is elected and therefore perceives his policy role as broader than the confines of directly-mandated programs.

The DA and the CAO have some similar functions in the area of governmental investigations. The CAO recently has added a Management Audit Division and a Special Investigation Unit. While both of these might be expected to bear a direct relation with the DA's Office by virtue of their mutual investigative interest in the conduct of government personnel, the actual nature of their relationship is not well defined. The DA does not view these new units as competition threatening his powers and responsibilities. To the contrary,

he appears to welcome them in the hope that they will relieve him of some of the assignments which he felt were out of his purview as being cases of his mismanagement not criminal offense. There also are indications that the DA's Office is prepared to lend investigators to the CAO if needed.

In the area of Federal grants, the DA's Office submits requests to the regular analysis and procedures in the CAO's Office. Similarly, they also must submit their EDP project proposals and requests to the CAO's systems development planning process.

This year's budget deliberations lend further insight into the relations of the DA with the Board and the CAO. In contrast to the Sheriff's current strategy, the District Attorney did not submit a "no increase" budget but, rather, included a number of new requests in the hope of getting a proportion of them approved.

Within the organization, budget requests and justifications were solicited first from the divisions. These requests added up to approximately 400 new positions and somewhere around \$49 million. The Chief Deputy, the Assistant District Attorney, and the main budget person worked with this preliminary budget and made cuts totalling about \$13 million, leaving a comparable overall request around \$36 million. After their review, the CAO budget analysts recommended under \$17 million and only 140 new positions. After examining the net differences, the District Attorney, the Chief Deputy, and the Assistant District Attorney set priorities on every position requested and selected six points of issue to specifically discuss. The discussion with the CAO over these issues resulted in some increases.

When the Board began their final budget deliberations, the CAO did not recommend that the Board support six of the District Attorney's requests totaling \$920,000. When the District Attorney developed the Department's strategy for going before the Board, he decided to only argue on a \$807,000 package which combined two juvenile requests. At this stage, it looked like the outcome would be a budget of \$29,731,000 (gross total including juvenile and child support funding). When child support costs applied to DPSS and revenue are deducted, a budget of approximately \$16 million remains. The District Attorney's Office considers this a net reduction from last year's budget of \$21,800,000. However, since the costs applied now credited to the District Attorney's Office have been deducted from the revenues of DPSS, this does not represent any net saving to the County.

When the District Attorney's budget came before the Board the Assistant District Attorney argued their case. CAO representatives first suggested to the Board that the elected officials be given percentage cuts and allowed complete discretion over the items to be cut. The Board, however, requested a list of possible cuts concerning the District Attorney and pursued a number of items with

the Assistant District Attorney. After allowing the Assistant District Attorney to respond to their question on the need for so many investigators (around 200), they cut twenty-two of the positions by a three to two vote. This cut amounted to \$350,000 and will represent the investigators that had been added to handle the Board-ordered investigations by the District Attorney's Office. There is some indication that this cut may at least partially relate to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the District Attorney's investigations. The juvenile package which the District Attorney had selected for top priority was never considered by the Board and thus has not been funded.

The District Attorney later appeared in person before the Board and eleven of the investigative positions cut were restored in the amount of \$170,000. On the same day, the Board ordered a 3.5% cut across the board which will apply to the District Attorney in addition to the previous cut.

The District Attorney's staff did prepare a program budget also but are dissatisfied with the requirements for this budget. They seem not to regard their program budget as a meaningful management tool.

6. Office of the District Attorney: Relations with Other Department Heads

The District Attorney's Office has little to do officially with other departments. Given the District Attorney's function, they must be prepared to react to problems in other departments and this isolates them from other departments. In performing this function, however, they do not monitor other departments on an ad hoc or spontaneous basis.

The District Attorney is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Justice, a group which meets to discuss local law enforcement problems and issues and consists of County and City heads of criminal justice agencies, judges, and the President of Los Angeles County Bar Association. Additionally, he chairs the above Committee's Ad Hoc Committee on Juvenile Justice.

C. Apparent Differences in Status, Flexible Authority, and Resources Because of Independently Elected Positions

There is no doubt that the Sheriff and the District Attorney are very powerful department heads. Part of this power can be attributed to their elected status. They are highly visible, have their own constituencies, and their departments are formally structured with greater independence from the central County authorities than other nonelected department heads. Also, it appears to be generally accepted that they have some greater discretion over the deployment of their resources than do other departments, although the extent to which this is so is open to question by the Supervisors currently.

A number of items in the preceding description, such as the recognition of their public posture, their independence in taking legislative positions, and their infrequent appearances before the Board, strongly suggest that they enjoy a considerable independence from the central authorities.

The central authorities have initiated measures which might be interpreted as reducing the autonomy of these departments. Examples of such measures include the management audit of the Sheriff's Department, the establishment of the CAO of the Justice Action Coordinating Committee and the Office of the Coordinator for Law and Justice, and the strengthening of the CAO's role in systems development planning. However, these developments conceivably could also represent, not an effort to centralize control over more autonomous departments such as the Sheriff and the District Attorney, but, an effort to assist in strengthening and increasing the managerial capabilities of these Departments. This could actually increase the independence of these Departments.

While there is no question but that being elected has bearing on the independence and flexibility of the elected officials, there also are no ready indicators of the actual weight of elected status itself as opposed to other possible factors. Certainly, the preceding description reveals a number of rather important differences in the Sheriff's and the District Attorney's relations with central authorities. For example, the District Attorney's priorities were severely challenged by the Board - the Sheriff's were not; the District Attorney does go before the Board on occasion - the Sheriff apparently does not; the Sheriff's Department is very outspoken about their control over the deployment of personnel - the District Attorney's Office is not. These differences might be interpreted as suggesting that the Sheriff and the District Attorney differ significantly in terms of their autonomy within the County government and thus that there are other, more important factors at work than elected status alone. Other possible bases for independence from central authorities might include the extent of contract services and the amount of independent funding from State and Federal sources. The nature of the function itself also might be determining.

The relationship of these institutions to service delivery in the law enforcement area will be more fully examined in the next set of staff reports to the Commission.

D. Office of the County Assessor

1. Formal Powers and Responsibilities

The State Government Code sets out in general terms the duties of all county assessors (Sec. 27420). In addition to generally defined duties, each county assessor in a county over 4,000,000, of which Los Angeles is the only one, is also required to issue, upon request of the Board of Supervisors, an annual estimate of the assessed valuation of

property within the county for the succeeding fiscal year (Sec. 27421). The Code also forbids the assessor to hold office as collector of taxes or auditor at the same time he holds office as assessor (Sec. 47422).

In practice it is the assessor's duty to identify, classify and value all taxable property within the county. The Department of the Assessor in Los Angeles is responsible for determining the assessed value of 1,800,000 individual parcels of land and the buildings on them, as well as 420,000 business, and personal properties, including 70,000 boats, airplanes and the like. The Department is the largest single unit of its kind in the United States, and perhaps in the world. This reflects the fact that only one city in the metropolitan area, Pasadena, still performs these functions through its own Assessor.* The valuation function is, of course, an initial step in the process used to determine tax rates.


The Department of the Assessor annually produces an assessment roll which lists assessed values of all properties at about 25% of market value, and shows all applicable exemptions. This uniform proportion to market value is required by State law. (Part II, Chapter III, Article I, California Property Tax Laws). The job of the Department is to insure that first, estimates of full cash value actually reflect current market condition and, second, that a constant percentage is applied to all properties to create assessed values.

Formal Organization

The organization of the Department of the Assessor is shown in Chart XVII. The Department employs about 1,700 people in five sub-departments: Administrative Services, Assessment Standards, Personal Property Appraisals, Real Property Appraisals and Technical Services. The Assistant Assessor is responsible for administering the Department on a day-to-day basis. He holds executive staff meetings and briefs the Assessor daily on the activities of the divisions. The executive staff also includes nine field deputies

* Pasadena's studies of the cost of transferring the function in 1971 indicated that \$115,000 could be saved annually by using the services of the County Assessor. However, the Pasadena Assessor was then using variable ratios. A change to the County system was said to imply shifting the tax burden somewhat from businesses to homeowners by imposing uniform assessments. The County Assessor maintained this would be unlikely to occur if the business audit program was updated. The City's governing board voted to retain the existing system.

CHART XVII: ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ASSESSOR



whose primary task is to deal with citizen complaints and to help citizens understand the appraisal and assessment process. Two of the field deputies are Spanish-speaking, and one is a specialist in the assessment and appraisal problems of senior citizens.

The Administrative Services Sub-Department (120 employees) is responsible for the routine internal management of the Department, e.g., payroll, budget, personnel, management training and retraining, purchasing, central correspondence, duplicating services and work measurement.

The Sub-Department of Assessment Standards (90 employees) is responsible for a number of important central planning functions in the Department. This sub-department was established in 1963. It performs year-round, in-house, internal audits of appraisal and assessment practices in the other sub-departments. In concert with the Systems Division, it also developed the computer assisted Appraisal Data System (ADS), established in 1972, on which the appraisal process relies. In addition, it does all the planning for the establishment of an annual work plan for the appraisal divisions, plus coordinating the five-year plans for the Department, thereby centralizing the previously regionalized system of work planning. It is here that the data are assembled on the basis of which the Assessor and his executive staff designate when, where and how the appraisal and reappraisal process will be focused.

The ADS requires a special word, since it is a new system in the County. The purpose of appraisal is to bring areas and properties in which property values have changed into line with existing market values. To this end the Department breaks down the County into hundreds of homogeneous areas, called economic clusters, in which properties are grouped which have similar value characteristics and operate under similar market influences. The ADS is fed market and sales data for cluster areas and statistically infers valuations. The Appraiser's job is to discover the appropriate set of factors for predicting values in the area, and to verify these in experience. Complete physical inspections are the exception rather than the rule under this system. Ratio studies indicate which geographic areas have changed significantly and thus require reappraisal and reassessment. Based on this clustering system the Assessor, along with the sub-department chiefs, decides which areas should be reappraised. The operating impact of the ADS, therefore, is to change the nature of the work of the appraisal staff by providing a mechanism for updating valuation other than cyclical reappraisal, and to centralize the system of work planning which had previously been carried out individually by the appraisal divisions.

The Sub-Department of Real Property Appraisals is responsible for actually producing appraisals for the more than 1,854,000 parcels in the County. This unit has more parcels under its jurisdiction than the total combined for San Bernardino, San Diego, Alameda and Orange Counties, the next four largest counties in the State, as measured by parcels on the tax rolls. The majority of the 720 persons in this unit are appraisers; they work in 18 regional offices located throughout the County. The regions do not follow the boundaries of supervisorial districts, but are set up to somewhat equalize work load among the offices and also to contain interrelated areas within a single office as well as for the convenience of the public. Each office handles about 138,000 parcels. This Department was reorganized in 1962. Before that, land appraisers valued land, and building appraisers valued buildings. The two preexisting divisions were merged to create this single sub-department, and a process of unit value appraisal adopted.

Since there is no cyclical reappraisal process for residential property, the work load for this Division is created by defining total appraisal time, subtracting from it mandatory and maintenance appraisals, and then assigning the remaining appraisal time to parcels designated by the Assessor as having the greatest difference between current and last appraised value, based on cluster mapping. Only a minority of the total number of parcels can be reappraised each year. Most reappraisal occurs in areas where values are rising; individual appeals are in general relied on to capture readjustments downward in areas where property values are falling. The sub-department also contains a division specializing in the valuation of commercial and industrial properties. A special cost section for analyzing the value of units over \$100,000 is also located here. Finally, this Division contains divisions for a special petroleum appraisal program, and special groups working on possessory interests, on high rise apartments and other special problems. The State Board of Equalization regards the Los Angeles County Assessor's Department as among the most specialized appraisal staffs to be found in any county in the State.

The Sub-Department of Personal Property Appraisals (345 employees) is divided into nine sub-units called areas. An area is either a number of properties in a geographic area, or a group with common appraisal characteristics. Appraisers are assigned and reassigned among the areas depending on variations in work load at different times during the year. The job of the sub-department is to identify personal property, define its ownership and appraise it. The records for this function are stored in the regional offices but a computer storage capability is maintained downtown, so that despite the area distribution of the actual appraising, there is a centralizing device through which the Assessor obtains information about the assets of taxpayers. The Assessment Standards Sub-Department has developed a series of guidelines which attempt to regulate - beyond instructions available in the units manual itself - how personal property appraisal is done.

Since 1969, by direction of the Assessor, the unit has gone to a cyclical appraisal program for small business firms, in place of annual on-site appraisal of the thousands of these businesses. The Assessor believes the risk that reviews every three years may result in some lag between appreciation and revenue is not as great as the savings realized by not conducting annual inspections. Every business is, however, contracted yearly by letter to check on ownership changes.

The personal property appraisal section tends to operate somewhat separately from the real property appraisal unit, but an effort to eliminate duplication has been made by the issuance of guidelines in instruction manuals, essentially outlining a division of labor between them in both collection and use of data. The Assessment Sub-Department also contains a division which audits the property reports of businesses. The Audit Division has been required since 1967 to conduct this evaluation for all businesses with a value of \$50,000 every four years. The County Assessor's office has been operating the division since 1963.

The Sub-Department of Technical Services (340 employees) is responsible for mapping exemption processing, and software systems development for the ADS. Actual processing of data is conducted by the Department of Data Processing.

The Process of Executive Management

The Assessor holds weekly meetings of the heads of these sub-departments. All principal appraisers from all divisions also attend weekly staff meetings. Most higher level supervisors participate in monthly across-sub-department staff meetings on a voluntary basis. The Board of Equalization, in considering management practice reports that in general: "The Assessor leaves no room for the staff to deviate from his policies and procedures. Throughout the office each leader, with the exception of the Assistant Assessor, has a relatively short span of management. Policies and procedures are carried out to the letter."

2. Relations to Central County Authorities

a. Relations with the Board


Theoretically, the Board of Supervisors' major control over the Assessor's Department is exercised through the budget. However, in fact, as elsewhere in County administration, this control is focused upon the areas in the annual budget request where increases are sought. Since the introduction of the ADS, the Assessor's budget has remained fairly stable providing few targets for detailed Board review.

The current year's Departmental appropriation of \$26 million represents an increase of 7% over the previous year. For the past three years, the difference between the Assessors's original request and the Board's final approved allotment has never varied more than a few hundred thousand dollars. It is possible that this record is at least partially related to the fact that prompt and accurate reappraisals are critical to reducing the need to increase the property tax rate. Since the net long-term direction of land prices - and therefore of assessments - is up, the Assessor can prove to the Board that its interest in preventing tax increases is served by providing him with the resources necessary for the reappraisal process. The present Assessor follows a policy of strict separation between his revenue raising role and his budget negotiations with the Board as a matter of principle, however.

As with the Sheriff and the District Attorney, the Board seems to have established an informal rule that the Assessor has the ultimate authority to distribute budget cuts, as well as broad control over the deployment of his personnel. Thus, for example, the Assessor created the Assessment Standards Division by transferring appraisal personnel without any approach to the Board. The Assessor has usually not had any problems in getting staffing levels approved by the Board, since although his budget has increased 18.6% in the last three years, he has actually decreased slightly the number of budgeted positions in the department from 1,693.6 in 1970-1971 to 1,633 in 1974-1975. The office issues the attached Chart XVIII to document the fact that it runs with fewer personnel even as the County bureaucracy as a whole expands. The superimposed budget figures show that this is in large part due to the capital intensive nature of the new appraisal system.

Communication between the Board and the Assessor is kept to a minimum. The Assessor has apparently not been before the Board on more than two occasions in the past three years, and has never personally appeared before the Board on the budget. The Board has made no formal attempt to direct the Assessor to do any particular jobs since 1964 when the Assessor took a strong stand against a Board attempt to combine the assessment function with that of setting the tax rate. He appeared at a Board meeting to argue for a strict policy of divorcing the Board's prerogatives in fixing tax rates and approving budgets from the Assessor's powers to value property. This argument took place in the context of one of the classic dilemmas which arise when these functions are separated. The taxing/budget making authority finds itself without reliable advance notice as to the revenue yield which can reasonably

CHART XVIII: GROWTH RATE OF THE NUMBER OF BUDGETED POSITIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ASSESSOR AND COUNTYWIDE



*The ratio of change from the base year 1970-1971.

be expected from a given tax rate. The assessing authority, on the other hand, is chary of providing broad pre-estimates of yield or, even more, of advance notices on increases in assessments of particular categories or locations of properties. In this case the Assessor took a strong stand against any intrusion upon his traditional role and he won.

The current Assessor is particularly careful to avoid any practice which relates to the political interests of the Supervisors. He refuses to allow assessments to be compiled by his staff according to supervisorial districts, either for use within the Assessor's Office or by a Supervisor. He provides no advance notice to the Board of changes in any assessments. He deals correctly with whatever Supervisor is designated as his department chairman (e.g., he requests this Supervisor to introduce the rare and minor items which he needs to get on the Board agenda), but copies of these requests, supporting information and all other correspondence with the chairman are simultaneously provided to all other Supervisors. Finally, the Assessor's Office will rarely agree to respond to a Supervisor's request for information that the latter can forward to a constituent; the Assessor prefers to respond directly to the citizen.

The Board has never initiated a management audit of the Assessor's Office. The Assessor has his own internal audit and work measurement programs in continuous operation. These are discussed below in connection with his relation to the CAO.

The Assessor's Department also appears to operate independently of the Board with respect to legislative positions and issues. The Assessor has his own legislative assistant, who handles the lobbying activities for the Department in Sacramento. The incumbent goes to Sacramento himself only once or twice a year to lobby or testify on bills. At times, the Board's position and the Assessor's position on various legislative proposals are different, and there is no thought that he should alter his stand because of supervisorial requests to do so.

The Board does have the power to appoint the members of the Assessment Appeals Board (Article 1.5, Section 1622 of Government Code), which grants relief from initial valuations in about 65% of the complaints they agree to hear. Until 1964, the Board itself sat as the appellate body in these matters. The incumbent Assessor recommended that they appoint an independent Assessment Appeals Board, which has led to the three such Boards which now exist. Each of these has three members and an alternate. Each member is appointed by an individual Supervisor.

The Board of Assessment Appeals hears cases only from parties at interest and does not hear actions initiated by third parties or bring appeals of its own accord.

The formal hearings of the Appeals Board have been reduced by about 15% since 1973 through introduction of the use of hearing officers, drawn from Appeals Board members, who conduct individual pre-hearing proceedings to screen the number of cases which must be considered by the full Board. The hearing officers are selected from Appeals Board members by the Executive Office of the Board of Supervisors. They now hear about 1,500 cases per year. The number of cases which actually reach the Appeals Boards is lower than under previous procedures. However, the number of rulings to the contrary of the Assessor's position has increased by 15% since 1973 in cases which do reach the Appeals Boards.

The Assessor is more independent of the officials of cities for whom his office provides the appraisal service than he is of County-level supervision. City officials apparently have little contact with the Assessor. As a matter of policy the Assessor never makes appearances before city councils. Occasionally, over the years, newly elected local officials have approached the office to request assessment information prior to official release of the rolls; here again, the policy is to not release this type of information under any circumstances because budget making bodies tend to "pre-budget" for any increase or decrease. However, assessed value estimates are provided to agencies and school districts which pass ordinances officially requiring such projections. These figures are not public and are available only to the official agency. The Assessor opposed this procedure but was required, after a successful suit by a school district, by the courts to adhere to it.

b. Relations with the CAO

The CAO has one full-time budget analyst who works on the Assessor's budget. The Department makes a studied effort every year to present a budget request which involves no personnel increase and the smallest dollar increase feasible. In this year's proposed 1975-1976 budget, for example, the CAO's recommendation was slightly higher than the Assessor's original request. When the Board voted an across-the-board cut of all departments, to be distributed by the CAO, the latter suggested deletion of approximately 20 positions from the Assessor's staff, but formally requested the Board to allow all elected officials, including the Assessor, full discretion on where the cuts would be made. The Assessor then responded by suggesting that the cut would necessarily delay the implementation of the Appraisal Data System program,

through which some reductions in personnel are being accomplished. Thus, the Board has been asked to take public responsibility for the consequences of sustaining the cut.

The CAO has generally scrutinized the Assessor's budget only in terms of such efficiency criteria as the use of overtime, and the ratio of auto mileage to appraisals. The CAO originally opposed the introduction of an ADS type planning and management information system in the Department. The ADS program began when, in 1970, a group of appraisers in what was then known as the "production planning team" were assigned by the Assessor to explore new appraisal systems. Several other counties had already begun to explore the use of regression analysis appraisal programs, and the adoption of this system, as well as the development of a planning section - the Assessment Standards Division - appear to have resulted from efforts to explore what other agencies were doing rather than suggestions from the County's central authorities.

The CAO has never conducted a management audit of the Assessor's Office and has not worked closely with the staff on major operational improvement projects. In the late sixties, however, the Assessor did work with the CAO to establish a work measurement program. The Assessor then requested eight positions to continue this operation within the Department. The work of most clerical positions and a few of the appraisal positions are now systematically measured.

The CAO has encouraged the Department to take greater part in the joint operation of information systems, and from time to time tries to ensure the sharing of information with other departments such as the Recorder, the Auditor and the County Engineer, who is partially responsible for the mapping on which the appraisal process is based. The Assessor's Department is conservative on information sharing because the State Code requires confidentiality vis-a-vis much of the data the Assessor collects. While the Department maintains the position that exemption applications should be public, it resists sharing information in the County data processing system to avoid exposing confidential material intermingled with public information relating to the assessment role.

The major responsibility for external management audits appears to be carried out not by the CAO but by the State Board of Equalization. The State Board issues rules to assessors throughout the State to insure uniformity in the assessment of property for taxation. The Board also performs an appraisal sample every three years to determine the full cash value of the County and to measure the Assessor's appraisal performance. This review involves a sample of


450 properties. There are normally differences on about half of these, and the Assessor's Office appeals about one-quarter of the disagreements, winning about two of every three appeals. Every six years the State Board performs an organizational study of the Office to evaluate its overall functioning. Copies of these evaluations are sent to the Grand Jury, the Board of Supervisors, and the Superior Court.

The Assessor has great independence in accepting or rejecting recommendations by the State Board, however. The County Assessor's Department has more resources than the State Board; level for level its personnel are more highly paid. Moreover, the foreword to the generally favorable 1972-1973 report indicates that the State review process is rather limited. It states that the Department ". . . is headed by a charismatic Assessor with strong leadership instincts and capabilities. He has surrounded himself with a loyal and highly intelligent management team. When such an organization sets forth as one of its goals 'Obtain the best possible report' and management directs that all interviews with our survey staff be 'monitored', typically by a supervisor of the person being interviewed, it becomes extremely difficult to discover areas where improvement is needed." The State Board's report does not appear until 18 months after its field work is done and the Assessor's Department maintains that the rationale for observing interviews is not to limit them but capture relevant information and comment as rapidly as possible so it can be used internally to make changes as needed.

c. Relations with Other Department Heads

The formal relationship of the Assessor to the Auditor, the Tax Collector, and ultimately to other spending agencies, is indicated in Chart XIX. The Assessor maintains a close working relationship with the Auditor, who receives the tax assessment roll and determines amounts to be levied as property taxes. There is also a working relationship with the County Engineer, whose mapping functions are actually supervised by personnel from the Assessor's Department. The incumbent Assessor believes it would be more efficient if this function were moved into his Department, so that surveyors, now on the payroll of the Engineering Department, would formally report to the Chief of the Assessor's Mapping Division. He would also like to establish closer relationships with or absorb some of the duties of the Recorder, who currently is not only the registrar of voters but the recorder of real estate deeds.

CHART XIX: ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE AUDITOR, TAX COLLECTOR AND THE SPENDING AGENCIES



While there are the normal civil service relationships with the Civil Service Commission and the Personnel Department, the Assessor's Department has worked to develop its own internal Affirmative Action effort, rather than working through Personnel. A retraining program involving the upgrading of eight minority employees of the Department to appraiser status has been tried and a larger, two-year program, also involving personnel already in the Department, has been put into operation. The Assessor has, however, exercised his prerogative to reject the Personnel Department recommendation that the Department seek or accept Federal funds to upgrade minority appraisers without examination.

The Assessor is also a member of several multi-agency committees for such purposes as coordination among department heads, general policy reviews in connection with regional planning, and the operation of the Redevelopment Agency. The Department also participates in the interdepartmental committee charged with review and approval of the use of data processing facilities. On the State and national fronts, the incumbent is active in such professional groups as the International Association of Assessors, the State Association of County Assessors, the National Tax Administrators, and the Western Tax Administrators.

3. Apparent Differences in Status, Flexible Authority and Resources Because of Independently Elected Position

The Assessor attributes the very real independence of his position and Department to his direct election, rather than to his function. Note, however, that the Assessor's role also by its very nature emphasizes developing efficient operations internally and maintaining a high degree of confidentiality. Whether the practice of acquainting the public with assessment and appraisal practice directly, rather than receiving Board approval or responding to Board-defined priorities, is an outgrowth of method of selection or function is harder to say. Many of the procedures of the Department seem to be perceived not only as efficient but also as improving public relations. For example, the introduction of the ADS will ultimately decrease on-site inspections of property, once it is clear that records are accurate. The Assessor uses sales verification letters to provide data needed to operate the data program, but follow up letters and phone calls are not as frequently used as in other counties. The reduction of small business reappraisal to once in three years is also related to the equation which determines costs, returns and public acceptance. The Assessor also publishes lists of assessments in newspapers as well as sending taxpayers individual notification of increases. The State Board regards the dual system as overly expensive; the Assessor urges it as an opportunity to get the widest public inspection of the results of appraisal processes.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS

The budget preparation process is one of the most important policy making processes in the County. Because of its complexity we have reserved the detailed discussion of that process to an appendix so that the reader will be able to follow the pattern in detail. The appendix should be read as an addendum to the report section on the CAO. The CAO plays a major role in the allocation of resources through the budget process. The most critical aspect of his policy making and resource allocation function is in the initial preparation of the budget, where he can cut or expand programs, in negotiation with department heads, and make significant modifications, without initial, detailed Board approval.

The budget process is a twelve month process controlled and coordinated by the CAO. The monthly timetable for budgeting is as follows:

- | | | |
|----|--|-------------------|
| 1- | Budget Division prepares departmental budget instructions, including population estimates and equipment prices, and due dates, etc. | September |
| 2- | Budget Division transmits departmental budget instructions together with those budget forms that are supplied by the Chief Administrative Officer | Early October |
| 3- | Auditor-Controller (Accounting Division) transmits his detailed budget instructions to the departments together with forms supplied by the Auditor-Controller and controlled by the Auditor-Controller | Mid-October |
| 4- | Departments prepare requests (appropriations and revenues, together with estimates of current year actual expenditures and revenues). | November-December |
| 5- | Budget staff prepares forecast of forthcoming budget including probable appropriations, reserves, revenues, current year surplus, assessed valuation and probable tax rate. | November-December |
| | Departments submit requests to the Auditor-Controller and to the Chief Administrative Officer. (Certain requests are checked by the Auditor-Controller and transmitted in turn to the Chief Administrative Officer.) | January |

- 6-

Annual budget policy luncheon at which time the Chief Administrative Officer discusses with the entire staff the budget forecast as prepared by the Budget staff and outlines overall budget policy for the forthcoming year.

Chief Administrative Office staff conducts review of all budget requests and prepares reports, in prescribed form to the Chief of the Budget Division. Reports are reviewed by the Chief of the Budget Division, the Assistant CAO and the Chief Administrative Officer.

Early January
- 7-

Department of Personnel conducts annual Salary Survey in cooperation with other public agencies. The Survey covers the salaries paid by private employers to certain "benchmark" positions.

Department of Personnel conducts special studies of salaries not covered by the Salary Survey or where inequities have been claimed.

January and February
- 8-

Department of Personnel reviews all new positions recommended in the budget to determine proper classification and allocation.

Before the start of budget hearings the Budget Division, with the cooperation of all budget staff, prepares revised budget forecast of forthcoming year, including probable appropriations and reserve requirements, revenues, surplus remaining from current year operations, assessed valuation and probable tax rate.

February, March, and April
- 9-

Budget hearings held by Chief Administrative Officer with department heads. In attendance are department head and his staff, Chief Administrative Officer, Chief of the Budget Division and Budget staff man.

At the conclusion of each budget hearing, staff men immediately revise the budget report to reflect the decisions reached.

March and April

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS (Cont'd.)

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|--|---------------------------|
| Budget Analysts assist Chief Administrative Officer in preparing "Budget Message" - <u>Recommendation to the Board of Supervisors for the Proposed Budget.</u> | Late April |
| Chief Administrative Officer submits his annual Recommendations for the Proposed Budget - "Budget Message." | Late April (Last Tuesday) |
| Board of Supervisors considers recommendations of Chief Administrative Officer for Proposed Budget and hears any department head not in agreement with the recommendations. (Some departments may desire to be heard at the time of the public hearings in June.) Board adopts the Proposed Budget and orders the Auditor-Controller to have it printed. | Late April (Last Tuesday) |
| 10- Chief Administrative Officer supplies Auditor-Controller with any detail of Proposed Budget not carried in CAO recommendation ("Cut Sheets"). | Early May |
| Auditor arranges for printing of Proposed Budget. | Early May |
| Department of Personnel reports on allocation or classification of all new positions recommended in the budget. | Early May |
| Budget analysts post positions approved in Proposed Budget to Salary Ordinance sections prepared by Department of Personnel. | May |
| 11- Department of Personnel submits annual salary recommendations. | Mid-May |
| Board of Supervisors holds salary hearings with employee organizations, taxpayer groups and department heads. | Late May |
| 12- Board of Supervisors closes salary hearings. Department of Personnel and County Counsel prepare the Salary Ordinance for the new fiscal year. | Late May |

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS (Cont'd.)

- | | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Salary Ordinance submitted to Board of Supervisors by County Counsel for approval. (Salary Ordinance includes authorization of positions by department, salary schedules for all positions and miscellaneous employment provisions.) | Late May |
| 13- Budget analysts convert each budget to reflect new salary schedules and costs and assemble any necessary changes to the Proposed Budget, including changes resulting from legislation and from the change in conditions or information since the time the original recommendations were prepared. | Late May and early June |
| Board of Supervisors holds public hearings on the Proposed Budget, continued from day to day, until all persons are heard, but not exceeding ten days. (Some department heads and commissions may also appear if they are in disagreement with the Chief Administrative Officer's recommended budget.) | Early June |
| Chief Administrative Officer submits final budget change recommendations (including any additional positions not previously authorized) to Board of Supervisors before close of hearings on the Proposed Budget. | Early June |
| Board closes public hearings and takes budget under advisement. | Mid-June |
| 14- Board considers the budget and determines upon a final budget on the basis of the Chief Administrative Officer's final change letter and other changes determined upon. (No item can be added, however, unless previously on file in writing with the Board of Supervisors.) | |
| Board approves the budget and instructs Auditor-Controller to prepare the final budget resolution. | Late June |

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS (Cont'd.)

Board of Supervisors adopts budget resolution as prepared by Auditor-Controller including appropriations, reserves and revenues other than the property tax for all jurisdictions under the control of the Board.	Late June
15- Budget staff men correct Budget Reports, Salaries and Employee Benefits detail sheets to reflect final budget, assemble work papers and submit to Budget Division for processing and filing.	Early July
Assessor submits tentative assessed valuation roll to Board for equalization hearings.	Early July
Auditor-Controller (Accounting Division) closes books on prior year's business and determines surplus available to finance new year's operations.	Early August
Auditor-Controller (Accounting Division) calculates tax rates.	Late August
Board of Supervisors adjusts revenue estimates, if indicated, and adopts tax rates. (Appropriations and reserves may not be adjusted.)	Late August- Early September
Auditor-Controller arranges for printing of final budget which is available in September.	Mid-September

In the fall of each year, the CAO transmits to the Department permanent departmental budget instructions. The first part of these are line item budget instructions. The second is a set of instructions for preparing the program budget requests. The CAO's Office draws up these instructions and the administrative analysts are then responsible for analyzing each departmental budget in accordance with their conformity to the instructions.

Most attention is initially focused on the line item budget, which displays actual monetary increases in the major activities of the Department. The program budget indicates the objectives of each departmental program and sub-program, along with program elements, target goals, and any measurable indicators of program effort. A portion of the program budget of the Department of Communications follows as an illustration.

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS (Cont'd.)AN EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM BUDGET: DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONSProgram IIICommunications Operations

Objective:

To continue to provide reliable County mail service and telephone operating service for efficient operation of County government.

Sub-Program III-AMail Delivery

Objective:

To continue reliable County mail service for better County government operations through maximum utilization of manpower and routing.

Element:

Delivery and Collection

Targets:

1. To continue to pick up and deliver within eight hours or less all mail and other items required for County departments.
2. Expand system to include all department's County mail.

Element:

Sorting and Metering

Targets:

1. Increase amount of mail metered for departments.
2. Meter mail for more departments.

Indicators of Sub-Program Effort1973-741974-75

Mail Stops Made

998

1,074

Miles Driven

432,824

439,300

Pieces of Mail

3,179,696

3,338,680

Mail Metered

\$ 245,229

\$ 250,619

Sub-Program Budget Summary

	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Est. Actual</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>Recommend</u>	<u>Change from 1973-1974 Allowance</u>
Gross Approp.	\$ 647,341	\$ 647,341	\$ 818,663	\$ 707,481*	\$ 60,140
Costs Applied	460,797	242,797	254,300	254,300	(-206,497)
Net Approp.	186,544	404,544	564,363	453,181	266,637
Revenue	2,161	2,161	1,997	2,161	-
Net Co. Cost	184,383	402,383	562,366	451,020	266,637
Budg. Pos.	41.1	-	57.7	41.1	-

* Includes \$22,061 for program administrative overhead. This figure was computed by prorating total departmental administrative overhead to each program on a percentage basis.

AN EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM BUDGET: DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd.)Sub-Program III-A (Cont'd.)Discussion

1. The sub-program objective requires expeditious pick-up and delivery of mail to promote County operational efficiency. The services provides delivery of all items picked up within eight working hours and saves the County several hundred thousand dollars per year because of the volume and unusual nature of many of the items handled. The mail service will handle 3,338,363 items, many quite large and bulky, for a total cost of \$564,363.

The increase is reflected in services and supplies, primarily for postal rate increases. The decrease in costs applied is the result of DPSS assuming its own metering service.

2. 1973-74 Goal Accomplishments - The Department met its major goal for this sub-program by continuing to provide eight (8) hour or one-day mail service to all subscribing County departments, even though there was an increase of mail brought about by the energy conservation program.

Sub-Program III-BTelephone Operations

Objective: To continue to provide reliable County telephone operations service for better County government operation through maximum utilization of manpower and equipment.

Element: Telephone Service

Target: 1. Answer all incoming calls within three rings.

Element: Analysis and Installation

Target: 1. Analyze telephone requisitions and provide for installations within two weeks of request.

Element: Training and Information

Target: 1. Train all new operators in functions of County government and in telephone switchboard techniques.

<u>Indicators of Sub-Program Effort</u>	<u>1973-74</u>	<u>1974-75</u>
Positions of Switchboard	394	399
Load/Staffing	344	339
Station Lines	38,375	38,900
Telephone Requisitions	7,150*	5,048

* Decrease is due to implementation of Civic Center Centrex in 1974.

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS (Cont'd.)

The program explanations are general and are intended to give the Supervisors, and the public, an indication of what funds are to be spent on what departmental activities and what results can be expected. Measuring results through indicators of program efforts is often an inexact art but the indicators tend to provide a sense of activity increases or decreases which can be related to changes in funding. For example, in the case of the Communications Department program illustrated, a measurable increase in program efforts resulted in a slight increase in program funding.

The administrative analysts are expected to speak for the CAO in the process of assisting the departments to prepare the annual budget. As in most budgeting processes, there is a tradition of increasing requests out of proportion to departmental needs at the early stages. This tradition relates to each department's view that in order to provide adequate services to the County, it should be funded at comfortable levels. The job of the analyst is to meet the Department's requests head on and to compare them with the stated requirements and limitations in the budget guidelines, as well as with the measured results indicators in the program budget. It is up to the individual analysts to assess the guideline messages and pare down or increase requests with the Department head. The analysts share the double burden of negotiating alterations in departmental budgets and defending any alterations by providing reasoning superior to that presented by the departments, while still maintaining solid working relations with the departments.

The budget process for 1975-76 was somewhat different from previous years in that a special budget advisory committee was created in the aftermath of a Board order to cut the Budget 15%. The CAO recommended the creation of the committee. The Board Special Advisory Committee was composed of representatives from each Board office, the Personnel Department and the CAO's Office. This immersion in the budget process was meant to provide Board staff with greater sensitivity to the real problems of finding areas in which to make such a cut in the context of departmental programming. This process was also the first time the Board staff looked at original requests from Departments with the cooperation of the CAO. Heretofore, while Supervisors did obtain requests and Budget Division proposals in confidence, the CAO's Office followed general policy of holding these proposals in confidence until the budget was completed and circulated to the Board just prior to the holding of budget hearings by the Supervisors.

There are a number of things the CAO does not do in the context of the budget process. First, the CAO's Office reviews the budget in terms of overall, Countywide service needs and senior CAO officials insist that the analysts do not assess service or program needs by supervisorial (geographical) districts. The CAO's Office does not officially keep a running tabulation on variations in budget from district-to-district. Second, while the CAO does publish a program budget, it does not appear to be treated as a central working document by the Board yet. The budgeting process is incremental in nature rather than programmatically defined.

APPENDIX I: THE BUDGET PROCESS (Cont'd.)

This means that most of the analysis by the administrative analysts is performed in relation to the current year's requested increase rather than by assessing the total amount. For example, if a department requested an increase of \$50,000 for a particular activity, bringing the total funding for the activity to \$150,000, the analyses performed would concern itself principally with the additional \$50,000 rather than with the base of \$100,000. Traditionally no significant amount of zero based budgeting has been performed. However, because of the mandated 15% cut this year, many departments were forced to take a closer look at their total programs, which did involve zero basing in some cases. Third, the CAO does not use the budget to force departments to meet programmatic goals. His focus is heavily on presently mandated programs rather than on using the budget to encourage program development. The original development of new programs is the responsibility of the departments themselves. Fourth, the CAO has no formal power or authority to reward or punish departments for achieving or not achieving their stated program goals and objectives as outlined in the program analysis.

As indicated in Table III the Board rarely makes deep inroads into the specific determinations the CAO has made. It may expand or reduce some items, require changes in general spending, and add fundings in response to arguments presented by community groups and citizens but rarely as a collectivity examines the budget line by line or rearranges CAO/Department priorities in great magnitudes.

Throughout the fiscal year, the CAO also controls the budget in that he has the authority to reallocate monies within a departmental budget to cover projects or other expenses which arise. Any proposal requiring a fiscal commitment from a department must go to the CAO before it appears on the agenda to be considered by the Board. Thus, throughout the year the budgeting process not only serves as a device for analyzing the needs of departments but also for rating changes through the need for the departments to submit requests to the CAO before they go to the Board. The CAO may require that supplementary documentation be added before a matter proceeds to the agenda, and may enter into discussions with the department prior to the appearance of the item, as a consequence of this responsibility for overseeing changes made by departments in their budgets.

APPENDIX II

TENURE OF ALL LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERVISORS BY DISTRICT1st District

1911 - 1915	C.D. Manning
1915 - 1918	J.J. Hamilton
1918 - 1926	Prescott F. Cogswell
1926 - 1930	Fred T. Beaty
1930 - 1934	Hugh A. Thatcher
1934 - 1938	H.C. Legg
1938 - 1950	William A. Smith
1950 - 1958	H.C. Legg
1958 - 1972	Frank Bonelli
1972 -	Peter F. Schabarum

2nd District

1911 - 1913	H.D. McCabe
1913 - 1918	Richard H. Norton
1918 - 1928	J.H. Bean
1928 - 1933	Frank L. Shaw
1933 - 1945	Gordon L. McDonough
1945 - 1952	Leonard J. Roach
1952 -	Kenneth Hahn

3rd District

1911 - 1914	S.A. Butler
1914 - 1926	F.E. Woodley
1926 - 1930	Sidney T. Graves
1930 - 1932	J. Don Mahaffey
1932 - 1934	Harry M. Baine
1934 - 1958	John Anson Ford
1958 - 1974	Ernest E. Debs
1974 -	Edmund D. Edelman

4th District

1911 - 1913	C.J. Nellis
1913 - 1917	W.E. Hinshaw
1917 - 1930	R.F. McClellan
1930 - 1936	John R. Quinn
1936 - 1938	L.M. Ford
1938 - 1944	Oscar Hauge
1944 - 1953	Raymond V. Darby
1953 - 1972	Burton W. Chase
1972 -	James A. Hayes

5th District

1911 - 1917	R.W. Pridham
1917 - 1921	Jonathan S. Dodge
1921 - 1932	Henry W. Wright
1932 - 1956	Roger W. Jessup
1956 - 1972	Warren M. Dorn
1972 -	Baxter Ward

APPENDIX III

MAJOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT STUDIES
CONDUCTED BY THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
1958 through 1974

- 1958 --A management audit of the Road Department.
- Organization study of the County mental health function
 in accordance with Short-Doyle legislation.
- 1959 --A management audit of the County Engineer's Architecture
 Division.
- 1960 --A management audit of the foster licensing program.
- An in-depth study of County Airport operations.
- Unification of janitorial services under the Department
 of Building Services.
- 1961 --A management audit of the County Adult and Juvenile
 Parole program.
- Los Angeles City and County Jail consolidation.
- A management audit of the Department of Small Craft
 Harbors.
- 1963 --Los Angeles City and County Health consolidation.
- Study of the need for and establishment of a County-
 wide Records Management Program.
- A management audit of Countywide laundry operations.
- A management audit of the Probation Department.
- 1964 --Consolidation of crafts functions in the Mechanical
 Department.
- Development of the Public Health License Ordinance.
- Conduct of pilot work measurement studies.

APPENDIX III (Cont'd.)

MAJOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT STUDIES
CONDUCTED BY THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
1958 through 1974

- 1965
- Los Angeles City and County consolidation of Public Defender functions.
 - Formation of a Management Services function in the Chief Administrative Office and establishment of a work measurement program.
 - A management audit of the Department of Public Social Services.
- 1966
- A management audit of the Sheriff's jail medical operations.
 - A management audit of the Health Department.
 - A management audit of the Parks & Recreation Department.
- 1967
- Study of the Automated Voting System, including staff assistance to the Election Devices Committee and implementation of the Vote Recorder Voting System.
 - A management audit of the Adoptions Department.
 - An in-depth study of the feasibility of unifying County health services activities.
 - A management audit of the Communications Department.
 - Study of the need for and establishment of a County Occupational Health Program.
- 1968
- Reorganization and management audit of the Medical Examiner-Coroner.
 - A management audit of the Department of Building Services.
- 1969
- A management audit of the Bureau of Medical Social Services.
 - A management audit of the Mechanical Department.
 - A management audit of the Purchasing & Stores Department and study of Purchasing Warehouse needs.

APPENDIX III (Cont'd.)

MAJOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT STUDIES
CONDUCTED BY THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
1958 through 1974

- 1970
- A management audit of DPSS Fiscal Division operations.
 - Planning and conduct of the 1970 General Election.
 - Study and planning for conversion of the County telephone system to Centrex.
- 1971
- Study of reorganization of human services activities.
 - Earthquake Task Force and facility replacement needs study.
 - Reorganization of County drug abuse activities.
 - Consolidation of Child Support functions under the District Attorney.
 - A management audit of the County Clerk.
- 1972
- Facility Acquisition and Management System study leading to formation of the Department of Facilities.
 - A management audit of the Department of Data Processing.
 - A management audit of EYOA.
 - A management audit of the Public Guardian functions of the Public Administrator.
 - Reorganization of the County Weed Abatement program and transfer from the Fire Department to the Agriculture Commission.
 - Development of licensing program for Board and Care facilities.
- 1973
- A management audit of the Probation Department.
 - Planning for and implementation of Federal adult welfare takeover (HR-1).
 - Investigation of the Sheriff's Video File System.
 - Management review of the Los Angeles Region Criminal Justice Planning Board.

APPENDIX III (Cont'd.)

MAJOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT STUDIES
CONDUCTED BY THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
1958 through 1974

1974

- Extensive transportation planning and transportation system improvement study efforts.
- Extensive efforts related to the energy crisis.
- A management audit of the Regional Planning Commission.
- A management audit of the Sheriff's Department (underway).
- Study of the need for an organization of an environment protection agency (underway).
- Development of a tentative plan for implementation of the "911" emergency telephone number (underway).
- A management audit of the Animal Control Department (underway).
- A management audit of the Air Pollution Control District Hearing Board.
- A management audit of the Public Defender (underway).
- A management audit of the Department of Urban Affairs (underway).
- A management audit of the Human Relations Commission (underway).

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